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Article 3

Market Fragmenting Regulation
WHY GASOLINE COSTS SO MUCH
(AND WHY IT’S GOING TO COST MORE)
Andrew P. Morriss† & Nathaniel Stewart††
INTRODUCTION
Virtually everyone holds an opinion on what is wrong
with gasoline markets. Some critics argue that gasoline costs
too much, fattening greedy oil barons at the expense of
consumers.1 Some link reducing oil producers’ profits to
stopping terrorism.2 Others contend that gasoline costs too
little, subsidizing suburban sprawl and gas-guzzling SUVs at
†
H. Ross & Helen Workman Professor of Law & Professor of Business
Administration, University of Illinois; Galen J. Roush Professor of Business Law &
Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Senior Scholar at the
Mercatus Center at George Mason University, and Senior Fellow, Property &
Environment Research Center, Bozeman, Montana. A.B. Princeton University; J.D.,
M.Pub.Aff. University of Texas; Ph.D. (Economics) Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. The authors thank the Mercatus Center for funding the research that
made this paper possible and A.F. Alhajji and Robert L. Bradley for comments. Marc
Demers provided excellent research assistance. Andrew Dorchak provided his always
excellent reference assistance. All errors are, of course, the sole responsibility of the
authors.
††
Fellow in Regulatory Studies at the Mercatus Center at George Mason
University, and Roe Fellow in Law at the Property & Environment Research Center,
Bozeman, Montana. B.A. Hillsdale College; M.A. John Carroll University; J.D. Case
Western Reserve University School of Law.
1
See, e.g., Press Release, Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi, With Skyrocketing
Gas Prices, Americans Can No Longer Afford Rubber Stamp Congress (Apr. 24, 2006),
available at http://www.house.gov/pelosi/press/releases/April06/Rubberstamp.html
(“With record gas prices, record CEO pay packages, and record oil company profits,
Speaker Hastert and the Majority Congress continue to give the American people
empty rhetoric rather than join Democrats who are working to lower gas prices now.”);
Press Release, Sierra Club, Update on Congressional Action this Week on Several
Environmental Fronts (Nov. 8, 2005), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/
pressroom/releases/pr2005-11-08.asp (discussing Sierra Club’s calling on Congress to
“put money back in the pockets of Americans who need it, not in the coffers of
multinational oil companies”); Surges in Energy Prices, The Nader Page, Mar. 13, 2004,
http://www.nader.org/interest/031304.html (“The expanding volume of consumer
dollars here are going to the oil industry.”).
2
See Gary S. Becker, Let’s Make Gasoline Prices Even Higher, BUS. WK.,
May 31, 2004, at 24, available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/
04_22/b3885046_mz007.htm.
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the expense of the environment.3 Web sites track gasoline
prices4 and grocery stores sell low-cost fuel to lure shoppers.5
Policy makers debate whether gas taxes should be cut to lower
the cost of living;6 need to be increased to make drivers pay the
full cost of their behavior;7 or whether gas taxes should be a
user fee for highway use.8 The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), congressional committees, and a host of state
governments have repeatedly investigated gasoline prices,
searching for someone to blame when prices rise.
These debates treat gasoline as a fungible commodity,
widely traded in a national or international market. And for
most Americans, gasoline gives every appearance of being just
such a commodity—you can fill up in Boston or Dallas, Los
Angeles or Cleveland, from pumps that look much the same
from city to city, and your car will run without noticeable
differences in performance regardless of where you bought gas.
But Gulf Coast refinery closures in the wake of Hurricanes
3

See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Seeds for a Geo-Green Party, N.Y. TIMES,
June 16, 2006, at A31 (calling for a $1 per gallon gasoline tax to “increase the price of
gasoline to a level that would ensure that many of the most promising alternatives—
ethanol, biodiesel, coal gasification, solar energy, nuclear energy and wind—would all
be economically competitive with oil and thereby reduce both our dependence on crude
and our emissions of greenhouse gases”); Jacob Weisberg, I Smell Gas, SLATE, Apr. 26,
2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2140613 (“Cheap gasoline imposes its own costs on
society: greenhouse gas emissions, air pollution and its attendant health risks, traffic
congestion, and accidents. The ideal way to cope with these externalities would be with
higher gas taxes or a carbon tax.”).
4
See, e.g., UCAN’s Gasoline Price Tracking Service, http://home.fueltracker.com/
home.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2007) (providing low gas prices for San Diego County);
GasBuddy.com, http://www.gasbuddy.com (last visited Apr. 12, 2007) (locator for low
gas prices in the United States and Canada).
5
Kathy Showalter, Grocers See Gold in Gas, Add Discounted Pumps, BUS.
FIRST OF COLUMBUS, June 12, 2006, available at http://columbus.bizjournals.com/
columbus/stories/2006/06/12/story3.html (describing trend toward subsidized gas prices
as means of luring customers to grocery stores); U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: MERGERS, STRUCTURAL CHANGE, AND ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT 42 (2004) [hereinafter FTC, MERGERS] (stating that “the FTC observed
significant growth in low-price gasoline retailing by supermarkets, club stores, and
mass merchandisers”).
6
See, e.g., Russell Nichols, Bill Proposes Gas Tax Cut to Save 21 Cents a
Gallon, BOSTON GLOBE, May 11, 2006, at B1, available at http://www.boston.com/
news/local/articles/2006/05/11/bill_proposes_gas_tax_cut_to_save_21_cents_a_gallon
(discussing proposed temporary repeal of Massachusetts gasoline tax to reduce cost of
living for “working families and small businesses”).
7
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 3 (calling for gasoline tax increases).
8
David J. Forkenbrock & Paul F. Hanley, Mileage-Based Road User
Charges, PUBLIC ROADS (Mar./Apr. 2006), http://www.tfhrc.gov/pubrds/06mar/02.htm
(“For almost a century, the motor fuel tax has been the mainstay of highway finance in
the United States. This method has the advantage of being roughly proportional to the
distance traveled and thus has the desirable attribute of being a pay-as-you-go form of
user charge.”).
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Rita and Katrina highlighted the fragility of gasoline markets,9
and significant differences in gasoline prices throughout the
United States over the last few years10 have raised questions
about whether a national market really exists. If the gasoline
market is not a national one, there are serious implications for
both consumer welfare and public policy. Broad, national
markets are able to absorb the impact of regulations at lower
costs to the consumer than are narrow, fragmented markets.
Moreover, fragmented markets offer the potential for implicit
collusion among producers, collusion that can be facilitated by
regulatory measures.
A recent regional price spike in Phoenix, Arizona
illustrated the fragmented nature of U.S. gasoline markets. On
July 30, 2003, the pipeline supplying gasoline to Phoenix
ruptured, cutting gasoline supplies to Phoenix by 30%.11
Phoenix gas stations sought alternate supplies from West
Coast refineries, offering to pay higher prices to bid the
gasoline away from California retailers. These West Coast
refineries had limited gasoline supplies, however, after earlier
unplanned refinery closures had left them with lower than
normal inventories. Because the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) requires Phoenix to use a special blend of
gasoline to control air pollution, gasoline from nearby Tucson
could not be sold in Phoenix until the EPA waived the boutique
fuel requirement on August 20.12 Once the waiver was granted,

9

See U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE MACRO-ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY
EFFECTS OF HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA: AN UPDATE 19-20 (2005), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6669/09-29-EffectsOfHurricanes.pdf
(describing
impact of Hurricanes Rita and Katrina on refineries); U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N,
GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES: THE DYNAMIC OF SUPPLY, DEMAND, AND COMPETITION 28-29
(2005) [hereinafter FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES] (noting that as a result of Ivan,
crude oil production immediately fell by 83% and continued below normal for several
months, with reductions in crude from Venezuela also occurring due to tanker delays
caused by the storm).
10
CARL E. BEHRENS & CAROL GLOVER, CONG. RES. SERV. ISSUE BRIEF
IB10134, GASOLINE PRICES: POLICIES AND PROPOSALS 1 (Oct. 27, 2005), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/56862.pdf (In the five years before 2004,
“gasoline prices demonstrated a great deal of regional volatility but less of an increase
at the national level.”).
11
This example is drawn from FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9,
at 1-6.
12
The delay was due to Arizona’s delay in requesting a waiver, not the EPA’s
processing. The waiver was requested on August 19 and granted on August 20. Id. at
3-4.
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gas from Tucson was trucked to Phoenix, raising prices in
Tucson but lowering them in Phoenix.13
U.S. gasoline markets are fragmented and that
fragmentation stems from over a century of often inconsistent,
overlapping regulations of gasoline and petroleum markets.
This article charts the sources and extent of that fragmentation
and its likely effects on the domestic gasoline market. We
highlight the dangers of following the current regulatory trend
toward additional fragmentation and recommend that policy
makers and industry analysts acknowledge the market’s fragile
condition and take remedial steps to avert future crises. Part I
outlines the characteristics of competitive markets and
examines the structure of the gasoline market as shaped by the
traits of gasoline, refining, distribution, and crude oil. Part II
turns to the regulatory measures that affect the market for
gasoline, tracing the impact of economic and environmental
regulation. We then identify the incentives created by the
structure of U.S. environmental regulation that lead to the
creation of regulatory market externalities and we suggest
measures to reduce those incentives and so avoid market
fragmentation. Part III concludes with recommendations for
avoiding this problem in the future.
I.

COMPETITIVE MARKETS AND THE MARKET FOR GASOLINE

The impact of regulation on gasoline markets can be
understood only against the backdrop of the role market forces
play in competitive markets and an understanding of the
complex nature of gasoline production and marketing. This
section provides a baseline for our analysis of the regulatory
market externalities created by economic and environmental
regulations.

13
Id. at 5-6. Tucson prices also rose because the pipeline passed through
Tucson on its way to Phoenix. The break, which was between the two cities, prevented
the Phoenix-blend gasoline from being shipped to Phoenix, reducing storage capacity in
Tucson and thereby reducing supplies in Tucson. Id. at 6. Although the waiver
resolved the immediate problem, the use of waivers discourages investment in capacity
to produce the boutique fuels, potentially worsening the problem. NAT’L PETROLEUM
COUNCIL, OBSERVATIONS ON PETROLEUM PRODUCT SUPPLY I-19 (2004) [hereinafter
NPC, OBSERVATIONS].
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The Role of Competition

The United States was founded with an eye toward
creating a national market.14 Preserving that national market
thus enjoys a longstanding tradition in American
Economic theory
jurisprudence—and with good reason.15
teaches that markets discipline firms, forcing them to cut costs
to compete and survive.16 Recent business news demonstrates
that this is not simply a textbook concept: Wal-Mart has forced
retail costs down;17 competition from Toyota and Honda has
pushed General Motors to force its suppliers to drastically cut
costs; and the competition from Southwest Airlines has driven
passengers’ costs down significantly in many markets.18 This
14

William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause: A
Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1369 (1994) (“In light
of the nation’s experience under the Articles of Confederation, there was a consensus
after the adoption of the Constitution that the federal government should be able to
exercise national authority to facilitate a national market.”); see also Paul B. Stephan,
Redistributive Litigation—Judicial Innovation, Private Expectations, and the Shadow
of International Law, 88 VA. L. REV. 789, 820-23 (2002) (describing courts’ role in
protecting the national market from “predatory localism” under the Constitution). The
Founders understood the importance of expanding the internal market beyond the
borders of the individual states. As Richard Posner has written, a key role of the
Commerce Clause was to prevent states from erecting barriers to interstate commerce:
“When so interpreted, the commerce clause becomes a charter of free trade—a subject
of detailed economic analysis since Adam Smith—and, relatedly, an element of an
efficient federalism.” Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document,
56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 17 (1987); see also Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Meaning of
“Commerce” in the Commerce Clause, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 789 (2006) (analyzing
contemporary sources and concluding that the Commerce Clause was intended to
address commercial activity); Nathaniel Stewart & Andrew P. Morriss, Hedgerow
Economics: The Marriage of Green Policy and Economic Regulation (working paper on
file with authors).
15
See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 38 (2d ed. 1980) (“Over the long pull, there is one simple criterion for
the survival of a business enterprise: Profits must be nonnegative. . . . [F]ailure to
satisfy this criterion means ultimately that a firm will disappear from the economic
scene.”).
16
F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 20-21 (3d ed. 1990).
17
See Steven Greenhouse, Mixed Grade for Wal-Mart on Report Card, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2005, at C4 (“A respected economic forecasting firm, Global Insight,
found that by keeping its prices low and pressuring rival retailers over the last 19
years, Wal-Mart has kept the Consumer Price Index 3.1 percent below what it would
have otherwise been.”); Emek Basker, Selling A Cheaper Mousetrap: Wal-Mart’s Effect
on Retail Prices 1, 28 (Univ. of Mo., Working Paper 04-01, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=484903 (finding price impacts on
commodity goods from Wal-Mart stores opening).
18
See, e.g., Steven A. Morrison, Actual, Adjacent, and Potential Competition:
Estimating the Full Effect of Southwest Airlines, 35 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL’Y 239, 25354 (2001) (estimating savings from competition from Southwest at $12.9 billion in
1998).

944

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:3

competition has costs for some market participants: Wal-Mart’s
competitors have suffered from Wal-Mart’s low prices;19
General Motors’ suppliers are fewer and leaner and their
workforces are smaller and less well paid as a result of G.M.’s
cost-cutting;20 and the major American “legacy” airlines have
been regularly forced into bankruptcy, cutting their employees’
compensation by the upstarts.21 It also has benefits: retail
customers, car purchasers, and airline passengers all pay
substantially less as a result of the market pressures produced
by competition.
The competitive pressures in these examples derive
from the breadth and depth of the markets in which these
firms operate. Because a bottle of a particular shampoo in
Dallas is (aside from its location) identical to a bottle of the
same shampoo in Boston or, for that matter, a bottle in
Bombay, the market is deep. Because there are many possible
shampoos that deliver roughly equivalent hair-cleaning
experiences, the market is broad. As a result, Wal-Mart can
buy shampoo to resell in a market that is both deep and broad.
If a bottle of shampoo costs less in one location than in another
(taking transportation costs into account), Wal-Mart can buy in
the cheaper location and ship the bottle to the more expensive
market. If the maker of one brand raises its price, Wal-Mart
can buy from a different manufacturer. The same is true in our
other examples. If auto parts can be made more cheaply in
Mexico than in Detroit, General Motors can obtain parts from
Mexico instead of from Detroit. If the profitability of airline
fares is higher in one market than another, Southwest can shift
planes from the market where the profits are lower to the
market where the profits are higher. Of course, by shifting
resources to the higher-margin markets, market pressures
increase in the more profitable markets as supply in them
increases, and decrease in the less profitable markets as supply

19
See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart, Driving Workers and
Supermarkets Crazy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2003, § 4, at 3 (“Wal-Mart has already
helped push more than two dozen national supermarket chains into bankruptcy over
the past decade.”).
20
See Jeffrey McCracken & Lee Hawkins Jr., Buyouts Promise a Big Boon for
GM, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2006, at A2 (describing General Motors’ payment to workers
to leave it and its supplier, Delphi).
21
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-836, LEGACY AIRLINES
MUST FURTHER REDUCE COSTS TO RESTORE PROFITABILITY 41-44 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04836.pdf (discussing impact of low-cost carriers’
entry).

2007]

WHY GASOLINE COSTS SO MUCH

945

there decreases. Over time, therefore, prices tend to converge
across linked markets.22
Consider the counterfactual: What if trade barriers
blocked markets from expanding and deepening? What if
shampoo sold in Dallas were required to be formulated
differently from shampoo sold in Boston?23 What if auto parts
made in Mexico were subject to lengthy inspections when they
were brought into the United States?24 What if airlines needed
regulatory permission to fly between cities and that permission
could be denied if allowing a flight would injure competitors?25
These barriers to trade would fragment the relevant markets
and reduce competitive pressures. This would benefit existing
providers of shampoo, auto parts, and air travel, as well as
existing providers of other competing products, since the
reduction in market pressures could allow market incumbents
opportunities to charge supra-competitive prices or reap other
benefits from reduced competition. The costs of fragmenting
these markets would fall on consumers, who would face higher
prices for the goods and services. Fragmented markets also
raise important equity considerations, since consumers in such
markets will face different prices for similar goods.26
Curbing market forces has effects on more than price.
Competition pushes firms to innovate in product design, cut
costs in production, find new markets, and engage in a host of
As discussed below,
additional beneficial activities.27
22
Before they actually converge, of course, new events may produce a new set
of price pressures.
23
This is not entirely fanciful. Guatemala requires sugar sold there to have
vitamin A added, a requirement that serves no purpose other than to protect
Guatemala’s high-cost sugar industry from imports. See CANADIAN AGRI-FOOD TRADE
ALLIANCE, EMERGING MARKETS: WILL CANADA MEET THE CHALLENGE? (Nov. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.cafta.org/emerging_markets.html (listing fortification
requirement as a non-tariff barrier to trade).
24
See Joel R. Paul, Do International Trade Institutions Contribute to
Economic Growth and Development?, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 285, 295 (2003) (discussing nontariff barriers to trade).
25
See Richard D. Cudahy, The Airlines: Destined to Fail?, 71 J. AIR L. & COM.
3, 8-9 (2006) (describing pre-deregulation control of routes by Civil Aeronautics Board).
26
Cost to Consumers of Deregulation of Crude Oil: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 96th Cong. 43-44 (1980) [hereinafter Cost to Consumers] (In an exchange
over the impact of price controls in the 1970s on consumers, the then-Secretary of
Energy, Charles Duncan, argued that uniformity of gasoline prices across the nation
constituted equitable treatment of consumers.).
27
See, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY,
AND POWER 549 (1991) (“Competition [in the 1950s and 1960s] took other forms
[besides price] as well. Never had motorists been better served. Tires and oil were
checked, windows were washed, drinking glasses and sweepstakes entry forms were
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improvements in gasoline quality since World War II are
largely attributable to “[i]ntense competition in the petroleum
Similarly, the rapid rise in microprocessor
industry.”28
capabilities in recent years tracks the fierce competition
between Intel and AMD.29 Such innovations yield widespread
benefits. In the case of microprocessors, a wide range of
products which incorporate microprocessors become more
powerful and less expensive as microprocessors fall in price.30
Markets also serve an important role as a discovery process,
with prices revealing opportunities to market participants.31
Competitive markets depend on the ability of firms to
enter and exit product markets. Perfect competition rarely
exists outside the textbook, but the existence of rivals forces
firms to innovate and compete even when competition is
imperfect.32 Even the existence of potential rivals can be an
important source of pressure on incumbent firms.33 Not
surprisingly then, incumbents often try to prevent competition
by seeking regulations that raise barriers to entry.34 By
handed out—and all for free—in order to win and hold the affection of
motorists. . . . Texaco also proudly assured its patrons that, for their benefit, it had
gone so far as to ‘register’ all its restrooms throughout the forty-eight states.”).
28
NAT’L PETROLEUM COUNCIL, IMPACT OF NEW TECHNOLOGY ON THE U.S.
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 1946-1965, at 261 (1967) [hereinafter NPC, IMPACT]; see infra
note 322.
29
See, e.g., Benjamin Pimentel, Intel Ramping up Competition with AMD,
S.F. CHRON., June 8, 2006, at D1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi
?f=/c/a/2006/06/08/BUGA8JAT7F9.DTL (describing product quality and price cuts
resulting from competition).
30
See Gordon Moore, Intel Keynote Transcript, Intel Developer Forum, Fall
1997, http://www.intel.com/pressroom/archive/speeches/gem93097.htm (noting that
drop in price of microprocessor performance has expanded range of products including
processors).
31
See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519,
525-26 (1945).
32
The airline industry is an excellent example of the impacts of such
competition. Despite their desperate need to raise fares, the legacy carriers (American,
Continental, Delta, Northwest, and United) have been forced to discount fares and
restructure their businesses in response to competition from discount carriers such as
Southwest. See THOMAS PETZINGER, JR., HARD LANDING 317-33 (1995) (describing
impact of Southwest Airlines).
33
See, e.g., Joel B. Dirlam & Alfred E. Kahn, Leadership and Conflict in the
Pricing of Gasoline, 61 YALE L.J. 818, 826 (1952) (describing how potential competition
limits market leaders in gasoline markets as “[a] good margin may tempt independents
and majors, other than the leader, to cut price in order to increase volume. Implicit
competitive influences of this sort may place very narrow limits upon the discretion of
the leader, even though overt price warfare is sporadic.”); see also William G.
Shepherd, Potential Competition Versus Actual Competition, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 15-17
(1990) (describing potential competition theory).
34
See John S. Moot, Economic Theories of Regulation and Electricity
Restructuring, 25 ENERGY L.J. 273, 273 (2004) (“Many forms of regulation . . . became
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erecting barriers to entry through regulations, incumbents can
deter new entrants and make supra-competitive pricing
possible.
Although the environmental law literature has
traditionally focused on the special case of unpriced waste
disposal services in analyzing market forces,35 market forces
also have a significant role to play in reducing negative
environmental impacts of production and consumption of
goods.36 For example, even where disposal of wastes to the
environment is unpriced due to the failure to fully specify
property rights in environmental goods, disposal of a waste
product represents the loss of any potential value contained in
that waste product. Increasing the efficiency of a production
process, which by definition involves reducing waste
production, allows a firm to produce more with the same or
fewer inputs.
Gasoline provides a classic example of this process.
Initially, gasoline was simply “the portion of crude petroleum
too volatile to be included in kerosene. The first refiners had
no use for it and often dumped an accumulation of gasoline into
the creek or river that was always nearby.”37 Consumer
suspect as creating barriers to entry and regulating price as a means of providing
supracompetitive rents to producers, rather than correcting market failures.”).
35
See, e.g., Noah Sachs, Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended
Producer Responsibility in the European Union and the United States, 30 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 51, 56-57 (2006) (criticizing products whose price does not take into account the
cost of disposing of their waste, noting that “[i]n this zero-price disposal market,
neither manufacturers nor consumers have any incentive to reduce waste generation or
packaging or to consider the costs of disposal in production or consumption decisions”).
36
See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET
ENVIRONMENTALISM (2d ed. 2001); TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIROCAPITALISTS (1997).
37
JAMES G. SPEIGHT, THE CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY OF PETROLEUM 567
(3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY]. When increasingly sophisticated
cracking operations increased gasoline yields in the 1930s, they also increased
byproduct gases, which initially had no economic value and were simply disposed of by
venting or burning. PAUL H. GIDDENS, STANDARD OIL COMPANY (INDIANA): OIL
PIONEER OF THE MIDDLE WEST 32 (Arno Press 1976) (1955) (“the quantity of these
byproduct gases increased until their disposal became an economic problem”).
Polymerization processes enabled refineries to turn these gases from wastes to
valuable octane-enhancing feedstocks. Id. More generally, Miller and Shea’s 1941
review concluded that “[t]he constant practical application of chemical and engineering
research to refining operations has resulted not only in improvement of products to
meet changing conditions and requirements but in the reduction of waste in processing
and in the manufacture of an almost infinite variety of products.” H.C. MILLER & G.B.
SHEA, NAT’L RES. PLANNING BD., TECHNICAL PAPER NO. 3, GAINS IN OIL AND GAS
PRODUCTION REFINING AND UTILIZATION TECHNOLOGY 36 (1941). Refineries continue
to find ways to reduce costs by making use of waste products. See Eric Martin,
Environmental Protection, in 2 MODERN PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY 197, 209 (Alan G.
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demand, generated by the rising automobile industry,38
transformed gasoline into a highly valued commodity.39 By
1900, demand for gasoline exceeded the quantities previously
produced by distillation and chemical engineers began
experimenting with “cracking” crude (using heat to boost
gasoline yields at the expense of the kerosene yield)40 and
“widening the cut” of gasoline.41 Ten years later, kerosene was
no longer the most important product42 and refiners were
worried about a shortage of gasoline.43 Production yields
captured the magnitude of the change: In 1880, 100 barrels of
crude produced, on average, 75.2 barrels of kerosene and 10.3
barrels of gasoline, while in 1940, the same 100 barrels yielded
an average of 40 to 50 barrels of gasoline, but only 5.5 barrels
of kerosene.44
Thus, in the presence of incompletely specified property
rights to environmental goods, market forces sometimes
provide an incentive to dispose of waste products in ways that
potentially damage the environment. This is best viewed,
however, as a special case caused by the failure to completely
specify property rights, rather than as the paradigmatic case.
The general market incentive is to reduce waste, an incentive
which is greater when the cost of waste disposal is positive
than when it is zero.45 The incentive to reduce waste exists
Lucas ed., 2000) (stating that “[t]he optimum place to recover wastes is within the
refinery itself” and listing examples).
38
U.S. auto sales doubled “approximately every two years” between 1900 and
1916. YVETTE TAMINIAU, ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE 57 (2001).
39
U.S. DEP’T OF COM., OFF. OF DOMESTIC COM., INDUS. SERIES NO. 73,
UNITED STATES PETROLEUM REFINING: WAR AND POSTWAR 14 (1947) [hereinafter
USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR] (“Demand for gasoline arising from the increased use of
the automobile was the principal force behind the increasingly complicated refining
technology and larger percentage conversion of crude oil to gasoline.”).
40
WILLIAM L. LEFFLER, PETROLEUM REFINING IN NONTECHNICAL LANGUAGE
4 (3d ed. 2000); see also YERGIN, supra note 27, at 111-12 (describing invention and
commercialization of cracking).
41
This was done by raising the gasoline fraction to include hydrocarbons
with boiling points up to 250 degrees Celsius rather than only up to 140 degrees
Celsius. TAMINIAU, supra note 38, at 57.
42
GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 33.
43
Id. at 140 (“One of the most urgent and important problems confronting
the petroleum industry in 1909 was the rapidly growing demand for
gasoline. . . . [A]lert refiners realized that, at the rate gasoline was being consumed by
1909, the normal supply would soon be inadequate and prices would skyrocket.”).
44
MILLER & SHEA, supra note 37, at 27.
45
Some critics of market processes object to the tendency of markets to
provide individuals with consumer goods, arguing that consumption itself is
problematic. See, e.g., BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS
221 (2004) (“Having too many choices produces psychological distress, especially when
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even in the limited case of free disposal, however, because the
waste itself has potential value that is lost when it is discarded,
as early refiners learned in the case of gasoline.
Despite its beneficial social effects, competition is costly
for market participants, so many prefer to avoid it. If
participants in a market can arrange to collude, they can
reduce competition and increase their profits, perhaps even
approaching what a monopolist would earn.46 Collusion on
prices is, of course, illegal.47 Monopoly profits are so desirable,
however, that market participants sometimes attempt
alternative methods that allow collusion without explicit
agreements.48 Where it avoids the attention of antitrust
authorities, such implicit collusion can result in higher prices
and reduced output.49
Difficulties for the would-be cartel go beyond avoiding
antitrust authorities, however. By undercutting the cartel
price slightly, a cheating member can greatly expand output
and so gain greater revenue—provided, of course, that the
chiseling goes undetected and unpunished by the rest of the
cartel.50 Because all cartel members face this incentive, a cartel
without an effective enforcement mechanism will quickly
unravel as members cheat the price down to the competitive
price. Thus, a cartel will only succeed if it can effectively
monitor its members’ behavior and punish those who cheat.51
Of course, antitrust law restricts explicit contracts in aid of
cartels, and would-be oligopolists must resort to less effective,
combined with regret, concern about status, adaptation, social comparison, and
perhaps most important, the desire to have the best of everything—to maximize.”).
Because such criticisms rest on a presumption that a minority is entitled to dictate its
preferences to the majority, however, we do not address them here.
46
See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 239-62
(1988) (summarizing literature on tacit collusion); Alexis Jacquemin & Margaret E.
Slade, Cartels, Collusion, and Horizontal Merger, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 415, 417-18 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989)
(“Sellers who recognize their mutual interdependence will have an incentive to
cooperate as long as the profit which each can obtain when acting jointly is higher than
when they act independently.”).
47
See Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
48
See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 524-26 (1990)
(explaining economics of implicit collusion).
49
See id. at 528-29 (discussing GE-Westinghouse implicit collusion in the
turbine generator market in the 1960s).
50
See Jacquemin & Slade, supra note 46, at 420-21 (summarizing literature
on incentive to cheat). There is some evidence that this occurs in the crude oil market,
with OPEC functioning only imperfectly as a cartel. See FTC, GASOLINE PRICE
CHANGES, supra note 9, at 23.
51
Jacquemin & Slade, supra note 46, at 417.
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more expensive, indirect methods of maintaining a cartel.
Such methods can be effective and allow cartel members to
escape legal sanctions, in some cases.52
Firms that wish to avoid competition must find a
substitute for explicit contracts that allows them to coordinate
their pricing behavior.53 This is difficult, but coordinating
behavior can occur even in the absence of legally enforceable
restrictions. Such efforts are simpler with fewer competitors.54
(If the cartel is successful at earning supra-competitive profits,
those profits will attract new rivals.55) Regulations can play an
important role here, as they can aid cartels by helping them
restrain output by assisting informal cooperation by members.56
52
See id. at 453 (discussing evidence of collusive bidding practices in
government auctions); id. at 443 (listing “cement, drugs, dyes, lumber, theaters, and
tobacco” as industries that may exhibit “conscious parallelism”).
53
Id. at 429 (discussing the “phases of the moon” strategy used in one cartel
to allocate low bid privileges). Critics of the oil industry continue to believe such
behavior explains much of the industry’s conduct. For example, a U.S. labor union
seeking to ensure that “a far higher proportion of the international tanker fleet
bringing petroleum to the United States should consist of American ships with
American crews,” commissioned a study of the oil industry aimed at proving that
“[t]here is a hard core of joint action and control in the oil industry surrounded at its
periphery by semi-independent fiefdoms which offer a somewhat deceptive patina of
truly independent competition.” STANLEY H. RUTTENBERG & ASSOC., INC., THE
AMERICAN OIL INDUSTRY: A FAILURE OF ANTI-TRUST POLICY, at iii-iv (1973).
54
Jacquemin & Slade, supra note 46, at 421. See also ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE
NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 114
(1995) (“Generally speaking, the difficulties of maintaining and enforcing cartel
arrangements were greatly enhanced in industries that were made up of a large
number of units producing a variety of unstandardized products, particularly where
limitations upon entry were slight.”).
55
Jacquemin & Slade, supra note 46, at 421 (“A cartel . . . contains the seeds
of its own undoing.”).
56
Among the best-known examples of regulations with this effect are the
industry codes legalized and promoted for a time by the National Recovery
Administration (NRA) during the New Deal. See LEVERETT S. LYON ET AL., THE
NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION: AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL 551 (1972)
(“Among the avowed purposes of the National Industrial Recovery Act none stands out
more clearly than the declaration of intention to revise the nature of competition in
American business. . . . As a consequence of this purpose of the law, NRA codes have
contained, either under the title of trade practices or otherwise, provisions designed to
regulate trade activities. Indeed the codes are called codes of fair competition.”). Given
the opportunity to write legally enforceable rules governing competitive behavior,
“business domination of the code-writing process was virtually inevitable” considering
the significant rewards of institutionalizing limits to competition for market
incumbents. HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 56. See also LYON ET AL., supra, at 568
(“[U]nder the terms of the law [business interests] were practically invited to find out
what they could secure with the trust laws in abeyance.”). The codes reduced
competition as the NRA generally “seemed willing to go along with the rationale of
trade association secretaries and business planners, to accept the ideal of ‘industrial
self-government’ and to allow a substantial measure of cartelization.” HAWLEY, supra
note 54, at 66. See also DAVID M. KENNEDY, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN THE GREAT
DEPRESSION 184 (1999) (Codes cartelized “huge sectors of American industry.”). See
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This brief survey of the impacts of market forces
suggests three issues to consider in our examination of
regulation’s effect on gasoline markets. First, competitive
forces exert more influence as the number of competitors
increases, raising the question of whether gasoline regulations
have reduced the number of competitors in the gasoline
market. In particular, incumbent firms will naturally seek to
erect barriers to entry, making it important to consider the
impact of regulations on entry. Second, competitive forces
exert more influence as the goods traded in markets become
more like commodities, and so are more readily substituted for
one another. We must therefore look to see if regulations
inhibit the commodification of gasoline. Third, cartels face a
serious enforcement problem when they cannot directly collude.
We should therefore examine whether regulations create
conditions under which refiners’ profit-maximizing behavior
results in tacit collusion without open violations of antitrust
laws. We now turn to the particulars of the gasoline market
and their influence on how these forces operate.
B.

The Market for Gasoline

Like most markets, the gasoline market is not perfectly
competitive even without taking into account the impact of
economic and environmental regulations.57 The two questions
that must be answered are: first, whether the gasoline market
so diverges from the textbook ideal as to demand regulatory
intervention to increase competitiveness; and second, whether
regulation has increased or decreased the market’s
competitiveness. We begin with the features of the market
created by the technical characteristics of gasoline, refining,
distribution, and crude oil. Perhaps the most important overall
development in refining is the trend toward fewer, larger, more
capital-intensive refineries. As we shall see, this trend is

also LYON ET AL., supra, at 620 (“[T]he NRA has, through several devices and in a wide
range of industries, shifted an important measure of control over prices away from
individual determination and increased the degree of influence and control of
industrial groups.”). See also id. at 705-15 (discussing contemporary criticism of the
NRA for fostering monopoly).
57
See Severin Borenstein & Andrea Shepard, Sticky Prices, Inventories, and
Market Power in Wholesale Gasoline Markets 1-2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working
Paper No. 5468, 1996) (describing price stickiness); FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES,
supra note 9, at 41-43 (same).
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partially the result of the nature of gasoline production and
distribution.
1. Crude Oil’s Impact on the Market for Gasoline
“U.S. refiners compete with refiners all around the
world to obtain crude oil.”58 As a result, world market trends
have important impacts on U.S. gasoline supply by affecting
the price,59 amount, and type of oil that U.S. refineries can
obtain.60 Because what can be produced in a refinery depends
in part on the type of crude oil used as an initial feedstock, the
market for crude affects the market for gasoline.
Crude oil is a complex mixture of hydrocarbons with a
variety of characteristics relevant to gasoline production
including density, sulfur content, pour point, carbon residue,
salt content, nitrogen content, metals content, and boiling
range.61 Crude’s qualities vary considerably depending on its
source.62 Characteristics of a particular crude may make it
58

FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 13.
Id. at 15 (“Variation in the price of crude oil drives most of the variation in
the price of gasoline.”). The FTC found that changes in crude prices accounted for 85%
of the variation in gasoline prices between 1984 and January 2005. Id. See also NAT’L
PETROLEUM COUNCIL, U.S. PETROLEUM REFINING: ASSURING THE ADEQUACY AND
AFFORDABILITY OF CLEANER FUELS, at C-7 (2000) [hereinafter NPC, ADEQUACY] (“The
characteristics of the crude oil feedstock are critical to process selection. There are
hundreds of crude oils available on the world market today that vary widely in physical
properties.”).
60
Those inclined to see conspiracies behind oil issues should note that
estimates of the concentration of the oil industry range from “very low” to “moderately
concentrated,” depending on whether all nominally independent oil firms are
considered independent in fact or whether OPEC is considered a single producer (as it
would be if the cartel functioned perfectly). See FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra
note 9, at 21. In particular, the FTC’s 2005 review of the oil industry concluded that
“[m]ajor private oil companies, both individually and collectively, control only a very
small share of world crude oil production.” Id. at 22.
61
JAMES H. GARY & GLENN E. HANDWERK, PETROLEUM REFINING:
TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 22-26 (4th ed. 2001); NAT’L PETROLEUM COUNCIL,
FACTORS AFFECTING U.S. PETROLEUM REFINING: A SUMMARY 53 (1973) [hereinafter
NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING] (“Crude oil is a substance comprised of a very complex
mixture of hydrocarbons, which are molecules consisting almost solely of carbon and
hydrogen atoms in various arrangements. Crude oil contains thousands of different
molecules of varying sizes . . . .”); FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 17
(“Crude oils from different fields usually have different chemical properties, including
differences in density and sulfur content.”); SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 244
(“It is now generally recognized that the name petroleum does not describe a
composition of matter but rather a mixture of various organic compounds that includes
a wide range of molecular weights and molecular types which exist in balance with
each other.” (citation omitted)).
62
SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 215 (“Petroleum is not a uniform
material. In fact, its chemical and physical (fractional) composition can vary not only
59
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unsuitable or more costly for particular refineries and more or
less expensive to formulate into gasolines with specific
characteristics.63 For example, refineries are often designed to
process particular types of crude oil and cannot easily change
to a different type (e.g., from lower to higher-sulfur crude)
without extensive and expensive modifications.64 The FTC
considers the technological capabilities of refineries to process
particular types of crudes relevant to its antitrust analysis of
proposed mergers in the oil industry.65 Indeed, refineries differ
so significantly that some analysts suggest that it is not even
meaningful to attempt to describe an “average” refinery.66
Crude oil supplies have shifted toward higher-sulfur
crude of the type supplied by Saudi Arabia, and away from the
lower-sulfur crudes that typified West Texas Intermediate.67

with the location and age of the oil field but also with the depth of the individual
well.”).
63
Carl Mortished, Western Refineries Spurning Sulphurous Saudi Oil, TIMES
(London), Sept. 16, 2005, at 52, available at http://www.energybulletin.net/print.
php?id=8949 (“Few refineries are able to convert” high-sulfur Saudi oil into low-sulfur
gasolines required by U.S. environmental regulations.); NAT’L PETROLEUM COUNCIL,
PETROLEUM REFINING IN THE 1990S: MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
15 (1991) [hereinafter NPC, 1990S] (“The kind of crude oil, other raw materials, and the
wide array of processing units employed in its manufacture will determine the gasoline
batch composition.”); FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 17 (“[R]efineries
are usually designed to be most productive using a specific range of crude oil. When
they substitute other types of crude, their efficiency and productivity will decline.”);
NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 13 (“A change in the type of crude oil
available to a refinery will affect the capacity of the refinery to process crude oil. Many
refineries are designed to process low-sulfur crude oils and would soon become
inoperable if significant volumes of high-sulfur crude oils were processed.”). Even as
early as the 1950s, some refineries were specifically designed for particular foreign oil
sources. DOUGLAS R. BOHI & MILTON RUSSELL, LIMITING OIL EXPORTS: AN ECONOMIC
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 44 (1978).
64
NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 4 (“A given refinery cannot
effectively process every type of crude oil. If a refinery processes a type of crude oil for
which it was not designed, the effective throughput capacity of the refinery will in
many cases be reduced substantially. . . . High-sulfur crude oil . . . cannot be
exclusively processed in a domestic refinery designed for low-sulfur crude oil without
the installation of additional facilities and/or extensive modification of existing
facilities to prevent corrosive damage and to meet product specifications.”). When
energy policies have dictated reallocation of crude supplies among refineries, the task
has proven to be a challenge. See infra notes 433-44.
65
FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 24.
66
NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 55.
67
JAMES G. SPEIGHT & BAKI ÖZÜM, PETROLEUM REFINING PROCESSES 27
(2002) (“In a more general sense, the average quality of crude oil has become worse in
recent years. This is reflected in a progressive decrease in API gravity and a rise in
sulfur content.” (citations omitted)). Lower-sulfur crudes are referred to as “sweet” and
higher-sulfur crudes are termed “sour.”
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This shift in crude supplies has occurred at the same time as
the demand for lower sulfur content in gasoline has increased
due to environmental regulations. As a result, many smaller
refineries optimized for low-sulfur crudes shut down rather
than incur the cost of modifications to handle high-sulfur
crudes.68
Crude prices also affect refinery operations. The price
of crude oil fluctuates based on a wide variety of international
and political events, seasonal demand, and other factors, with
the price of crude determined in the global market.69 Changes
in relative prices between crude and refinery products have
substantial effects on individual refineries’ profitability, and
these effects can differ greatly depending on the characteristics
As a result, particular refiners may
of the refinery.70
experience economic conditions that reduce their profitability,
even as other refiners continue to make money, producing
temporary or permanent shutdowns or product mix changes.
The evolution of the crude oil market also influenced
refinery location. Refineries were initially located near oil
fields but soon came to be located closer to the markets for
their products, in part because of security concerns that
developed during World War I,71 and in part because of supply

Typical sweet crudes are West Texas Intermediate (the popular, traded crude
on the New York Mercantile Exchange), most Louisiana and Oklahoma
crudes, North Sea, and Nigerian crudes.
Sour crudes include Alaska North Slope, Venezuelan, and West Texas. Sour
from fields like Yates and Wasson.
Intermediate crudes include California Heavy, such as from the San Joaquin
Valley and many of the Middle East crudes.
LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 17.
68
NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 16. Sulfur comes bound with
the hydrocarbons and is released when the hydrocarbons are burned, creating “one of
several smelly or otherwise environmentally objectionable sulfur/oxygen or
sulfur/something compounds.” LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 16. See also U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, OFF. OF COMPLIANCE, EPA 310-R-95-013, PROFILE OF THE PETROLEUM
REFINING INDUSTRY 11 (1995) [hereinafter EPA, PROFILE] (noting that cost of
upgrading to meet 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments also made it more economical “in
some cases” to close refineries rather than upgrade to meet the new standards).
69
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-96, ENERGY MARKETS: EFFECTS
OF MERGERS AND MARKET CONCENTRATION IN THE U.S. PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 18
(2004) [hereinafter GAO, MERGERS] (“The price of crude oil produced in the United
States is determined in the world oil market because the decontrol of domestic oil
prices in 1981 has effectively linked the U.S. oil market to the world oil market.”).
70
LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 219-21.
71
J.D. Butler, The Influence of Economic Factors on the Location of Oil
Refineries, 1 J. INDUS. ECON. 187, 193-94 (1953).
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problems for oil field plants.72 Limited infrastructure continues
to give refiners in some locations cost advantages. Trade
regulations also encouraged location of refineries near markets,
as many countries adopted preferential tariffs for crude oil
relative to refined products to offset crude’s higher
transportation costs and encourage domestic refining.73
Locating a refinery away from oil fields requires infrastructure
to deliver the crude to the refinery, and as the oil market
became an international one, oil increasingly came to be
transported by tanker.74 Eventually, refineries concentrated
relatively close to ports capable of handling tankers in order to
reduce transportation costs once the tanker arrived.75 As a
result, “refinery operations have become more concentrated
both regionally and nationally” since the 1980s.76
Today, the only real alternative to locating a refinery
near a port is to locate it near a pipeline connected to a crude
oil source (either an oil field or a port).77 Because land near
ports is desirable for other uses, and because refineries are
often not considered desirable neighbors,78 the potential sites
72

USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 13 (“The modern [1947]
refinery with its several expensive units and laboratories needed to make selected
hydrocarbon products is being built at locations where markets are accessible. A
steady source of supply can be depended on through trunk pipe lines, or tankers.”).
73
Butler, supra note 71, at 195; EPA, PROFILE, supra note 68, at 7 (“For
reasons of efficiency in transporting crude oil feed stocks and finished products,
petroleum refineries typically were sited near crude oil sources (onshore petroleum
terminals, oil and gas extraction areas) or consumers (heavily industrialized areas).”).
74
U.S. government subsidies for tankers also played a role. See 1 ROBERT L.
BRADLEY JR., OIL, GAS & GOVERNMENT: THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 1003-05 (1996).
75
Refineries were initially located near U.S. oil fields, but capacity soon
shifted to coastal areas as the shipment of oil by tankers became common after 1920.
See J. Sidney Gould, Recent Changes in Location and Size of Petroleum Refineries, 1 J.
BUS. U. CHI. 497, 501 (1928) (discussing trend toward coast locations). For example,
Rocky Mountain state refiners are the major market for some Canadian oil fields and
the lack of more than “minimal infrastructure in place to deliver oil produced in the
Rockies and Canada to other refining regions” gives those refiners a price advantage.
Stock Report, Frontier Oil, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 27, 2006), at 1.
76
D.J. PETERSON & SERGEJ MAHNOVSKI, NEW FORCES AT WORK IN REFINING:
INDUSTRY VIEWS OF CRITICAL BUSINESS AND OPERATIONS TRENDS 24 (2003).
77
See USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 15 (describing
transportation constraints on location requiring refineries to be built near ports or
pipelines); see also YERGIN, supra note 27, at 410 (discussing impact of need to build
pipelines and tankers to accommodate post-war boom in gasoline consumption).
78
See Alastair Walling, Exposed Refineries, Price-Gouging, and the Gas
Crisis that Never Was, 20 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 55, 56 (2006) (discussing NIMBY problems
of refineries); Tom van Riper, Not in My Backyard, FORBES, Sept. 7, 2005, available at
http://www.forbes.com/energy/2005/09/07/katrina-oil-refineries-cx_tvr_0907refineries.html
(quoting an oil analyst who stated that a company proposing a new refinery “would
need to hire about 15 lawyers just to argue it won’t break any environmental
regulations”).
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for new refineries are limited.79 Therefore, it is more costly and
complicated to build a new refinery, inducing refiners to
expand existing refineries rather than build new ones, and
limiting competition from new entrants since owning an
existing refinery is a de facto requirement for entry.
Crude markets have three important impacts on
gasoline markets. First, the international nature of the crude
market creates powerful incentives to locate refineries in places
where crude shipments can readily reach the refinery. As a
practical matter, this limits refineries in the United States to
locations near domestic oil fields, near deep water oil
terminals, or near pipelines connected to terminals or oil fields.
Securing a feasible location for a refinery thus becomes a
barrier to entry into the refining industry. Second, crude
supplies are trending toward types of crude that are more
costly to refine into less-polluting forms of gasoline,
particularly with respect to sulfur content. This increases the
capital intensity of refining, contributing to the trend toward
fewer, larger refineries. It also makes entry into the refining
business more difficult, an additional limit on competition.
Third, the relationship between crude prices and refined
products’ prices has a significant impact on refinery economics,
putting a premium on refineries that are capable of flexible
production methods, which puts older, less sophisticated
refineries at a competitive disadvantage. This contributes to
the trend toward more capital-intensive refineries.
2. Gasoline Production’s Impact on the Market
The method of producing gasoline also has significant
impacts on the market for gasoline. At the most abstract level,
producing gasoline is simply a matter of separating crude oil
into the hydrocarbons with the appropriate boiling range and
those with higher or lower boiling ranges. Early petroleum
refineries did so by distilling off the various components from

79
PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 23 (“The refining industry is
dominated by legacy assets. In many cases these are century-old sites, chosen because
they were near major population centers or crude oil supplies (e.g., major producing
fields, crude oil pipelines, and ports) of that time. As a result, most major refineries
are clustered along the coasts. Because of demographic shifts, the movement of
industry, and changing crude oil supplies in the intervening years, this hardware
legacy no longer matches the current supply-and-demand patterns for many regions
and communities.”).
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small batches of crude,80 making refining “a wasteful,
underdeveloped operation in the hands of many people, each
one working on a small scale.”81 While distilling remains an
important step in refining,82 technological progress quickly
added more sophisticated processes, with a refinery today best
described as “a complex network of integrated unit processes
for the purpose of producing a variety of products from crude
oil.”83
Refineries use a variety of methods to transform the
crude into refined products.
“Any hydrocarbon can be
converted into any other hydrocarbon by the appropriate
applications of energy, chemistry, and technology.”84 Among
the most important method is “cracking,” which converts
higher molecular-weight components into lower molecularweight components by rupturing the carbon bonds with heat
(“thermal cracking”), or catalysts (“catalytic cracking”).85 A
second important technique is “coking,” in which low-value
80

SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 536 (“Early refineries were
predominantly distillation units, perhaps with ancillary units to remove objectionable
odors from the various product streams.”); id. at 565 (describing earliest thermal
cracking units based on heating crude in pressurized containers); see also USDOC,
WAR AND POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 7 (“The complexity of the large modern [1947]
refinery is as marked as the simplicity of the first refinery that went into operation at
Titusville, Pa., in 1861. The contrast may be drawn by comparing the expenditures of
the Cities Service Oil Co. of approximately 75 million dollars for its Lake Charles, La.
plant (70,000 B/D capacity) with the 15 thousand dollars spent to construct the
Titusville refinery.”). By 1930, there were 472 petroleum refineries operating or being
built in the United States, processing 850,000,000 barrels of petroleum a year. MILLER
& SHEA, supra note 37.
81
DAVID O. WHITTEN & BESSIE E. WHITTEN, THE BIRTH OF BIG BUSINESS IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1860-1914, at 9 (2006).
82
SURINDER PARKASH, REFINING PROCESSES HANDBOOK 1 (2003) (“The first
processing step in the refinery, after desalting the crude, is separation of crude into a
number of fractions by distillation.”). Refinery capacity is generally measured by
distillation capacity. FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 180. However, “capacity to
produce refined products at some refineries exceeds their distillation capacity because
their downstream processes rely, at least in part, on intermediates produced at other
refineries.” Id. at 180 n.4.
83
SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 501. A 1941 government report
summarized a long list of “remarkable achievements” in refining and concluded that “it
is possible to rearrange the molecular structures of oils to obtain greater yields of
products with more desirable properties than was possible when refining was largely a
distillation operation.” MILLER & SHEA, supra note 37, at 27.
84
James G. Speight, Thermal Chemistry of Petroleum Constituents, in
PETROLEUM CHEMISTRY AND REFINING 121, 122 (James G. Speight ed., 1998).
85
SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 503-04. Catalytic cracking took off
after World War II, with U.S. capacity increasing fivefold from 1945 to 1965. NPC,
IMPACT, supra note 28, at 285. There may be higher molecular weight by-products
produced as well. SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 503. See also EPA, PROFILE,
supra note 68, at 19-24 (describing and diagramming process); LEFFLER, supra note 40,
at 59-70 (describing process in nontechnical terms).
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residual fuel oils are cracked into transportation fuels, leaving
a residual of carbon with impurities known as coke.86 Further
significant advances in refinery technology and design enable
refiners to extract greater amounts of gasoline and other highvalue products.87
Refining technology evolved partially as a result of
rising demand for gasoline. Oil refineries primarily produced
kerosene from about 1870 (when they became “characteristic
features” of the new oil industry)88 until 1910, when the shift in
demand to gasoline prompted innovative new methods to
increase gasoline yields.89 Today the primary function of most
86
EPA, PROFILE, supra note 68, at 19-20. See also NPC, IMPACT, supra note
28, at 284 (describing coking’s development after 1930). Leffler gives a colorful
description of coking: “If thermal cracking is like throwing a hamburger on a hot grill,
coking is like Texas barbeque—slow cooked all the way through.” LEFFLER, supra note
40, at 110.
87
SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 585 (“The last 60 years have seen
substantial advances in the development of catalytic processes. This has involved not
only rapid advances in the chemistry and physics of the catalysts themselves but also
major engineering advances in reactor design . . . [which together] have allowed major
improvements in process efficiency and product yields.” (citations omitted)). This
progress had an impact on costs as well: total operating costs for refineries fell 12% in
real terms from 1945 to 1965. NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 257.
88
SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 7; USDOC, WAR AND POST-WAR,
supra note 39, at 1 (“In contrast to the early years of the industry, gasoline and fuel oil
now compose about four-fifths of refinery production.”). The early years of the oil
industry “are shrouded in a statistical fog.” Butler, supra note 71, at 188. We do know
that production more than doubled between 1900 and 1910 and again by 1915, and
increased tenfold between 1900 and 1930. Id. Kerosene was originally produced from
asphalt and similar substances and by 1859, there were thirty-four companies making
$5 million of kerosene per year in the United States. YERGIN, supra note 27, at 23.
89
SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 565-67. “The original incentive to
develop cracking processes arose from the need to increase gasoline supplies. Since
cracking could virtually double the volume of gasoline from a barrel of crude oil, the
purpose of cracking was wholly justified.” Id. at 585 (citations omitted). Before the
invention of methods of cracking the heavier hydrocarbons, refineries faced the serious
problem of producing various products “in certain rather closely fixed proportions” as
“under present methods over 50 per cent of the crude oil refined must go into kerosene
and fuel oil classes of products. No effort or sacrifice can make a given crude yield over
50 per cent of gasoline and lubricating oils by commercially successful methods.” Lewis
H. Haney, Gasoline Prices as Affected by Interlocking Stock Ownership and Joint Cost,
31 Q.J. ECON. 635, 649 (1917). Cracking soon solved this problem. A 1924 article
noted:

The yield of gasoline has been increased greatly by the widespread use of
cracking processes. A refiner using Mid-Continent crude can recover from 45
to 55 per cent of gasoline from a barrel of crude petroleum when pressure
stills are used, as compared with about 25 per cent from ordinary distilling
methods. Improvements in internal combustion engines should soon make
possible the utilization of a still larger yield of serviceable motor fuel than is
now obtainable in the form of gasoline from cracking processes.
Huston Thompson, Distribution of Gasoline and Methods of Price Control, 116 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 89, 90 (1924). Thermal cracking made it possible to convert
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refineries is to produce gasoline, with other products generally
treated as byproducts.90 Over 80% of the volume of finished
products falls into the “light petroleum products” class
(gasoline, diesel, home heating oil, and jet fuel).91
As a result of these technological changes, gasoline
refineries today do not simply produce a single product.
Rather, they now produce a variety of intermediate components
of gasoline, which the refineries then blend in a complex
operation to achieve the desired characteristics for the final
gasoline product.92 Because components blended into gasolines
may have multiple uses, with refineries often closely integrated
with petrochemical plants,93 and because unit shutdowns affect

40% of crude to gasoline, the technological limit until World War II. USDOC, WAR AND
POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 8. It also made possible processing of “straight-run”
gasoline to raise its octane rating. Id. Catalytic cracking, which developed in the
1930s, boosted output further. Id.
90
SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 567 (“It is generally recognized that
the most important part of any refinery is its gasoline (and liquid fuels) manufacturing
facilities; other facilities are added to manufacture additional products as indicated by
technical feasibility and economic gain.”). This has been true for some time. See
ALBERT V. HAHN, THE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY: MARKET AND ECONOMICS 5 (1970)
(“In the U.S. the demand for motor fuel has tended to grow faster than for fuel oil or
diesel fuel. Accordingly, most refineries contain catalytic cracking units which convert
heavy fractions to additional gasoline . . . .”).
91
FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 179.
92
Blending various outputs of refineries developed early. In 1917, for
example, Lewis Haney complained that gasoline “had ceased to be a homogeneous
product and in its name were sold blends of heavy naphtha or ‘cracked’ residual
products combined with more volatile elements.” Haney, supra note 89, at 647. Yet by
1924, Huston Thompson reported without comment that “[t]he great bulk of gasoline
used as a motor fuel for automobile and other internal combustion engines is a blended
product. Formerly only ‘natural’ or ‘straight run’ gasoline, obtained by distilling
petroleum by the application of heat at atmospheric pressure, was sold for motor fuel
purposes.” Thompson, supra note 89, at 89. The FTC also noted blending and cracking
had begun to play a significant role in 1915. U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE
PRICE OF GASOLINE IN 1915, at 21-22 (1917) [hereinafter FTC, 1915]. By World War II,
the transition to “a product made by careful blending of refinery stock prepared by
involved new processes and special additives developed in extensive research
programs” was complete. NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 51-52. By the
late 1960s, in-line blending techniques were used for about half of U.S. gasoline
production, a technique which a technical survey called “one of the significant new
developments in the refinery industry.” NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 293. Blending
is done in virtually all refineries today. J.D. Robinson & R.P. Faulkner, The Oil
Refinery: Types, Structure and Configuration, in 2 MODERN PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 37, at 1, 8. See D.R. Blackmore, Gasoline and Related Fuels, in 2 MODERN
PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY, supra note 37, at 217, 245-46 (discussing complexity of
modern blending techniques).
93
David S. Glass, The Petrochemical Interface, in 2 MODERN PETROLEUM
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 37, at 149, 149.
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the available blendstocks,94 the components of the final product
may vary considerably over time, even within a single refinery.
The mix of components operational at any particular time at a
particular plant also has an impact on the refinery’s ability to
operate at its full capacity.95
The process of improving oil production and refining
began almost as soon as oil was commercially produced.96
Cracking and coking techniques first appeared after World War
I,97 during a period in which “the field of hydrocarbons
chemistry took off in a series of revolutionary discoveries.”98
The technology rapidly advanced again during and after World
War II, in response to the war’s demand for fuel for combat
aircraft.99 From then on, “the refining industry became a
branch of the chemical industry and it was capable of
transforming the complex mixtures that constitute petroleum
into high-quality fuel components by controlling specific
chemical reactions.”100 One significant example of technological
94
NPC, 1990S, supra note 63, at 15 (“As an individual processing unit is shut
down for scheduled or unscheduled maintenance, the gasoline formula may be adjusted
to compensate for a shortage of that unit’s blendstock.”).
95
See, e.g., NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 25 (stating that “configuration
and processing capability in units downstream of the atmospheric distillation unit may
be such that the product output mix is uneconomic at full utilization of atmospheric
distillation capacity”).
96
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 19 (noting “innumerable mechanical
innovations that lowered business costs and reduced oil waste”).
97
USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 7 (“The refinery process
used to convert crude petroleum to products at the Titusville plant [the first refinery],
and the only one used up to about the time of World War I, was the crude-distillation
process.”); MILLER & SHEA, supra note 37, at 26 (stating that “the introduction of the
cracking process in 1912 marked the beginning of a new epoch in the chemistry and
refining of petroleum . . . [and] led the way for further technical advances in refining
practices”); see also YERGIN, supra note 27, at 111-12 (describing development and
commercialization of cracking); 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1107-08 (describing
development of technology).
98
RICHARD H. K. VIETOR, ENERGY POLICY IN AMERICA SINCE 1945: A STUDY
OF BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS 28 (1984).
99
SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37, at 536, 565; TAMINIAU, supra note 38,
at 61 (“World War II was a trigger for the production of fuel that had an octane number
of 100 and for the production of vast quantities of aviation gasoline of a high quality.”).
Consider one particularly dramatic example: catalytic cracking was first put into
commercial operation in 1936 and refinery capacity for it was at 122,000 barrels per
day in 1940. By November 1944, U.S. catalytic cracking capacity reached 1,011,650
barrels per day, a 729% increase in four years. USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR, supra
note 39, at 9. Automobile engine advances also spurred improvements in refining
technology. MILLER & SHEA, supra note 37, at 26 (“The petroleum-refining industry
has had to keep pace with the rapid strides in development made by the automobile
engine and the changing demands of the automotive industry, and improvements in
engine design and efficiency often have resulted from the ability of refiners to improve
the quality of motor fuel and lubricants.”).
100
TAMINIAU, supra note 38, at 61.
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progress shows how dramatically refining changed under
demand pressures.
In the early 1930s, the 100 octane
reference fuel “was a rare chemical costing $25 per gallon in
the small quantities necessary for anti-knock testing purposes,”
but by 1941, “the industry [was] manufacturing millions of
gallons of isooctane for use directly as aviation fuel at little
more than 25 cents per gallon.”101
The increasingly sophisticated technology gave refiners
ever greater control over the refining process. As a result,
refineries became increasingly capable of producing a wide
range of outputs with multiple uses.102 “[M]ajor changes” in
refinery processing after World War II vastly increased output
Refineries were able to obtain
quantity and quality.103
increasing amounts of gasoline and other high-value
transportation fuels from each barrel of crude.104 Today,
refineries use a wide range of “downstream” processing units to
process lower-quality crudes, make products with more
demanding specifications, and increase yields.105 Investment in
these technologies has soared since the 1980s, with hydrotreating capacity increasing 53.6% from 1985 to 2003, thermal
cracking capacity increasing 29.5% over the same period, and
catalytic hydro-cracking capacity increasing 42.4%, compared
to a 9% increase in atmospheric distillation capacity and a

101

MILLER & SHEA, supra note 37, at 30. Demand for higher-octane gasolines
beginning in the 1930s led to innovations as well. SPEIGHT, CHEMISTRY, supra note 37,
at 681 (discussing use of thermal reforming to improve octane). Average octane ratings
rose steadily from World War II into the mid-1960s. NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at
262 (showing increase for premium from motor octane number (MON) 78 / research
octane number (RON) 85 to MON 90 / RON 99 by 1965).
102
LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 77.
103
NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 281.
The NPC’s assessment of
technological change from 1945 to 1965 in refining concluded:
The product specifications of all refinery products have been steadily
changing since World War II to improve the performance of these products in
end use. As the equipment and machinery using petroleum products have
become more sophisticated, so have the treatment and finishing techniques.
Technology advances have improved the operating and economic aspects,
resulting in a beneficial influence on blending, as well as improvements in
the uniformity of product quality. Usually, blending formulations are
dictated by product volume requirements and product costs, and the treating
and finishing steps are taken to assure that the blend meets specifications.
Id. at 293.
104

FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 53 (“Consumer demand
for products such as gasoline and diesel has motivated investment in downstream
processes that can increase the yield of these products from a given barrel of crude.”).
105
FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 182.
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15.6% increase in vacuum distillation capacity.106 The payoff
from this investment has been significant. Gasoline production
grew from 142,465 barrels per day in 1900 to 4.1 million
barrels per day in 1960, reaching 8.3 million barrels per day in
2005.107 In addition, there has been dramatic progress in
catalysts, substrates, and catalysis modeling as well, which has
allowed improvements in “environmental performance, product
quality and volume, feedstock flexibility, and energy
management without fundamentally changing fixed capital
stocks.”108
As the production process became more complex,
gasoline evolved as well. “Prewar [World War II] gasoline was
a simple mixture of largely unprocessed stocks with basic
additives for octane improvement and storage stability.”109 By
the 1960s, additives had become more sophisticated and
refineries produced a range of specific hydrocarbons to blend
into the finished gasoline.110 Refineries have also become more
complex in an effort to reduce raw material costs, adding
technology to allow processing of lower-quality fuels.111
Refineries today are essentially solving a complex linear
programming model to optimize the mix of hydrocarbon
fractions produced and the blends of gasoline created.112
In short, refinery production is not a static process.
Refineries can adjust the fraction of their output that goes to
gasoline and regularly do so.113 A more recent development is
106

Id. at 201 tbl.7-3.
Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Refinery and Blender Net Production of Finished
Gasoline, available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/mgfrpus2a.htm (last visited
Apr. 12, 2007) (all figures except 1900); NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at C-1 (1900
figures).
108
PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 44.
109
NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 256.
110
Id. See also NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 28 (“Demand for light
products such as gasoline and diesel fuel exceed the natural quantity of these products
in crude oil” and so prompt investment in conversion technology.).
111
NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 28-29.
112
GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 243. Because of the technological
changes induced by demand for higher-performance fuels by World War II, the postwar period is the most appropriate for examining long-term trends in the industry. See
also NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 297 (noting increasing sophistication of refinery
controls as refinery complexity grew); PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 44
(“Innovations in advanced process monitoring and controls have allowed refineries not
only to operate more efficiently and safely but also to produce fuels to more-exacting
product quality specifications in a more reliable manner—not unlike a highly
automated chemical plant.”).
113
PARKASH, supra note 82, at 119 (“The yield of products in FCC [fluid
catalytic cracking] depends on the feedstock quality, type of catalyst, and operating
107
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the operation of a network of refineries as a unit, allowing “for
movements of feedstocks and blending stocks across refineries
and therefore more efficient use of capacity at each refinery.”114
Regulations dictating the characteristics of outputs place
additional constraints on the process, substantially increasing
its complexity and making compliance with the various
regulatory mandates and technical constraints a managerial
“art form.”115 Moreover, crude oil price and product price
variations also influence decisions about refinery operation.
For example, as oil prices climbed, refinery economics changed
and the ability to maximize production of the appropriate mix
of high-value products became more important than
maximizing volume.116 The result was “increasingly wide
variations in refinery margin” depending on whether refineries
had the ability to produce the appropriate combination of

conditions. FCC units are usually operated to maximize the yield of gasoline; however,
the process is versatile and can be operated to maximize middle distillate or LPG, both
of which are at the expense of gasoline.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/RG0048, AN ANALYSIS OF REFINERS’ TOTAL BARREL COSTS AND REVENUES FROM THE SALE
OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS: 1976-1979, at 23 (1980) (“If the wholesale price difference
[between gasoline and heating oil] is less than about 2 cents per gallon, an economic
incentive may exist to take feedstock away from the catalytic cracker and put it into
heating oil. Conversely, if the difference exceeds 5 cents per gallon, an incentive may
exist to take distillate away from heating oil and put it in the catalytic cracker for
gasoline, up to the capacity limit of the cracker.”). One regular change is the shifting of
production between maximizing gasoline in the summer and maximizing heating oil in
the winter. LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 65.
114
FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 102.
115
LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 147.
Leffler describes the competing
constraints as follows:
The emissions from burning gasoline cannot exceed various combinations of
the four emitants [toxics, NOX, VOCs, SOX] . . . . The control mechanism sets
limits on combinations of the four.
At the same time the generation of the four emitants is connected in
complicated ways to the gasoline characteristics [a wide range of technical
criteria including RVP, oxygen content, benzene, aromatics content, olefin
content, sulfur content, and the T50 and T90] . . . . Because of their impact on
the four emitants, all these properties have explicit limits, some by statute, at
least in the US.
Finally, in order for gasoline to work well in car engines, refiners must make
gasoline that meets their own performance specifications . . . .
Id.
116

P. Ellis Jones, Introduction, in 2 MODERN PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY, supra
note 37, at xv, xviii (“The key to refinery economics became the addition of value—the
excess of realizable value of the saleable products over the cost of crude and other
feedstocks, and other economic inputs such as chemicals, catalysts, utilities,
maintenance and salaries.”).
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products, leading to the closure of some older refineries and
significant upgrades to others.117
This increased sophistication of refinery operation
comes at a price.118 Investments in hydrotreating in the 1970s
and 1980s, for example, allowed the Gulf Coast refiners in
particular to process cheaper sour crudes, but roughly trebled
capital expenditures.119 The equipment necessary to maximize
the production of economically valuable products, which
requires
producing
precisely
calibrated
intermediate
hydrocarbons and blending them into consistent products, is
considerably more sophisticated and expensive than the
rudimentary distillation equipment used in the industry’s early
years.120 Accordingly, gasoline’s production process has become
complex and capital intensive,121 which in turn allows precise
control over the product’s final characteristics. Although
technology has repeatedly revolutionized refining over the last
100 years, refining’s modern sophistication may be nearing the
limits of current technology’s ability to squeeze additional
capacity out of existing refineries,122 due in part to the maturity
of many refining technologies.123
117

Id. at xviii-xix.
Not all refineries are equally complex, of course. NPC, 1990S, supra note
63, at 15 (“Of the more than 120 refineries producing gasoline in the United States,
processing complexity ranges from the relatively simple topping-reforming plants to
extensive coking deep conversion systems.”).
119
PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 62. See also FTC, GASOLINE
PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 66 n.66 (noting investments to enable processing
lower-quality crude).
120
See USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 13 (New technology
developed in the 1930s “require[s] much larger capital to construct and maintain the
refinery proper.”); id. at 28 (listing the need to secure “adequate capital” to build new
capacity and technology as one of the major problems of smaller refiners); MILLER &
SHEA, supra note 37, at 31 (“The time has arrived [1941] when it is possible for the
industry to obtain virtually what it desires from petroleum and its gaseous
hydrocarbons by an increasing variety of catalytic and synthetic processes, which give
the flexibility so desirable and necessary for profitable operations.”). Leffler gives some
detailed hypothetical examples that demonstrate how different refinery characteristics
affect the output streams. See LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 219-21.
121
See WHITTEN & WHITTEN, supra note 81, at 137.
118

Economies of scale in refining, the efficiencies in close fractional refining
(rather than waste various oils, refiners tried to maximize production of the
more marketable products and to offer the remainder for specialized uses),
and the superior products from the refining process combined to give refiners
a strong competitive advantage over small-scale distillers.
Id.
122
PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 39 (“Upgrading pipes, controls,
catalysts, and boosting process temperatures and pressures is no longer cost effective
without major changes in the capacity or configuration of reactor vessels—changes that
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Wider trends in manufacturing also affected gasoline
refining and retailing. The last decades of the twentieth
century saw increased attention paid to inventory control, with
“just-in-time” manufacturing processes124 cutting inventory
costs in a wide range of businesses.125 Trends in retailing, such
as the rise of retail giants like Wal-Mart, also had an impact as
those companies moved into gasoline retailing, bringing their
buying power to bear on the price and terms of gasoline sales.126
Refiners expanded vertically into higher-margin retailing, with
service stations evolving to include convenience stores.127 These
changes, together with the closure of smaller and less efficient
are much more expensive. ‘Most of the easy, low-hanging-fruit investments have been
made,’ said one participant.
Another concurred: ‘The capacity for additional
improvements is declining.’ Mid-size and smaller refineries could probably still obtain
10-15 percent increases, observed a third respondent, but larger firms ‘probably can’t
go a whole heck of a lot higher.’”).
123
Id. at 43 (“The petroleum refining industry relies on mature technologies
and processes—many of which were developed decades ago. The increases in
productivity experienced in the 1990s were achieved through incremental
improvements in existing refinery equipment, processes, and practices. ‘Not much is
being done on the processes themselves,’ said one executive of a leading operating
company.”).
124
Just-in-time, or lean production cuts costs through aggressive inventory
management and other techniques. See S. Robson Walton, Wal-Mart, Supplier
Partners, and the Buyer Power Issue, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 509 (2005) (describing
techniques and assessing impact of Wal-Mart’s cost-cutting on partners).
125
See id. at 518-22 (describing cost-cutting). Just-in-time techniques have
spread to the gasoline business with “better market information and transparency.
With greater information about the status of a firm’s supply chain and inventories,
maintaining just-in-time operations and running on the edge have become less risky
from a business perspective.” PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 42. See also
FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 54-55 (noting trend toward reduction
of inventories of gasoline to reduce costs and to free up capital for other investments);
id. at 76 (noting impact on reducing prices by making refineries more efficient and
increasing them by making the system less tolerant of unplanned outages).
126
See infra note 165.
127
Yergin describes the early evolution of the gasoline retail market as
follows:
Before the 1920s, most gasoline was sold by storekeepers, who kept the motor
fuel in cans or other containers under the counter or out in back of the store.
The product carried no brand name, and the motorist could not be sure if he
was getting gasoline or a product that had been adulterated with cheaper
naphtha or kerosene.
....
In 1920, certainly no more than 100,000 establishments sold gasoline; fully
half of them were grocery stores, general stores, and hardware stores. Few of
those stores were selling gasoline a decade later. In 1929, the estimated
number of retail establishments selling gasoline had grown to 300,000.
Almost all of them were gas stations or garages.
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 209.
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refineries, reduced refiners’ excess capacity, and so the amount
of spot market, unbranded gasoline.128 The spot market for
essentially commodified gasoline had provided needed
flexibility for the national market, allowing quick response to
shortages. But as the spot market shrank in the 1990s, the
ability to make up for shortfalls caused by even a temporary
closure of a particular refinery129 declined.
3. The Properties of Gasoline and the Market
The physical process of gasoline production is crucial to
understanding the market for gasoline. Refineries produce a
wide range of products, including nonfuel products from
solvents to asphalt, chemical feedstocks such as benzene, and
fuels including diesel, jet fuel, kerosene, liquefied petroleum
gas, residual fuel oil,130 distillate fuel oil, and motor gasoline.131
Gasoline comes in many varieties, as it has almost from the
beginning of the industry.132 Indeed, “gasoline” is now defined
in the technical literature simply as “complex mixtures of
hydrocarbons having typical boiling ranges from 100 to 400ºF
128
A spot market is one “in which a commodity or currency is traded for
immediate delivery. It is distinguished from a futures or a forward market, in which
contracts for delivery at some future date are traded.” THE MIT DICTIONARY OF
MODERN ECONOMICS 398 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d ed. 1986).
129
See PARKASH, supra note 82, at 384 (noting need for refineries to change
product mix in response to conditions such as “a critical pump-out of service, partially
coked-up furnace, catalyst bed with high pressure drop or low activity, a delayed ship
causing severe ullage constraints, or a change of specifications can upset the best-laid
plans” for output). The need to shift from aviation fuel to gasoline had contributed to
the post-World War II shortages. YERGIN, supra note 27, at 410.
130
Residual fuel oil (or “resid”)

is the viscous residuum of the refining process which strips the lighter
molecules from crude oil. Because of its consistency—it sometimes cannot be
pumped unless heated—resid cannot be transported long distances
economically except by water . . . . The primary U.S. market for resid is as a
utility and industrial fuel . . . .
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 144-45.
131
EPA, PROFILE, supra note 68, at 4.
132
As early as 1917, the FTC noted that “[t]he idea that gasoline is gasoline is
erroneous.” FTC, 1915, supra note 92, at 44. A 1958 survey identified forty types of
gasoline produced by refineries. GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 9 (citing
American Petroleum Institute survey from 1958, published in Info. Bull. No. 11).
Today, “gasolines of many different designs have evolved to meet local needs and
legislation.” Blackmore, supra note 92, at 218; see also JOHN K. PEARSON, IMPROVING
AIR QUALITY: PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES FOR THE AUTO INDUSTRY 83 (2001)
(“Gasoline composition varies depending upon the crude oil source, refinery processes
used in its manufacture, and the amount of oxygenated compounds added in the final
blend.”).
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(38 to 205ºC) as determined by the ASTM method,”133 leaving
open the application of the term to a wide range of substances.
As one refinery executive noted, “Gasoline is not gasoline
anymore. It is a specialty chemical.”134
There are many properties that differentiate gasolines
from one another. These properties determine both engine
performance135 and the environmental effects of burning the
These impacts are not simple or
particular gasoline.136
unidimensional. Particular characteristics of gasoline can have
both positive and negative impacts on engine performance and
the environment, often making the precise mix of
characteristics a matter of tradeoffs. The motives for changes
in gasoline characteristics vary over time. For example, the
EPA seeks to reduce SOX emissions and to improve catalytic
converter performance by reducing the amount of sulfur in
fuels.137 Yet early efforts to reduce gasoline’s sulfur content
were market-driven. For example, in the 1880s, the Lima,
Ohio oil field produced sulfur-contaminated oil that yielded
products so odiferous that they were virtually impossible to
sell,138 and in the post-World War II period, sulfur was “an
important contributor to engine wear and deposits.”139
133
GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 9 (citing American Petroleum
Institute survey from 1958, published in Info. Bull. No. 11). See also J.G. Calvert, J.B.
Heywood, R.F. Sawyer & J.H. Seinfeld, Achieving Acceptable Air Quality: Some
Reflections on Controlling Vehicle Emissions, 261 SCIENCE 37, 42 (1993) (“Gasoline is a
complex mixture containing hundreds of different HCs; its physical and chemical
properties are difficult to describe with a few parameters.”); Blackmore, supra note 92,
at 217 (discussing meaning of the term “gasoline”).
134
PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 21 (quoting a “technology and
services executive”).
135
GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 14 (“The Reid vapor pressure (RVP)
and boiling range of gasoline governs ease of starting, engine warm-up, rate of
acceleration, loss by crankcase dilution, mileage economy, and tendency toward vapor
lock.”); LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 130-31.
136
Data from a study before the widespread use of boutique fuels found major
differences in emissions from different forms of gasoline. A 1993 article, for example,
reported:

Recent data . . . indicate that the highest exhaust emission fuels had some
combination of T50 (the temperature at which 50% of the fuel evaporates)
values greater than 100ºC, T90 (the temperature at which 90% of the fuel
evaporates) values exceeding 171ºC, or sulfur content greater than 300 parts
per million by weight. . . . According to a 1992 survey, 20% of commercial
fuels exceeded these distillation cutpoints and 40% of commercial fuels
exceeded the sulfur cutpoint.
Calvert, Heywood, Sawyer & Seinfeld, supra note 133, at 40.
137
NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 43.
138
GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 3.
139
NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 262.
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Similarly, controlling evaporation from storage tanks first
became an industry priority as a cost-cutting measure,140 only
later becoming an environmental measure.
One major characteristic of gasoline is its volatility,
measured in terms of Reid Vapor Pressure (RVP) or the
Drivability Index (DI).141 “Overall, lower RVP appears to be the
major contributor to lowered VOC [volatile organic compounds]
emissions resulting from the use of RFG [reformulated
gasoline].”142 But too low an RVP can cause incomplete
combustion in the engine, leading to higher HC emissions due
to unburnt fuel.143 Gasoline with a higher RVP improves
starting in cold conditions, but, at high temperatures and
altitudes, can cause vapor lock, which degrades engine
performance.144 Optimizing the volatility of a gasoline blend
thus
involves
tradeoffs
over
several
performance
characteristics and consideration of the altitude and
temperatures of the area where the gasoline will be used.
Since at least the 1930s, refiners have optimized their products’
volatility for different temperature and pressure conditions,
and a number of other characteristics as well.145 Different
140

Id. at 258.
“The Reid vapor pressure is approximately the vapor pressure of the
gasoline at 100ºF (38ºC) in absolute units (ASTM designation D-323).” GARY &
HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 15. See also Blackmore, supra note 92, at 228
(discussing volatility issues). The Driveability Index is calculated from “three specified
distillation points plus an oxygen content measurement in some forms of the
calculation.” NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 93.
142
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL OF REFORMULATED
GASOLINE 142 (1999) [hereinafter NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL].
143
Blackmore, supra note 92, at 228. Too low an RVP, however, and “the
vapour pressure in the fuel tank can fall to a dangerously low level under cold ambient
conditions whereby it falls below the upper flammability limit of the gasoline, thereby
posing a risk of fire during refueling.” Id. at 225; see also id. at 228-29 (discussing
impact of volatility on driving performance and emissions).
144
GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 11.
145
As early as the 1930s, refiners began to introduce “seasonally balanced”
gasolines with characteristics that varied with location and season, making them more
volatile in winter to help starting, and less volatile in the summer to boost mileage.
GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 478; LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 131; NPC, IMPACT, supra
note 28, at 256 (volatility optimization). Customers seek a range of gasoline
characteristics.
141

In general, customers will be looking for good performance under all weather
conditions (power, smoothness (driveability), cold starting, fuel economy), for
reliability (no engine damage, no undesirable combustion noise such as
knock, cleanliness and non-corrosion of the components) and for
environmental acceptability (not only legislated exhaust and evaporative
emissions, but also low odour levels, and the ability to meet regular emission
checks).
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gasolines are generally defined in terms of desired properties
rather than by their particular components. But the definition
of the optimal mix of characteristics has changed significantly
over time, as evolving production techniques gave refiners
greater control over gasoline composition.146 For example,
“front end volatility” of gasolines increased after World War II
into the 1960s because the higher volatility “improved
performance characteristics markedly.”147 Today, of course, a
primary concern is reducing volatility to reduce vehicle
emissions.148
Since World War II, gasolines have often contained, in
addition to their various hydrocarbon components, a variety of
additives designed to improve some aspect of their
performance.149 In particular, additives that control engine
“knock” by increasing octane have played an important role.150
Perhaps the most important innovation was the Ethyl
Blackmore, supra note 92, at 217.
146
See NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 261-62 (“Following World War II,
motor gasoline changed from a relatively simple mixture of petroleum fractions into a
complex product made by careful blending of many intermediate refinery stocks. . . .
[T]he refiner is able to exercise close control over the final product to give it desired
properties.”).
147
Id. at 263. These improvements include “starting easier, warmup is
quicker, there is less crankcase dilution and, to a lesser extent, an improvement has
been made in cylinder deposits and engine wear.” Id.
148
See infra note 514 and accompanying text.
149
Blackmore, supra note 92, at 238 (discussing increasing need for additives
for product differentiation, maintaining engines, and preventing corrosion and deposits
from mandated oxygenates); NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 52 (noting
that in the 1970s, “[s]pecial detergent or dispersant additives are now available to help
maintain a clean carburetion system, resulting in improved engine performance, better
mileage in city driving, reduced carburetor maintenance and reduced exhaust
pollutants”); NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 256 (“Additives now [1967] are used not
only for octane improvement and stability, but also to reduce carbon deposits, clean
carburetors, prevent carburetor icing, prevent corrosion, reduce spark plug fouling, and
for many other quality improvements.”); id. at 263 (“Prior to 1950, the number of
different additives used in gasolines was relatively small.”); YERGIN, supra note 27, at
549 (“[P]urpose [of additives] was to carve out brand identification for a product,
gasoline, that was, after all, a commodity that was more-or-less the same, whatever its
brand name. In a period of a year and a half, in the mid-1950s, thirteen of the top
fourteen marketers began to sell new ‘premium’ gasolines, racing hard to outdo one
another in extravagant claims.”).
150
GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 13. Anti-knocking ability is
measured in terms of octane numbers. As engines increased in their compression
ratios, higher octane-number gasoline became necessary. MILLER & SHEA, supra note
37, at 29. “The type of hydrocarbons present in gasoline governs its anti-knock value,
and therefore this property of motor fuel is controllable in cracked and synthesized
gasoline.” Id. at 30. The octane number serves as an index to relate the gasoline in
question to the standard of a mixture of normal heptane (octane equal to zero) and
isooctane (octane equal to 100). Id.; see also Blackmore, supra note 92, at 221
(describing knocking problem in depth).
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Corporation’s introduction of anti-knock gasoline in the 1920s,
which forced companies without contracts for Ethyl’s additives
to develop their own high-performance fuels.151 Lead, for
example, was added to gasoline for many years to improve its
octane rating152 and, more recently, methyl tertiary butyl ether
(MTBE) was added to reduce the environmental impact of
combustion and boost octane.153 In short, products labeled
“gasoline” initially varied substantially from retailer to
retailer.154 Early retail gasoline competition focused on quality
claims155 as consumers gradually learned to distinguish
differences relevant to performance.156 Some states attempted
quality regulations, but these initial efforts were based on an
imperfect understanding of gasoline quality.157 Similarly, today
151

GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 287-92.
MILLER & SHEA, supra note 37, at 30. The discovery of lead’s anti-knock
properties had “radical repercussions for the oil industry . . . [and] became one of the
components of the dominant design in the search (in the era of ferment) to increase the
quality of fuel.” TAMINIAU, supra note 38, at 55. See also Arnold W. Reitze Jr., The
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives Under Section 211 of the Clean Air Act, 29
TULSA L.J. 485, 497-98 (1994).
153
LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 141-45. See NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at
82-89 (overview of MTBE use). Of course, both were eventually removed from U.S.
gasolines because of their overall negative environmental impacts. See NAS, OZONEFORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 107 (lead phased out to protect catalytic
converters); infra note 525.
154
For example, a 1935 analysis concluded that
152

almost any gasoline could operate satisfactorily the automobile of 1920, and
many fuels were then evaluated more in psychological and esthetic ways than
in terms of performance. But today [1935] the automobile gasoline must be
made so that its properties will conform to the requirements of a high-speed
high-compression motor . . . . In order to fill these and other new economic
needs the industry began to treat the crude oil in special ways to produce
products of higher quality and a greater variety of properties.
MILLER & SHEA, supra note 37, at 27 (quoting Frederick D. Rossini, Chemical
Constitution of the Gasoline Fraction of Petroleum, REFINER AND NAT. GASOLINE MFR.,
June 1935, at 255). Early refineries produced kerosene of such variable quality that
the very name of the Standard Oil Company was chosen to convey the “standard
quality of the product.” YERGIN, supra note 27, at 40. Of course, variable quality in
kerosene was particularly dangerous—“[i]f the kerosene contained too much flammable
gasoline or naphtha, as sometimes happened, the purchaser’s attempt to light it could
be his last act on this earth.” Id.
155
GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 180-81 (Early competition between Standard
(Indiana) and Wadhams Oil Company of Wisconsin was over quality. Wadhams
argued gas from cracking was inferior, Standard argued its gas was uniform in quality.
The main issue was which worked better under cold conditions.).
156
Id. at 182 (Light-gravity gas started easier but had greater tendency to
vapor lock and gave less mileage. Motorists soon recognized this.).
157
Id. at 179 (States regulated gasoline quality and these laws “were based
upon gasoline obtained directly from crude oil” and refined products processed with
cracking, etc. could not satisfy the definitions (which specified a gravity of at least 63
degrees).).
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many gasolines are blended with ethanol, initially thought to
improve environmental quality, but now largely seen as
ineffective.158
Over time, however, the consistency of gasoline
converged in several key respects.159 From the consumer’s point
of view, the most important was the gradual standardization of
octane ratings; three roughly similar grades of gasoline are
now offered by most U.S. gasoline retailers.160 Although some
gasoline retailers attempted to differentiate their products
through the use of particular additives161 or unusual octane
ratings,162 from the 1920s to the 1980s, gasoline steadily
became more of a commodity in which price competition
dominated competition through product differentiation.163 Not
158
See Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 19, 28-37 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L.
Smith, Jr. eds., 1992) (reviewing the politics of the oxygenate provisions in the CAA
Amendments of 1990).
159
NPC, 1990S, supra note 63, at 15 (“With the exception of the additives
package, which is typically unique from brand to brand, gasolines are generally
interchangeable.”); id. at 30 (stating that “most current gasolines are truly
interchangeable products”); see also NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 95 (noting
development of ASTM standards for gasoline specifications and efforts by refiners to
use “internal specifications” to assure quality).
160
LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 137.
161
Mobil, for example, promoted the inclusion of detergents in its gasoline
starting in the 1950s. See United Dairy Farmers, http://www.udfinc.com/mobil/ (last
visited Apr. 12, 2007) (“Mobil has long recognized that gasoline detergent additives are
necessary for modern vehicles to stay in top operating condition. In fact, Mobil was the
first gasoline marketer to use detergents, back in 1954, 40 years before the U.S.
government began to require their use. Since that time, we’ve continued our
leadership position in gasoline detergency. In 1985, Mobil was the first to use
detergents that cleaned fuel injectors. We continue to use state of the art detergent
additives in all of our gasoline grades.”). Exxon told consumers, “[p]ut a Tiger in your
Tank.” See Tiger, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiger (last visited Apr. 12,
2007) (describing Exxon’s use of tiger mascot). Amoco sold unleaded gasoline long
before gasoline retailers were required to do so and marketed the absence of lead as an
advantage. See Leslie H. Moeller, Nick Hodson & Brad Wolfsen, The Superpremium
Premium, STRATEGY+BUSINESS, Winter 2004, available at http://www.strategybusiness.com/press/16635507/04401.
162
Dirlam & Kahn, supra note 33, at 831 (describing how Sun Oil competed in
the 1950s by “offering higher than standard octane gasoline at standard prices” and so
“giving the customer more for his money”); James B. McNallen, A New Concept in
Gasoline Marketing, 22 J. MKTG. 273 (1958) (discussing Sun’s marketing strategy).
163
Jones, supra note 116, at xxi (“In the period up to the late 1970s there was
an element of performance competition amongst the major oil companies, but since that
time this element of competition has largely disappeared and, in respect of petroleum
fuels at least, it has become much more of a commodity market meeting industry
standard specifications. Where companies have sought to distinguish their fuels in
recent years it has rarely been on the basis of performance . . . .”); see also Vernon T.
Clover, Price Influence of Unbranded Gasoline, 17 J. MKTG. 388, 393 (1953) (noting that
a study of independent gasoline retailers in the 1950s found that “[i]ndependents, as
compared to standards, offer little in the way of services, and put little stress upon
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surprisingly, as the product became more of a commodity,
refining became a low-margin business,164 and any effort to
raise prices caused the price leader to lose market share.165 As
refiners’ attempts to reduce competition failed, the gasoline
market increasingly approached the economics textbook ideal.
Thus, market forces helped bring about a relatively steady
decline in the real price of gasoline—aided, of course, by the
decline of real crude oil prices that occurred throughout most of
this period.
The crucial point for our purposes is that gasoline is a
complex commodity, the design of which presents refiners with
a large number of tradeoffs.166 Gasolines differ in terms of their
environmental impacts and their engine performance. With
gasoline composition largely unregulated through the 1980s,167
market pressures during that decade commodified gasoline,
pushing it toward a more-or-less standard set of characteristics
about which consumers cared (e.g., octane), broadening and
deepening the market for gasoline.168 Refiners remained free to
attractive buildings and facilities, and uniformed employees,” instead stressing prices
below the standards).
164
See, e.g., Walter Pfeiffer, Refining: Let the Good Times Roll (Paper
Presented at CERAWeek 2005), available at http://www.accenture.com/Countries/
Canada/Research_And_Insights/RefiningLetGoodTimesRoll.htm (last visited Apr. 12,
2007) (“Over the last 20 years conventional wisdom has been that refining is capital
intensive and low margin. The industry has been trapped in a period of limited
demand growth, overcapacity and low profitability, coupled with repeated boom-andbust cycles. It has become viewed as more of a necessity, rather than an attractive
business in which to invest and grow . . . .”). Pfeiffer forecasts better times ahead,
however. Id.
165
Further evidence of the commodification of gasoline is the development of
new forms of marketing gasoline to develop alternative revenue streams. As early as
the 1920s, Standard Oil of Indiana was treating its service stations as vehicles for the
sale of a broad array of products, giving managers quotas for its entire range of
products from furniture to lubricants. GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 283 (“By the late
1920’s Standard service stations had evolved into stores for the sale of petroleum
products instead of simply being gasoline filling stations.”). Grocery stores are
increasingly using gasoline sales as a loss leader today. See Penelope Patsuris, WalMart’s Next Victims, FORBES, Nov. 10, 2004 (describing Wal-Mart’s move into gas
sales); Report: Gas Group Fumes Over Giant Eagle Discounts, PITT. BUS. TIMES, Mar.
14, 2005, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/stories/2005/03/14/
daily7.html (describing grocery store use of fuel discounts to gain market share).
166
For example, hydrotreating gasoline to remove sulfur also reduces octane
by approximately ten numbers in “FCC gasoline” (that made with fluid catalyticcracking units). NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 45.
167
The major exception was the mandatory phaseout of lead in the 1970s and
1980s. See infra notes 496-502 and accompanying text.
168
Market pressures during the 1980s were particularly effective as the
industry had excessive domestic refining capacity through the mid-1990s as a result of
the distortions introduced by MOIP and 1970s price controls/allocation system. See
NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 21.

2007]

WHY GASOLINE COSTS SO MUCH

973

alter other gasoline characteristics to maximize profits,
producing gasoline blends that varied with refinery equipment
and crude supplies. Since then, however, environmental
regulations and engine performance demands have complicated
the market by introducing new requirements.169
4. The Impact of Distribution Systems
Gasoline was originally transported by tank wagons and
The “most revolutionary development” in
rail cars.170
transportation was the 1929 conversion of an oil pipeline into a
gasoline pipeline running from Bayonne, New Jersey to
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.171 “With a carrying charge far below
railroad freight rates, gasoline could now be shipped into the
Middle West via the Ohio River and the Great Lakes and have
a profound competitive effect upon the price of gasoline from
Wood River, Whiting, and other Mid-Continent refineries.”172
Pipeline capacity rapidly expanded in the 1930s. Capacity
grew from 1,289 miles in 1930 to over 8,000 miles by 1940.173
By the 1980s, the pipeline networks and the rest of the
transportation system174 had grown to allow refiners to ship
across wide territories,175 although significant gaps remained.176
169
NPC, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 13, at I-18 (“As product specifications
become more restrictive, the ability to utilize all the flexibility and volume capacity
inherent in the refining system can be diminished.”); PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra
note 76, at xiv (“As demand for petroleum products has grown, their quality and
performance have changed substantially as a result of environmental regulations and
motor vehicle performance requirements.”).
170
GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 46-48 (describing early distribution methods).
171
Id. at 466.
172
Id. at 466-67.
173
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 825.
174
NPC, 1990S, supra note 63, at 23 (“As gasoline moves from each refinery
through the complex maze of transportation modes, through terminals and bulk plants
to the consumer, it may move into many tanks and vessels owned and operated by
different companies.”); PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 23 (“In response to
the changing geography of consumption, a complex network of refined-products
pipelines has evolved.”).
175
FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 210 (“Pipelines are the leading method
used for bulk transport of refined products within the United States; transportation by
water is also important.”); PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 23 (“The East
Coast and the Midwest, while having relatively few refineries given the size of their
population, obtain approximately 40 and 20 percent, respectively, via pipeline and
water carriers from Gulf Coast mega-refineries. The Northeast also relies on a large
increment of refined products (17 percent in 1999) imported from abroad, giving that
region a measure of additional market liquidity.”).
176
PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 23 (“California, Nevada, and
parts of Arizona are largely walled off from the rest of the country by both geography
and stringent local environmental regulations.”).
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“[S]hipments by pipeline increased from 236 billion ton-miles
in 1979 to 299 billion ton-miles in 2001.”177 As gasolines
became commodities, this system allowed shipments to be
treated as interchangeable178 and refiners routinely engaged in
product exchanges to reduce transportation costs and solve
temporary shortages.179
Today the United States has a “complex set of facilities”
that distribute gasoline and other fuels which “includes a
network of geographically dispersed pipelines, marine vessels,
and occasionally rail cars” and which “is made even more
complex by the number of different product variations that
Most large
must be transported to the marketplace.”180
petroleum markets are supplied primarily by local refineries
because “[t]he fundamental transportation and flexibility
advantage of moving crude oil versus a variety of products
generally favors local refiners serving local markets.”181
Distribution systems are critical to the competitiveness of a
local market, however, as they link markets and allow
shipments in and out as local demand and supply conditions
vary. “In some cases a pipeline may have more control over the
pricing and volume of products entering a market than do the
refiners supplying the pipeline.”182
Unfortunately, however, “[a]ccess to refined product
pipelines . . . varies widely among different regions in the U.S.”183
The amount of refinery capacity and the interconnection of an
area with other areas are important determinants of whether
or not market pressures can produce a response to temporary
shortages.184 For example, almost half of U.S. refining capacity
is concentrated on the Gulf Coast,185 while 95% of East Coast

177

FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 210.
NPC, 1990S, supra note 63, at 23 (stating that the “preponderance of
shipments” of gasoline are “interchangeable”).
179
Id. at 23 (“The interchangeability of base motor gasolines is further
demonstrated by the product exchanges between refiners in different locations. It is
typical for a refiner in one location to trade or exchange surplus product to another
refiner located in a different state. . . . Unique additive packages, specified by each
company, are often added at the terminal upon truck loading in order to achieve unique
product quality and marketing differentiation.”).
180
NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 101.
181
Id. at 22.
182
FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 189.
183
FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 80.
184
Id. at 69.
185
Id. at 81.
178
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refineries sit in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware.186
New England, on the other hand, has no refineries or
pipelines,187 and California remains isolated by its special fuel
formulations and lack of pipelines.188
As might be expected, “refinery capacity [also] varies
widely among different regions of the U.S.”189 Refined products
are often not produced where they are used, so they must be
transported to the market. These transportation costs limit the
extent to which any particular refinery can sell its gasolines in
each location and define the extent of market power each will
have in particular areas.
The product mix is also crucial to determining the cost
of transportation. When different products are sent through a
pipeline, for example, the interface between the two products
where some mixing occurs must be sold as the lower-quality
product, producing a loss in value.190 Boutique fuels make this
even more difficult.191
A low degree of connectivity to the broader market has
been crucial in determining the success of some refiners. For
example, “[a] critical asset of many smaller refiners is their
location in interior markets where a lack of pipeline access
protects them from competition from large coastal refineries.”192
Extending a pipeline into a small refiner’s territory is a “real
threat.”193 Thus, these higher-cost producers survive only
because they are insulated from competitive pressures by their
relative isolation from the broader market and the costs and
regulatory obstacles associated with entering those markets.

186

Id. at 84.
Id. at 85.
188
Id. at 87.
189
FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 79.
190
NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 105.
191
Id. (“As the number of different products increases and batch sizes
decrease, quality control become more difficult and the effective capacity of the pipeline
system decreases.”); see also id. at 108 (For each new fuel specification, “there will be
distribution system modifications required.”).
192
PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 18-19; see also NPC,
ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 29 (“In some situations, local markets are isolated from
direct product supply routes and are therefore more expensive to supply from distant
refining centers.”); FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 52 (“A small
refinery’s cost disadvantages from small-scale operation may be offset if it is located
near an area of crude oil production or strong gasoline consumption, so that
transportation costs are low, or if it is able to serve a niche market.”).
193
PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 67.
187
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Understanding the Market for Gasoline

This brief overview of the non-regulatory aspects of
gasoline markets paints the following picture: Gasoline has a
broad range of characteristics produced from a substance that
itself varies significantly, using equipment that varies from
location to location. Its production remains subject to various
constraints imposed by the crude, the equipment, and the
characteristics of the final product demanded by consumers.
Market pressures produced a commodity fuel from this mix of
unique inputs, equipment, and outputs, at least with respect to
the characteristics about which consumers have a preference
(e.g., octane, RVP).
Refiners were able to create this
commodity by using other aspects of gasoline composition (e.g.,
the particular combination of hydrocarbon fractions blended
into a particular batch) because the differences among these
characteristics were invisible to, and so irrelevant for,
consumers. Refiners were also able to continually expand
output from refineries through technological progress, again
making use of the ability to use a variety of blendstocks
without changing the consumer-demanded characteristics of
the gasoline. The price of being able to do so, however, was
increasing the complexity of refineries to give them the
flexibility to process quite different crudes into gasolines with
the appropriate consumer-demanded characteristics.
Without the impact of either economic or environmental
regulation of refining, the market for gasoline was likely
headed toward fewer, larger, more complex refineries
producing
a
product
with
sufficiently
commodified
characteristics that consumers primarily differentiated among
gasolines by price. In the absence of regulation, therefore, we
would expect to see a national market for gasolines, with
regional variations in composition designed to promote uniform
performance under a range of local conditions. The limit to
such a market would likely be transportation costs. Those, in
turn, would likely have been derived primarily from the extent
of the pipeline and tanker network. Because businesses in
other markets have prospered by solving similar logistical
problems,194 an unregulated gasoline market would likely have
led to logistical innovations, extending the market’s size. This
194
See MICHAEL BERGDAHL, WHAT I LEARNED FROM SAM WALTON: HOW TO
COMPETE AND THRIVE IN A WAL-MART WORLD 126-27 (2004) (describing Wal-Mart’s
logistics savings).
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conclusion stems from the above analysis and the almost
uninterrupted trends toward such a market, despite the radical
shifts in regulatory policy since World War II, which are
described in the next section.
How competitive would gasoline markets be in the
absence of regulation? Counterfactuals are always difficult to
prove, but it seems most likely that markets would have tended
toward the competitive end of the spectrum for two reasons.
First, from the consumer’s perspective, gasoline has moved
steadily toward commodity status, particularly during the
comparatively unregulated early period and the brief return to
relatively unregulated status during the 1980s. During this
period (and into the 1990s), refineries became more efficient
and competitive.195 Second, although the capital intensity of
modern refineries makes entry more costly than it would be in
a less capital-intensive industry, capital intensity alone is not a
sufficient barrier to entry to prevent the development of
competition where opportunities for profit exist. The industry
would likely have attracted new entrants. Indeed, when excess
capacity declined in the 1980s, additional capacity in existing
refineries quickly eliminated the higher than usual returns
that the industry briefly enjoyed during the late 1980s.196
Moreover, as economic deregulation occurred in the 1980s, new
firms did enter the refining industry by buying existing
refineries.197 We now turn to the impact of regulatory policy
and the question of whether it produced negative regulatory
externalities that fragment the market.
II.

REGULATORY IMPACTS

Energy markets have historically been subject to
numerous regulations from a wide range of federal and state
agencies. One analysis of U.S. policy through the 1970s
concluded that the dominant theme was a “drift toward
government control” of the oil industry, perhaps best explained
“by the tendency to presume that any situation defined as a
problem must have a solution, and that a solution is, ipso facto,
195
NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 30 (using financial data collected by the
Energy Information Administration to demonstrate increased competitiveness).
196
Id. at 32 (returns to capital rose to 13% in 1988-1989 before declining to 4%
in 1990-1998 as new capacity came online).
197
For example, Valero, the largest U.S. refiner today, bought its first refinery
in 1981. Valero Energy Corp., Valero Through the Years, http://www.valero.com/
About+Valero/History/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
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worth pursuing.”198 These regulations have had a major impact
on gasoline markets, if not always the impact intended.
Although the focus shifted from economic regulation to
environmental regulation after the 1981 decontrol of oil prices,
the depth of the interaction between the government and the
market continued. In this section, we describe the major
economic and environmental regulations that shaped the
gasoline market.
A.

Economic Regulatory Activity and Gasoline Markets

U.S. energy policy reflects numerous twists and turns,
falling into five distinct periods, each characterized by a
different approach to government intervention.
1. The Early Years
The regulatory story of the refining business, and of the
oil business more generally, begins with Standard Oil and its
opponents’ efforts to defeat the company’s alleged monopolistic
advantage.199 Indeed, one of the abiding themes of American
regulatory policy—fear of monopoly—was present virtually
from the start of the oil industry.
The recurrence of
government intervention aimed at preventing monopoly bred
“an unusually virulent and mutual distrust between
government and the oil industry” that has persisted ever
since.200
There is extensive literature on Standard Oil and the
evidence on whether the company harmed or helped consumers
remains decidedly mixed.201 For example, despite playing the
villain to the trust-busters’ hero, Standard Oil actually
contributed positively toward the creation of a national market
in gasoline. The company took the lead in creating a standard
form of gasoline. Indeed, John D. Rockefeller chose the name
198

BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 14-15.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); see also GIDDENS,
supra note 37, at 124-25 (describing issuance of opinion by Supreme Court). The
attack was led by Ida M. Tarbell, whose series in McClure’s was later published as a
554-page, two-volume work with 242 pages of appendices including copies of contracts,
maps, and reproductions of letters. David M. Chalmers, Introduction to IDA M.
TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY at xiv-xv, xxii (David M.
Chalmers ed., Dover Publ’ns, Briefer ed. 2003) (1966).
200
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 34.
201
See 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1070-1105 (summarizing Standard Oil
case and analyzing welfare effects).
199
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“Standard Oil” in part to convey the image of a standardized
product, a key marketing advantage in the early years of the
petroleum industry, when many refined products varied widely
in quality.202 Standard Oil also played an integral part in
establishing a national market for petroleum products by
building infrastructure to help move oil and refined products
around the nation.203 By 1910, a truly national gasoline market
had begun to emerge, ironically weakening Standard Oil’s
market power just as the antitrust-based assault on the
company reached its climax.204 On the other hand, there is
little doubt that Standard Oil and its successors repeatedly
attempted to cartelize the industry. Indeed, the trend toward
consolidation was apparent by the end of the Civil War, only a
few years after the first oil well began producing.205 Such
efforts are unsurprising. After all, the dream of monopoly
profits casts a tempting lure and there is no reason to expect
the oil industry to be any better able to resist this lure than
other firms.
Anti-monopoly efforts give government involvement in
gasoline markets a lengthy pedigree. In the Standard Oil
cases, the result was a famous court-ordered breakup in
1911,206 followed by various antitrust actions seeking additional
remedies when the newly-separated Standard companies
provided less vigorous competition for one another than
Despite these
antitrust authorities thought optimal.207
aggressive antitrust efforts, before the outbreak of the First
World War, U.S. refining was “expanding and profitable.”208
By the end of World War I, a second regulatory concern
had appeared: national security. The Great War highlighted
202

See id. at 1093.
Id. at 1089-94 (summarizing Standard Oil’s contributions).
204
WHITTEN & WHITTEN, supra note 81, at 147 (“At the peak of Standard’s
power, the trust controlled over 90 percent of crude oil production and refining
capacity. By the time the firm was dismembered under court order—the manifestation
of the public’s fear and ignorance—Standard controlled less than 70 percent of
production and refining, and the percentages were falling.”).
205
Id. at 10.
206
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
207
The breakup was insufficient to end the “problem,” however, as the new
companies created continued to be owned by overlapping shareholder groups. 1 BRADLEY,
supra note 74, at 1087. Public suspicions of the oil companies continued, fueled by
observations that the newly independent Standard companies did not invade one
another’s territories. Id. at 1089. Thus, although formal coordination had been ended,
antitrust regulators feared that informal coordination among the Standard companies
was continuing to restrain competition and keep prices above the competitive level.
208
2 id. at 1110.
203
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the military importance of oil supplies209 and wartime price
Responding to these
controls caused supply problems.210
concerns, the federal government deemphasized its antitrust
activity as regulatory attention shifted to maximizing
production for the war effort.211 Because national security
concerns often run counter to antitrust policies, federal energy
policy can appear bipolar as it cycles between them.212
A third regulatory motive appeared during World War I
as energy companies recognized that influencing government
policy was potentially lucrative. Wartime price controls put
many refiners into financial difficulties, prompting some to
seek government assistance.213 Rent-seeking by oil interests
began in earnest as the wartime experience created new
players in energy regulation debates in the form of oil trade
associations organized to lobby for industry favors in
Washington.214
A related desire to prevent “excessive competition”
presented yet another justification for regulation after the war.
The post-war boom saw oil production and use soar.215
Domestic oil discoveries increased, and although these made
the United States a net exporter of petroleum by 1923,216
increased supplies exerted consistent downward price
209
Mining Laws of 1872 and 1989: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Mineral
Resources Development and Production of the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources, 101st Cong. 35 (1990) (“The 1920 Mineral Leasing Act . . . was passed in
1920 after the United States had fought the great war in which oil powered ships and
other vehicles had played a vital role.”); CARL J. MAYER & GEORGE A. RILEY, PUBLIC
DOMAIN, PRIVATE DOMINION: A HISTORY OF PUBLIC MINERAL POLICY IN AMERICA 169
(1985) (Oil lands policy after the war “met the needs of a powerful official constituency,
the American military.”).
210
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 28.
211
HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 10.
212
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 33.
213
2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1111.
214
HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 10 (“The newly organized trade associations
remained as a prominent part of the postwar economy. Business leaders, especially
those who had worked in Washington, had caught a new vision of what could be done
by economic planning and business-government cooperation. A new breed of public
administrators, skilled in the techniques of wartime control, were more prone to reject
competitive values and stress the goal of a planned economy.”). Of course, national
security and military concerns continue to surface in energy policy debates today, and
often touch on a wide range of related issues. See Jon Schutz, An Analysis of the 2001
National Energy Policy: Is a Domestic Production-Based Oil Policy Appropriate for the
United States?, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 307 (2004) (surveying U.S. dependence on
foreign oil and energy security issues).
215
GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 172 (crude consumption up from 240,000,000
barrels in 1912 to 412,000,000 barrels in 1918).
216
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 20.
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pressure.217 Oil producers worried that too much competition in
production kept prices low,218 while conservationists worried
that excessive consumption would deplete stocks.219
Oilproducing states tried to regulate production to prevent
technical inefficiencies from dissipating the resource through
over-drilling, and made an effort to keep prices higher for
mineral rights owners by restraining production.220 These
efforts had limited success,221 although the development of legal
doctrines such as pooling held out the promise of a solution to
the problem of wastefully rapid production.222
Demand for gasoline continued to grow through the
1920s, rising from 2,747,000,000 gallons per year to
15,051,000,000 gallons per year between 1918 and 1929,
primarily due to increased automobile use.223 Refined product
imports soared from 3,000 barrels per day in 1918 to 82,000
Although the United States
barrels per day in 1929.224
remained the chief oil producer, foreign discoveries began to
create a world-wide crude industry and many of the major oil
companies took steps to limit competition. For instance, the
1928 “As Is” agreement aimed to preserve existing
international market shares; the “Red Line” agreement that
same year limited competition over Middle Eastern production;
and various patent pools restricted competition between the
chemical and petroleum industries.225 Nevertheless, without
enforcement powers, these arrangements typically failed to
prevent competition from resurfacing.226

217
218

1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 88.
Id. at 88-89 (describing industry concern with overproduction of crude in

mid-1920s).
219

HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 27.
See 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 78-131 (comprehensive survey of state
conservation legislation).
221
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 22 (explaining that waste in oil fields was a real
problem in the 1910s-1920s; state boards had been unsuccessful in reigning in
production).
222
See 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 200-11 (describing mandatory pooling
and unitization rules). Bradley makes a convincing case that there were private
alternatives to mandatory pooling and unitization and that these were blocked in part
by antitrust laws. See id. at 211-17.
223
GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 213.
224
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 716 tbl.13.1.
225
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 23, 26-28.
226
Id. at 28 (“[D]espite the elaborate administrative procedures and
interlocking joint-ventures designed to implement these agreements, their
effectiveness was limited by the absence of sovereign authority. Only prorationing
within the United States proved to be durable, comprehensive, and enforceable.”).
220
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These four cornerstones—monopoly, national security,
rent-seeking, and restraining “excessive” competition—laid the
foundation for energy policy throughout the twentieth century
and into the twenty-first. Often contradictory, they yielded
ever-shifting coalitions that brought each policy to the fore at
different times and contributed to the general incoherence of
energy regulatory policy by providing a wide range of policy
targets in different directions. Nonetheless, on the eve of the
Great Depression, despite the shifting attentions of the federal
and state governments, the market for gasoline was well on its
way to becoming a national market. Transportation costs227
and crude prices were falling, while demand for gasoline
continued to skyrocket. Refiners were competing on quality,
driving gasoline toward commodity status,228 and new
technologies were boosting gasoline yields from crude.229 The
monopoly problem was held in check by vigorous competition
and the ease of entry; America was a leading oil producer,
temporarily vitiating the national security concerns; states
were groping toward legal mechanisms like unitization to solve
the technical problems of wasteful production, if not the
economic problem of increasing supply; and regular new
discoveries limited the ability of the incumbents to rent-seek by
undermining collusion.
2. The New Deal
When the Great Depression suffocated the economy of
the Roaring Twenties, oil prices fell dramatically.230 They were
hit particularly hard because of the supply boom caused by the
discovery of substantial reserves in East Texas in 1930.231 More
than 5,000 new wells were drilled there between 1930 and 1932
and the East Texas field alone met one-third of U.S. demand.232
Refinery capacity greatly exceeded the Depression-reduced
demand, with the capacity-to-demand ratio at 1.48.233 Despite
the Depression, technological progress continued and began to
have an important impact by the end of the 1930s, improving
227
228
229
230
231
232
233

See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 77.
See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 254.
HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 212.
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 23.
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 296 tbl.8-8.
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gasoline quality, as an “octane race” developed.234 In oil and
refined products, as elsewhere, Franklin Roosevelt’s
administration sought recovery through measures promoting
higher, more stable prices, bringing the “excessive competition”
policy to the forefront.
Existing state regulatory schemes offered one means of
raising oil prices, but these schemes were too porous, allowing
the so-called “hot oil” to leak out of regulated channels into
commerce, undercutting prices.235 “This bootleg oil was secretly
siphoned off from pipelines, hidden in camouflaged tanks that
were covered with weeds, moved about both in an intricate
network of secret pipelines and by trucks, and then smuggled
across state borders at night.”236 In 1932, oil prices plummeted
further, falling from $1.05 per barrel to $0.25 per barrel, and
Texas and Oklahoma declared martial law in the oil fields in
an attempt to stop hot oil.237 Even when the states were
successful in raising prices and limiting domestic production,
foreign oil imports threatened to undermine their efforts,
sparking demands for tariffs to protect domestic producers.238
The Roosevelt administration severely limited imports of both
crude and refined products in September 1933.239
The federal government moved to assist the states in
restricting hot oil240 by including a provision in the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) giving the president authority
to ban hot oil,241 and imposing a tariff on crude oil imports of
The Roosevelt
twenty-one cents per barrel in 1932.242
administration took several additional steps, including
promulgating an industry-designed Oil Code under the
National Recovery Administration (NRA), which limited

234
GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 600; see also id. at 482 (Despite the Depression,
Standard expanded to upgrade equipment to produce more high-grade gasoline.); 2
BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1134 (“On the eve of hostilities, the U.S. refining industry
was prospering with the automobile age. Markets were expanding, and technological
advances abounded.”).
235
HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 213; YERGIN, supra note 27, at 255-56.
236
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 255.
237
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 23.
238
GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 461 (mid-continent and Gulf Coast producers
wanted a tariff of $1 per barrel in 1929).
239
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 721.
240
Id. at 99-103 (describing hot oil provisions of the NIRA).
241
HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 213.
242
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 92. In an attempt to head off the tariff, several
producers agreed to voluntary cuts in imports of 25% and more. GIDDENS, supra note
37, at 462.
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competition and created a production quota for each state.243
The production quota, as amended in 1934, allocated crude
among refineries,244 further restricting competition. As with
other industries’ codes, the rules included policies that enabled
the industry to take steps to limit competition and so promote
higher prices.245
The Supreme Court struck down the NRA system and
its hot oil provision in 1935,246 but federal intervention had
established a framework in the oil industry that survived the
demise of the NRA itself.
Congress quickly passed the
Interstate Transportation of Petroleum Products Act (also
known as the Connally Hot Oil Act),247 banning transmission of
hot oil in interstate commerce and lending federal assistance in
stopping the leakage.248 Together with “suggested” federal
production limits, this created an informal system that
effectively enforced the “suggested” quotas set out by the
federal government and proved sufficient to coordinate
production even without mandatory federal controls.249 A
congressional investigation later concluded that the various oil
controls formed “a perfect pattern of monopolistic control over
oil production, the distribution thereof among refiners and
distributors, and ultimately the price paid by the public.”250 It
also encouraged the oil industry to look to Washington for
aid.251 The addition of a tariff on foreign oil in 1932 limited the
ability of the growing number of foreign oil producers to
compete on price with domestic producers in the U.S. market,252
243

YERGIN, supra note 27, at 255-56.

Theoretically, [these quotas] were justified as conservation measures, but in
reality the rate of withdrawal bore little relation to what a geologist might
regard as the rate necessary to minimize waste. The state allowables, in fact,
rarely deviated from the monthly estimates of the Federal Bureau of Mines,
estimates that in effect merely stated how much crude oil would be needed to
meet demand for gasoline at the existing price level.
HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 217-18.
244
GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 517.
245
2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1120-27.
246
See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking hot oil
provision); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (striking
NIRA); see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 107-08 (describing impact of these cases).
247
Pub. L. No. 74-14, 49 Stat. 30 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 715 (2000)).
248
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 255.
249
Id. at 257. See also HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 216-17 (describing debates
over federal role).
250
Quoted in HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 219.
251
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 96-98.
252
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 258.

2007]

WHY GASOLINE COSTS SO MUCH

985

while declining production from the East Texas oil field helped
limit hot oil.253 Although crude tariffs began to fall at the end of
the 1930s, the relatively high refined-product tariffs stayed in
place, protecting domestic refiners from foreign competition.254
In effect, a little more than twenty-five years after the decree
breaking up Standard Oil, the federal government created a
more effective oil cartel than Standard Oil ever was.
Antitrust concerns reemerged in the late 1930s, with an
FTC investigation finding evidence of “a wide variety of pricefixing, market-sharing, exclusive dealing, and productionrestricting arrangements” in many industries, including
refining.255 The Madison Oil cases in 1937-1938 led to the
convictions (later overturned) of sixteen corporations and thirty
individuals accused of conspiring to fix prices through a buying
arrangement in which major companies agreed to purchase the
surplus gasoline of specified independent refiners to keep it off
the market.256 (The defendants argued they were merely
continuing activities which the NRA had encouraged.257)
Antitrust activity was sufficiently vigorous in the 1930s and
early 1940s that when Attorney General Tom Clark reviewed
the list of proposed names for industry representatives to the
National Petroleum Council in 1946, he found that more than
half of the executives on the list had been convicted personally,
pled nolo contendere, or headed companies convicted or under
indictment for antitrust violations.258
In the early 1940s, efforts to prepare for war refocused
attention on national security issues.259 A “Petroleum Industry
War Council” was set up with seventy-eight oil company
executives to coordinate working with the government, and
there was “an unprecedented degree” of government control

253

GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 542.
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 722-23.
255
HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 166.
256
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). See also
HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 374, 433 (new trials ordered in eighteen cases and all
charges dismissed in eleven).
257
HAWLEY, supra note 54, at 374.
258
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 35-36.
259
Antitrust concerns resurfaced in the “Mother Hubbard” case, which the
Justice Department brought in 1940 against the American Petroleum Institute and
twenty-two of its largest corporate members. Id. at 34. The case was suspended
during the war, and resumed in 1946, and then dismissed in favor of several suits
against smaller groups of defendants. Id. The clear message of this case was “that its
every action was subject to question by the Attorney General of the United States.” Id.
254
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over the industry.260 As they had in World War I, the demands
of war production dramatically affected the petroleum
industry.
Normal methods of transporting crude and products were disrupted
by the submarine attacks along our East Coast. Future military
requirements for petroleum products were indefinite. For example,
the initial goal for 100 octane [for aircraft] gasoline was set at
120,000 B/D late in 1941, a staggering figure considering that
production at that time was somewhat less than 40,000 B/D. Three
years later, the requirement for 100 octane gasoline was more than
600,000 B/D.261

Refineries broke records for production and new facilities were
built to satisfy the demand for aviation fuel, lubricants, and
toluene (used in bombs).262 Standard of Indiana alone, for
example, had a daily capacity for 1,150,800 gallons of 100
octane aviation gasoline in 1944, more than the entire industry
had before the war.263 Once again, technological progress in
refining was rapid and regulators emphasized coordination of
production over competition, encouraging coordinated efforts
among refiners to meet the military’s needs for fuel.264
The period from the Depression to the end of World War
II saw gasoline markets buffeted by the constant cycling among
government policy aims. Concern over ruinous competition
swung to antitrust vigilance only to have national security
issues trump both. These inconsistent energy policies had a
threefold effect. First, just as they had in World War I, the
demands of wartime production produced rapid technological
innovation which, in turn, spurred better quality that helped
commodify gasoline. Second, the growth in domestic and
international crude supplies, which produced the “ruinous”
competition that the NRA oil code sought to prevent, kept
downward pressure on crude prices. This pressure on prices
masked industry rent-seeking to some degree, since the rents
could be funded by having refined product prices fall more
slowly than crude prices. Third, the artificial limits on U.S.
260

GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 607; see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 23539, 243-48 (discussing World War II-era regulation).
261
NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 324; see also 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at
1136-39 (describing crash program to boost aviation fuel output).
262
GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 609, 615.
263
Id. at 619.
264
2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1138-39 (discussing government coordination
of refining “as though all [plants] were components of one huge refinery” and use of
regulation and subsidies to accomplish that end).
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crude production kept crude prices above world levels, creating
conditions that produced the post-war Mandatory Oil Import
Program to restrict the importation of cheaper foreign crude
oil.
World War II led to improved refinery technology and,
applying that technology to peace-time needs, the market for
gasoline advanced significantly. After the war, much of the
federal petroleum regulatory bureaucracy was “dismantled.”265
With gasoline quality improved, gasoline production ready to
soar, and demand for gasoline poised to explode, had there
been no further interventions, it seems likely that a truly
national and competitive gasoline market would have emerged.
3. From World War II to Price Controls
The end of World War II unleashed tremendous demand
for gasoline as the lifting of wartime rationing and the post-war
boom put Americans on the road in record numbers.266 Demand
for other oil-based fuels also surged as the United States
shifted from a coal-based to an oil-and-gas-based energy
economy.267 Despite shifting refineries from war production to
automobile gasoline, this surge in demand meant there was
little excess refinery capacity in the United States,268 as can be
seen from the fall of the ratio of operating refining capacity to
domestic consumption from 1.48 in 1930 to 1.03 in 1950.269 The
creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) in 1947 cut tariffs on both crude and refined
products,270 boosting imports and making the United States a
net importer of oil for the first time.271 Prices soared, more than
doubling between 1945 and 1948.272 Within a few years,
however, the high prices induced so much entry by new
producers273 that refinery capacity increased beyond demand,
265

1 id. at 248.
NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 255-56; YERGIN, supra note 27, at 409.
267
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 3.
268
NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 255-56; YERGIN, supra note 27, at 409.
269
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 296 tbl.8-8.
270
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 724.
271
JAMES EVERETT KATZ, CONGRESS AND NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 13 (1984);
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 395.
272
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 409. Not surprisingly, this led to “more than
twenty Congressional investigations” and accusations of an oil company conspiracy to
force prices up. Id.
273
Over $2 billion in refining expansion and improvement went into
production between 1946 and 1952. 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1151.
266
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creating “an intensely competitive industry, with the individual
refiners working diligently, as new equipment [was] installed,
to find ways of increasing efficiency and reducing operating
Gasoline markets continued to deepen, prices
cost.”274
continued to fall, and product quality continued to improve as
competition drove refiners to innovate.
Internationally, producing countries began to move into
refining in an effort to boost their share of the revenue from
their oil,275 and the ever-growing stream of cheap foreign oil
began to roil domestic oil politics.276 “Before foreign oil became
available, the state prorationing agencies had managed output
in order to avoid such circumstances. But once cheap oil was
available anywhere in the world economy, it was irresistibly
drawn into the market vacuum that prorationing had created
in the United States.”277 The major oil companies invested
heavily in foreign sources, tanker fleets, shipping facilities, and
coastal refineries, bringing cheaper crude to their U.S.
refineries, and thus gaining a major cost advantage over
independent refiners reliant on higher-cost U.S. sources of
crude.278 By January 1949, imports were growing at an annual
rate of 25%.279 By 1957, imports as a percentage of rising
demand reached 17%, up from 11% just eight years earlier.280
Independent domestic refiners, particularly those located away
from easy access to foreign crude, were left with only the more
expensive domestic crude supplies. These refiners worried,
correctly, that they would lose market share to the refineries
with access to the cheaper foreign crude as those refineries

274

NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 255-56; see also YERGIN, supra note 27, at
409. Differential tariffs encouraged imports of heavy fuels, such as residual oil, and
discouraged imports of lighter fuels, such as gasoline, biasing U.S. refinery production
toward the lighter end. VIETOR, supra note 98, at 101 (The tariff on gasoline was fiftyone cents per barrel but only five cents for resid; as a result, resid imports rose 136%
while imports of more valuable distillate declined 18% in 1953.); id. at 113 (Some
importers began bringing in even more “unfinished oils,” a category that was not
covered and was stuff that needed more refining.).
275
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 436 (noting Venezuela’s move into refining to
capture downstream revenues); id. at 518 (organization that became OPEC formed in
1959 and a key decision was to move into downstream industries like refining).
276
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 91 (stating that imported oil available at half the
price of U.S. oil “caused a major disruption” in energy markets).
277
Id. at 115.
278
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 110 (“Import patterns by firms were
already changing at the time mandatory controls were instituted [in 1959]. A minority
of refineries were importing crude oil; a shrinking majority were not.”).
279
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 95.
280
Id. at 105 tbl.5-5.
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exploited their cost advantage to extend their market
penetration into the independent refiners’ territories.281 Thus,
domestic oil producers feared free trade in oil, turning their
attention to rent-seeking.282 Domestic crude-oil price controls
were reintroduced from 1950 to 1953.283 At the same time, tax
incentives for refinery projects, nominally motivated by
national security concerns, produced a boom in refinery
expansion and construction, especially among small refiners.284
Heavy reliance on foreign oil returned national security
concerns to the U.S. energy debate.285 The massive wartime
collaboration between the refining industry and the
government continued after the war on a slightly smaller
The Suez Canal crisis in 1956, for example,
scale.286
strengthened those favoring a more interventionist policy
toward oil by highlighting the vulnerability of foreign
supplies.287 The 1950s and 1960s also saw “huge investments”
in refining drive down gas prices through “hard competition.”288
In part, this reflected the rise in domestic crude production
that the quotas had produced, a 29% increase between 1959
and 1969.289
281
Id. at 125 (Arguing for protection, “the inland refiners asserted that if
imports were limited to the real importers, their cost advantage would allow them to
penetrate the markets of inland refiners and drive them out of business. The right to
trade quotas to real importers in exchange for domestic oil was a paper
transaction . . . .”).
282
Id. at 3 (Conflict in the 1945 to 1958 period shifted from stimulating supply
to protecting market share as market went to super surplus conditions.).
283
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 250-52.
284
2 id. at 1156-58.
285
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 139 (“Import controls, and their
administration, were ostensibly designed to enhance the national security, however
defined. In general, this goal required maintenance of a larger domestic petroleum
industry than would otherwise exist, and one secure from attack.”).
286
The Secretary of the Interior convened the National Petroleum Council.
NPC, IMPACT, supra note 28, at 324; VIETOR, supra note 98, at 38 (stating that the
function of the National Petroleum Council was for industry and government to talk
and for industry to discuss policy among itself). And, after the Korean War broke out,
the federal government formed the Petroleum Administration for Defense. NPC,
IMPACT, supra note 28, at 324; VIETOR, supra note 98, at 41 (During the Korean War,
the government sought to replicate World War II organization of the oil industry with
the Petroleum Administration for Defense that reported to the Secretary of Interior.).
See also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 253-57 (describing Korean War-era planning
agencies).
287
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 41; YERGIN, supra note 27, at 536 (“The
Suez crisis of 1956 highlighted concerns about national security. The price fall that
followed the crisis further increased the clamor among independents for protection in
the form of tariffs or quotas.”).
288
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 548.
289
Id. at 539.
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The federal government first attempted to encourage
domestic production on national security grounds through
voluntary programs, including a voluntary quota system begun
in 1957.290 The voluntary quotas failed for several reasons.291
Some companies did not cooperate because they had
disproportionately large foreign oil holdings and some refused
because they feared antitrust prosecutions.292 New importers
fought controls, even voluntary ones, because their imports
would be frozen at low levels since they had just begun to
import, some going so far as to build coastal refineries “in an
effort to establish themselves as legitimate importers before
the regulatory die was cast.”293 The price differentials between
foreign and domestic crude, caused by state-level prorationing
rules limiting domestic production, continually attracted new
competitors into the oil import business, undermining the
voluntary quota system.294
Economic conditions also weakened the voluntary
system. “The recession of 1958 did in the voluntary program.
While oil demand dropped substantially, imports increased
further, and the political pressure for mandatory controls was
becoming irresistible.”295 In particular, powerful Texas and
Oklahoma politicians like Senate Majority Leader Lyndon
Johnson, House Speaker Sam Rayburn, and Oklahoma Senator
290
When the voluntary plan was announced, with a goal of cutting imports
from 1,266,700 barrels per day (the 1957 level) to 1,031,000 barrels per day, fourteen of
twenty-two importers agreed, one refused on the advice of antitrust counsel, five
sought adjusted quotas informally, and two invoked the plan’s formal process to receive
a higher quota. BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 45-47.
291
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 732-33 (discussing reasons for failure).
292
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 537; VIETOR, supra note 98, at 112 (citing Sun
Oil as one example of a company that refused to participate in the voluntary quota
system because of antitrust implications).
293
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 109. Moreover, politically it would have been
impossible to give the major oil companies a cartel controlling imports. Id.
294
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 24-25. The “new importer” problem
was serious.

The growth in imports by these firms, partly due to niches created in the
market by limitations on the more visible major firms, made them impossible
to ignore even while they were difficult to police on a voluntary basis.
Newcomers for the most part were not constrained by the unofficial sanctions
that could be imposed on large, multinational, established firms. They were
less affected by public or industry opinion. Moreover, some were not involved
in domestic production and thus did not even have the incentive to restrain
imports that would follow from sharing production losses within the United
States if collective restraint on imports failed.
Id. at 35.
295

YERGIN, supra note 27, at 537.
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Robert Kerr pushed hard to restrict imports to benefit U.S. oil
producers.296 Although the Eisenhower administration was
ideologically opposed to government intervention in the
market, it yielded to the political realities of oil politics and
implemented controls—giving the United States “centralized
decision making and free market rhetoric.”297
The mandatory quotas which began in 1959 became “the
single most important energy policy in the postwar era,” one
which quickly “accumulated policy goals outside of promoting
The quota system, known as the
energy security.”298
Mandatory Oil Import Program (MOIP), was in effect from
March 1959 to April 1973. It effectively constrained refiners
only until late 1972.299 MOIP produced “a decade of stasis in
policy,” locking in a regulatory approach which ignored the
decade’s major changes in energy supply and demand.300 MOIP
brought rent-seeking to new heights.
A roll call of the special interest groups in energy policy would find
most of them the recipient of at least some favored treatment: small
refiners, inland refiners, Northern Tier refiners, major oil
companies, oil producers, petrochemical companies, northeastern
utilities and other identifiable and isolatable consuming interests,

296
Id. at 538. Oil-state senators, who supported MOIP, also delivered other
benefits to big companies and support for MOIP was the price for those benefits, such
as overseas tax credits and depletion allowance overseas. VIETOR, supra note 98, at
134. Louisiana Senator Russell Long made this point clear to the oil companies,
saying:

I believe your industry would make a great mistake not to realize that; as far
as the government is concerned, as far as the fair treatment you are entitled
to expect from your government is concerned, the people who will be your
advocates are people who are very much interested in domestic oil. . . . It is
very much to your advantage to have a very healthy domestic industry and
do everything within your power to cooperate to that end.
Id.
297

BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 15.
“Quotas are inherently
discriminatory. The criteria by which government allocates import licenses are not
based on impersonal market forces (unless the licenses are auctioned); licenses are
allocated subjectively in a way that is usually influenced by political considerations and
the fact that allocation necessarily benefits some and harms others.” Id. at 263-64.
298
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 115; see also id. at 84 (“Schemes surfaced to use
the program to the special benefit of some segments of the refining industry and some
domestic producers and marketers; to promote economic development of certain areas
and enhanced air quality; and to aid various special consumer groups.”).
299
WILLIAM C. LANE, JR., THE MANDATORY PETROLEUM PRICE AND
ALLOCATION REGULATIONS: A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 4 (1981).
300
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 115; NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at
37 (describing MOIP as the “principal element of government policy affecting the
petroleum refining industry”).
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deep water terminal operators, Island interests, West Coast
consumers, and so forth.301

The costs of the import quota regime were largely borne by “the
undifferentiated portion of the consuming public.”302 MOIP also
produced one of the most ironic unintended consequences of
any federal program—the program spurred Venezuela to
convene the first meeting of the organization that eventually
became the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC).303
Under the mandatory system, the federal government
granted refiners permits to import crude oil, holding the total
amount imported below the amount that would have been
imported in a free market.304 Established importers got 80% of
their historic imports, with the amount to be gradually reduced
until it was proportionate to the amounts new importers
received, eventually putting all importers on the same level, at
least theoretically.305
As a result, domestic crude prices were higher than they
would have been in the absence of the quota system and the
right to import the cheaper foreign crude became valuable.306
The “historical” allocations also attempted to address the
equitable concern that “[r]efinery location, capital decisions,
marketing arrangements and production and supply patterns,”
all of which had been disrupted by the voluntary controls,
“would be more dramatically altered by mandatory controls.”307
In particular, MOIP shifted refinery construction from larger to
smaller,308 rewarding each new refinery with a quota.
Ultimately, the mandates hindered the refining industry
response to changes in market conditions: “The quota
301

BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 16. The distribution of gains from the
award of quotas created “tensions” in the administration of the program. Id. at 45.
“Those receiving the gains complained when newcomers were permitted to enter the
field because the gains would be spread over more firms or because the total gains
would be reduced. Those on the outside were anxious to receive a share of the windfall
and pressed for participation.” Id.
302
Id. at 17; see also VIETOR, supra note 98, at 141 (stating that import
controls were estimated to cost consumers about $3.3 billion in 1968, while Arabian
crude sold at $1.25 per barrel, and domestic oil at $3 per barrel).
303
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 764.
304
LANE, supra note 299, at 4.
305
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 122.
306
LANE, supra note 299, at 4; VIETOR, supra note 98, at 120 (stating that
quotas had “a tangible dollar value”).
307
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 110.
308
2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1172.
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discouraged the expansion of domestic refinery capacity,
altered refinery location within the United States, altered the
mix of the final products, encouraged investment in cracking
capacity, and discouraged investment in capacity to handle
high-sulfur feedstocks.”309
A full account of MOIP lies beyond the scope of this
article,310 but the program introduced distinctive features in
gasoline markets that require some discussion.311 An important
effect was that the administrative allocation of valuable import
rights inevitably led to interest groups exerting tremendous
political pressures in hopes of sharing in the allocations.312 Of
course, as these groups organized politically,313 politics
intertwined with a variety of technical questions, the resolution
of which would reward some interests and punish others no
matter how they were answered.314 For example, petrochemical
companies sought their own import quotas for feedstocks,
arguing that their plants faced unfair competition from
petrochemical
plants
aligned
with
quota-possessing
refineries.315 This raised definitional questions about what
309

BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 294-95. See also 2 BRADLEY, supra note
74, at 1163 (MOIP affected “virtually all major aspects of refinery operation—entry,
plant siting, plant size, merger and acquisition policy, product mix, and, of course,
profitability.”).
310
MOIP is described in detail in BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 66-82.
See also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 738-50; 2 id. at 1160-81.
311
2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1172 (noting that between 1954 and 1958,
ten refiners with a capacity over 10,000 barrels per day were built, while in the next
twelve years only nine such refineries were built).
312
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 538-39 (Under MOIP, “there were continuing
fights over allocations, struggles over interpretations, searches for loopholes, and the
ever-more-intense hunt for exceptions and exemptions.”); BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note
63, at 139 (“Other interests understandably coveted the wealth thus transferred and
sought to divert the import control program to achieve still other ends and different
distributive effects. Once the subsidy-wealth-transfer character of quotas was
recognized, it became increasingly difficult for the authorities to deny other ‘worthy’
causes entry into the program.”); VIETOR, supra note 98, at 135 (“Nearly every sector of
the industry supported the Program in principle, but it was every firm for itself in
carving-up the pie.”).
313
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 115 (The small refiners, for example,
formed the American Petroleum Refiners Association in 1962 to protect their interests
in the quota program.); VIETOR, supra note 98, at 131 (Specialized trade organizations
formed to fight over resid imports.). See infra notes 338-43 (discussing residual fuel oil
imports).
314
See Andrew P. Morriss & Susan E. Dudley, Defining What to Regulate:
Silica and the Problem of Regulatory Categorization, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 286-87
(2006) (discussing role of interest groups in regulation).
315
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 167 (“When the petrochemical
companies were included in the quota structure in 1966, they simply joined the group
of other refiners who had enjoyed the subsidy benefits of import quotas from the
beginning of the program. The great stake of the petrochemical companies in the long
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constituted a petrochemical plant compared to a refinery, since
the two were technologically indistinguishable. The question
Granting the quotas rewarded
had no easy answer.316
independent petrochemical producers; denying them advanced
integrated refinery-petrochemical operations.
The result was special interest lobbying on a grand
scale. “However intricately wrought and carefully articulated
the rationales for each action, the impression was inescapable
that the mandatory quota program was being treated as a
source of unappropriated funds available for a variety of
putative public purposes.”317 Ultimately, the interest-group
maneuvering led to a program so complex that “[f]ew other
regulatory schemes in America’s history can match the
Mandatory Oil Import Program for labyrinthine complexity, or
for the distortion of markets and interest-group dissension that
it caused.”318 By 1968, MOIP had metamorphasized far beyond
its initial goals, with “special allocations for asphalt refiners,
electric utilities, heating oil importers, petrochemical
companies, and finally, for crude oil quotas into foreign trade
zones from which refined products would presumably be
exported.”319
Not surprisingly, MOIP roiled refining in the United
States. The system favored smaller refiners, giving them a
disproportionate share of import rights.320 Yet these refiners

run was the extent to which they would lose their market share to petrochemical
production by oil and gas companies.”). See also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 745.
316
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 164 (“Other administrative problems
arose out of the technical difficulty of defining a petrochemical plant as distinct from a
refinery, and of defining feedstocks for inclusion within the program [for allocations of
quotas for petrochemical plants].”).
317
Id. at 178-79.
318
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 119; see also YERGIN, supra note 27, at 538-39.
319
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 139.
320
LANE, supra note 299, at 4-5. The quota system incorporated a “sliding
scale” that favored smaller refiners.
The basis for the different incremental levels of quotas was the amount of
refinery runs by firm, not by plant. It was advantageous, then, for refinery
ownership to be fragmented. This policy had predictable effects. First, it
reduced the value of a small refinery as a merger prospect for an established
refining firm. Second, it provided incentives for the formation of “concubine”
relationships with large firms which could acquire informal control, but not
integrated ownership, of small firms without losing the preferential quota of
the small firm. The history of the program contains charges of concubinage
but the extent of its existence is unknown. Finally, the sliding scale
encouraged small refineries, or preserved their existence, by the additional
revenues obtained through the sale of import tickets.
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were often the least technologically sophisticated. The smallrefiner bias also failed to reward those oil companies that had
invested heavily in foreign supplies, tanker fleets, and coastal
refineries in anticipation of a growing reliance on imports.
Moreover, MOIP’s small-refiner bias discouraged consolidation
of refinery ownership, preventing larger companies from
buying out these smaller refiners, which could have increased
efficiency. Refiners were allowed to trade their import quotas,
which many inland and independent refiners did, using them
to gain access to domestic crude owned by rivals.321 In many
respects, therefore, the program was simply a transfer of
wealth from the large, integrated oil companies to the smaller,
inland refiners.322
Under MOIP, some inland refiners received a particular
323
Because every refiner received a quota, even
bonus.
refineries with no ability to actually import oil were given
quotas.324 (Had this not been done, coastal refineries likely
would have displaced inland refineries, as their cost advantage
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 115-16. The eleven real importers “objected
strenuously” to this program. VIETOR, supra note 98, at 125. “They had to participate
in it since their own quotas were insufficient to supply their coastal refineries,” and
Atlantic Refining calculated that the profits from quota exchanges were $135 million
by 1964. Id. This continued under its successor program in the 1970s. See EPA,
PROFILE, supra note 68, at 11 (noting that the Crude Oil Entitlements Program “had
encouraged smaller refineries to add capacity throughout the 1970s”).
321
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 74-75 (summarizing the trading rules);
see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 738-39 (describing trading). As Bohi and Russell
note, “[t]he exchange process was merely a veil covering the transfer to inland refiners
of some of the benefits of importing cheap foreign oil. No productive function was
changed in maintaining the facade that something was actually happening.” BOHI &
RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 77.
322
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 114 (Quotas would clearly be subsidy to inland
refiners, who could not refine the oil they were allowed to import.).
[R]efineries located inland traded their import tickets to those companies
with refineries located on the coast in return for access to domestic sources of
crude owned or controlled by the coastal refiners. Companies with coastal
refineries tended to be the larger, integrated companies. Thus, one result of
the [quota system], and the trading system that evolved under it, was that
smaller, inland refiners tended to depend on exchange arrangements with
major oil companies for access to crude.
LANE, supra note 299, at 5. See also VIETOR, supra note 98, at 133 (“Independent
refiners grew dependent on the Program from which they drew ‘tickets,’ knowing that
without them they could not long compete with larger, integrated refiners running
cheap foreign crude.”).
323
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 125 (The quota exchanges among inland refiners
and coastal refiners were “the fundamental redistributive choice of the whole
mandatory program. [They were] primarily a response to political pressure from
domestic refiners, justified by a perverse obeisance to free enterprise.”).
324
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 71.
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from using imports would have enabled them to expand at the
expense of inland refineries.325) The “Northern Tier” refiners
using Canadian oil also got a special bonus.326 These refineries
received quota allocations in the initial distribution, when
Canadian oil was labeled foreign, and then an exemption from
the quota system for Canadian oil as a result of Canadian
complaints.327
Yet these refineries did not lose the quotas they had
received to allow them to import the Canadian oil, giving them
what became known as the “double dip.”328 Although the double
dip was “an obvious fluke,” it was not remedied because of the
political power these refineries mustered in its defense.329
Although the Northern Tier refineries’ historical quotas were
reduced faster than those of other refiners—to partially
compensate for the double dip—this did not entirely eliminate
the special treatment.330
The quota system also discouraged construction of new
refinery capacity in the United States.331 While the total
amount allowed to be imported increased as refinery capacity
increased, there was “no direct mechanism” to provide the
“access to foreign crude oil supplies necessary to the operation
of new refinery capacity in the United States.”332 In addition,
oil companies began lobbying for and receiving exemptions for
refineries in various U.S. territories outside the continental
United States to serve the U.S. market.333 Not surprisingly, the
325

Id. at 72.
The special access to Canadian oil alone boosted growth in this region. See
id. at 297 tbl.8-9 (refinery capacity growth in Montana, Minnesota, North Dakota, and
Wisconsin—a total of 19.6 (thousand barrels per day) in 1930, 66.5 in 1950, 157.4 in
1955, 214.1 in 1960, 287.7 in 1965, and 345.4 in 1970).
327
Two months after MOIP began, however, it was modified to allow land
imports without quotas in order to assist Canadian oil exporters. VIETOR, supra note
98, at 129. It also helped Venezuelan exports to eastern Canada, since the western
Canadian oil that MOIP would have kept out of the U.S. market would have otherwise
displaced Venezuelan exports to eastern Canada. 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 739-40.
328
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 129.
329
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 129. For example, in May 1960, the Department
of the Interior considered a rule change to eliminate the loophole, but North Dakota
politicians intervened and Interior abandoned the revision. Id. One oil company that
competed with the double-dip refiners waged a five-year war against the provision, but
was unable to stop Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey from preserving it. Id. at
130.
330
Id.
331
2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1171-72.
332
NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 7.
333
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 51. In particular, refineries were built
in the United States Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico as a direct result of the quota
326
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ratio of domestic refining capacity to domestic petroleum
consumption, which was 0.98 in 1960, fell during MOIP to 0.81
in 1970.334
A further impact involved the diversion of crude imports
to uncontrolled products. Controls on crude were useless
without controls on refined products, inasmuch as uncontrolled
finished imports would simply substitute for U.S. refining of
foreign crude unless their importation was also controlled. The
original program design thus forbade imports of refined
products outside the quota system.335 This proved impossible to
sustain, however.336 Refiners with existing plants outside the
United States that were refining for the U.S. market lobbied
for allowances for imports of those plants’ products. They
argued that restricting such imports “could virtually eliminate
the market served by those refineries, with predictable serious
consequences for the firms.”337 Moreover, some refined products
were exempt, encouraging their production outside the United
States.338 For instance, residual fuel imports (or “resid”), a
heavy fraction of crude oil, soon entered outside the quota
system. This exemption “altered the product mix capability of
domestic refineries and created a special dependence on
imports of heavy fuels.”339 Predictably, U.S. production of resid
fell after 1960 from 332,200,000 barrels of production with
program exemption for oil imported to those jurisdictions on economic development
grounds. Id. at 297 (“Imports of products from Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
received special treatment under the quota system. Consequently, refineries were
encouraged to locate in these islands for reasons other than those the free market
would dictate.”); 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 743-46 (describing increase in refinedproduct exports from Puerto Rico); VIETOR, supra note 98, at 136-37 (describing Puerto
Rico exemption); YERGIN, supra note 27, at 539 (“[T]he building of substantial refining
capacity in the American Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico because of special exemptions
to the quotas that were granted to refineries there on economic development
grounds.”).
334
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 296 tbl.8-8.
335
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 737.
336
Unrestricted fuel oil imports were allowed into the East Coast (PADD I
region), and “clean-product imports” were allowed due to program incentives. NPC,
ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 20.
337
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 110.
338
NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 7. The factors enumerated as
providing incentives for offshore location included: “to accommodate revisions in U.S.
import quota restrictions;” “logistical considerations,” such as better harbors for
tankers elsewhere; “[t]o minimize the risks associated with acquiring crude oil
supplies,” because foreign refineries often have greater access to foreign crude supplies;
“[t]o avoid environmental delays” because regulations are “less severe” in some foreign
locations; and “[t]o minimize overall costs” due to higher tax rates in the United States.
Id. at 33.
339
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 298 & tbl.8-10.
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233,200,000 barrels of imports, a ratio of 1.42, to production of
257,500,000 barrels with 557,800,000 barrels of imports, a ratio
of 0.46, in 1970.340 Overall, the quota program “encouraged,
through relatively cheap imports, northeastern utilities and
other consumers to favor heavy fuel oil and encouraged
domestic refineries to alter their output mix toward the lighter
products,”341 particularly boosting Caribbean refineries’
production of resid.342 Further reinforcing the quota-driven
nature of resid use, resid consumption declined after these
programs ended, with natural gas and distillates taking its
place.343
Combined, these effects piled distortion upon distortion
as interest groups competed for special favors in the political
marketplace. Consider just one example of the dynamics of
MOIP: When Canadian oil was exempted under the overland
exemption, not only did it create the “double dip,” but it
provoked complaints from Mexico that its oil was
disadvantaged. To mollify Mexico, and with the assistance of
the State Department,344 one of the most vivid of the MOIP
distortions began: the “Brownsville U-Turn” or “Mexican
Merry-Go-Round.” Despite the lack of an overland connection
between Mexican oil fields and U.S. markets, a “crevice” in the
import regulations was used to bring Mexican oil into the
United States as “overland” oil exempt from import quotas.345
Mexican crude was moved by tanker from its producing regions to
the U.S. port of Brownsville, Texas, on the Mexican border, unloaded
in [customs] bond and then shipped into Mexico in trucks, which
made a U-turn, and promptly reentered the United States. On
reentry, the crude was taken out of bond, duty was paid on it, and it
officially entered the United States under the overland exemption.
Because a market for only a fraction of the Mexican oil existed in
Brownsville, most of it was reloaded upon tankers and shipped to
East Coast U.S. ports as “domestic” oil.346

340

Id.
Id. at 299.
342
Id. at 159 (“The increase in resid imports provided a wider market for
foreign crude and made possible the further development of Caribbean refinery
capacity. The unbalanced demand for resid led domestic refineries to be built with
additional processing to minimize resid output, so that lighter products were more
expensive to produce.”).
343
FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 65.
344
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 133.
345
Id. at 132.
346
Id.; see also YERGIN, supra note 27, at 539.
341
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Such strategies boosted Mexican exports to the United States
from 7,000 barrels per day to over 40,000 barrels per day.347
Venezuela also was given a special deal on resid imports
because it too was upset by the Canadians receiving the
overland exemption.348 As noted earlier, this transformed the
U.S. refinery output away from resid.349
Making gasoline a political issue also undermined the
security of investments in refining capacity. For example,
when oil companies raised the price of gasoline in February
1967, an unnamed administration official was quoted as saying
that the government would flood the country with imported
gasoline if the prices were not rolled back. Some were.350 Such
threats undoubtedly discouraged investment.351 This is clear
from the decline of U.S. capacity relative to U.S. demand.
In the years [leading] up to 1960, refinery capacity exceeded
domestic product consumption, with the excess available to process
crude oil for export. After 1960, the deficit in refinery capacity
steadily widened. From 1960 to 1970, refinery capacity increased a
total of 25.2 percent while domestic product consumption grew by 52
percent, or more than twice as fast. Thus, the United States became
increasingly dependent on product imports. When U.S. crude
production declined after 1970, and high-sulfur foreign crude could
not be used, the dependence on product imports was exacerbated.352

Overall, the MOIP-induced “decade of stasis in policy”353
meant that “[b]usiness and government were preoccupied with
the tactical issues of administering [policy]: import quotas and
MOIP seriously distorted
‘prorationing’ for crude oil.”354
refiners’ supply of crude. “Without controls, cheaper foreign oil
would have forced down domestic oil prices and driven
marginal producers out of business.”355 MOIP’s microeconomic
impacts included preventing the international majors with
access to foreign oil from gaining as much market share as they
would have without MOIP and allowing “several dozen,
347

1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 741.
Venezuelan oil, which had a low specific gravity, produced a
disproportionate amount of resid per barrel and could not compete with Middle Eastern
oil on the open market. VIETOR, supra note 98, at 130; see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note
74, at 741.
349
See supra notes 340-42.
350
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 140.
351
Id. at 296-97.
352
Id. at 296.
353
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 115.
354
Id. at 3.
355
Id. at 115.
348
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relatively inefficient independent refiners to stay in
business.”356 Moreover, MOIP encouraged the migration of
refinery capacity to foreign locations.357
Because of declining U.S. crude production and growing
U.S. energy demand, the increase in quota exemptions after
1970 helped devalue the quotas and ultimately made the
system “meaningless” in terms of constraining imports.358 The
increasing number of exempted imports eroded support among
oil producers while the costs of the program became higher and
more obvious as time passed.359 MOIP was formally abandoned
in April 1973.360 When the quota system changed in 1973,361
and the major companies no longer found trading for import
quotas necessary, it disadvantaged MOIP’s beneficiaries. For
example, both the double dip and the Canadian exemption
encouraged refinery location along the northern border of the
United States.
When the quota program ended, “these
refineries could not compete with other domestic refineries
better located to receive U.S. crude oil or imported feedstocks.
Then, with the reduction and prospective elimination of
Canadian crude oil exports, these refineries, and the markets
they served, faced especially severe problems.”362 The small
refiners sought a new crude oil allocation system to ensure
their continued access to oil,363 discussed in the next subsection.
The gasoline market was thus under two sets of
countervailing pressures between the Korean War and the
Arab oil embargo. The first set, from market pressures, pushed
the industry toward technological innovations, standardized
products, and efforts to expand market share. The second set,
driven by the economic regulations imposed by the federal
356

Id. at 145.
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 295 (“[S]ome of these [foreign
refineries] were given access to U.S. markets. Consequently, domestic refinery
capacity began to lag behind final product demand. To meet demand, importers
increasingly sought to switch away from crude oil and toward finished products, and
this switch was approved by import control authorities who foresaw domestic shortages
if it was not allowed. The result was that the mandatory quota program discouraged
investment in domestic refining and encouraged investment in foreign refining.”).
358
LANE, supra note 299, at 6.
359
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 2.
360
Proclamation No. 4210 (Apr. 18, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 9,645 (Apr. 19, 1973).
361
The quota system was eroded by the combination of declining U.S.
production, which necessitated increasing imports, and the proliferation of exemptions
and exceptions to the quotas for various interest groups that expanded the amount of
crude imported. See LANE, supra note 299, at 6.
362
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 297.
363
LANE, supra note 299, at 5-6.
357
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government, allocated resources to smaller, generally less
efficient refineries and limited foreign competition to domestic
producers. The result was to partially offset the market’s
incentives for larger scale refineries and to create incentives for
importing exempt refined products rather than crude oil.
Indeed, even before the embargo in 1973, “the United States
was experiencing an unprecedented shortage of refined
petroleum products” partly because of a lack of domestic
refining capacity.364 Over time, however, the gains from
subverting the crude oil import allocation scheme gradually
eroded the effectiveness of the program, making the petroleum
market in early 1973 freer than it had been since at least 1959.
However, the combination of price controls imposed by the
Nixon administration in an effort to control inflation and the
Arab oil embargo in 1973 created conditions under which
opponents of liberalizing energy markets were able to regroup.
4. Price Controls and the Arab Oil Embargo to
Decontrol
By the 1970s, the cumulative impact of the various
exemptions and special provisions had eroded MOIP and oil
Although the Nixon
imports had risen sharply.365
administration initially considered scrapping the quota system
entirely and replacing it with a tariff,366 the oil industry’s
negative political reaction torpedoed those plans.367 However,
364

KATZ, supra note 271, at 13.
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 589 (“The Mandatory Oil Import
Program . . . was laboring under mounting strain, creating controversies and gross
disparities among companies and regions. Its loopholes and exceptions were very
lucrative to those who had figured out how to capitalize on them, and all too visible.”).
366
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 142. Nixon appointed a task force, headed by
Phillip Areeda, to examine the quota system. It got 10,000 pages of comments from
more than 200 firms, associations, etc., and position papers from two dozen scholars,
etc. Id. “In effect, the Task Force staff of economic liberals seized control of the review
process and neither the Interior Department nor the White House could recapture it.”
Id. The program had also been intensely criticized during the 1969 Senate hearings.
Id. at 141.
367
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 589. Oil consumers wanted looser controls to cut
prices; domestic oil interests wanted to keep prices up; and majors who had fought the
system when it was implemented
365

had by now generally reconciled and adjusted themselves to the system, and
were content with it. Prices were protected for their domestic production,
and the companies had devised distribution systems outside the United
States to dispose of their foreign oil. Many of them, therefore, were alarmed
at the prospect of change and argued against it.
Id.
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after 1970, “rising world prices and general relaxation of
controls progressively eliminated the protective effect of the
quota.”368 Instead, the administration’s anti-inflation policy,369
based on a series of price control “phases,” overtook the quota
system as the primary economic regulation of the petroleum
industry.370
Oil was at the heart of the Nixon price controls, with
crude and refined product price increases in 1970 prompting
the administration to investigate oil companies, Nixon himself
to denounce them, and relaxation of the MOIP quota
restrictions.371 Phase I of the Nixon price controls, which ran
from August 1971 until November 1971, was intended to break
expectations of price increases372 and freeze the nominal price of
gasoline and other refinery products and domestically produced
crude.373 Of course, such rules had no impact on world markets
and so the uncontrolled international price of gasoline and
crude oil diverged sharply from the controlled domestic prices,
severely disadvantaging firms selling gasoline domestically
made from imported oil. The cost advantage imported oil had
held was now reversed.
Phase II of the price controls lasted from November
1971 until January 1973, and limited wholesale price increases
to no more than 3% annually.374 Multiproduct firms, including
refineries, were given some flexibility through “Term Limit
Pricing” (TLP) agreements, which allowed them to meet the
Phase II rules by keeping the average of prices across products

368

BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 268.
LANE, supra note 299, at xviii (attempts to control inflation preceded the
Arab oil embargo and included price controls on oil and oil products).
370
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 120 (Nixon “acceded to market pressures by
gradually liberalizing its controls until 1973, by which time they were irrelevant
anyway.”); BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 208 (noting that inflation had become a
concern in the mid-1960s).
371
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 466.
372
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 210. See 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at
467-68 (describing Phase I).
373
LANE, supra note 299, at 8. In particular, imported crude-oil price
increases could not be passed on to consumers of gasoline because cost increases in
imports could be passed through only if the imported product was kept in its initial
form and inventoried and accounted for separately from any domestic materials. Id.
Since the foreign crude oil was refined (a change in form) and impossible to keep
segregated from domestic source oil in most refineries (the inventory and accounting
rules), the cost increases in foreign oil could not be passed on to consumers. Id.; see
also BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 213.
374
LANE, supra note 299, at 9; see also BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 215
(describing Phase II); 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 469-71 (same).
369
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within the guidelines rather than each individual price.375
Unfortunately for refiners, the TLP agreements could not
include gasoline, home heating oil, and residual oil, so refiners
wishing to recoup the increased costs of imported oil had to do
so through price increases for their other refined products.376
For example, diesel fuel, although chemically equivalent to
home heating oil, was allowed in TLP agreements, resulting in
plentiful diesel supplies and shortages of home heating oil.377
The Nixon administration refused to allow gasoline and home
heating oil price increases out of fear of a political backlash.378
The TLP rules further distorted relative prices, discouraging
gasoline production. Thus, even before the Arab oil embargo in
1973, price controls were having a major impact on gasoline
markets by keeping prices artificially low and discouraging
gasoline production. Moreover, the differences in price for
crude from different sources created political pressure for a
government program to allocate access to cheap crude.379
“Conditions had been created [by Nixon programs] wherein
there was no market incentive to raise domestic production, no
incentive to reduce consumption, and no incentive to increase
imports.”380 Shortages began to appear in late 1972 and early
1973.381 Although this led Nixon to suspend the quota program
in April 1973,382 the formal elimination of quotas had little
effect because events and the Nixon administration’s approach
“had rendered the quota program ineffective before it was
replaced”383 and the elimination of quotas did not connect the
distortions introduced by the price controls.

375

LANE, supra note 299, at 9.
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 215; LANE, supra note 299, at 11.
377
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 216. See 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at
469 (describing TLP provisions).
378
LANE, supra note 299, at 11-12. Oil companies that sought price increases
were “almost invariably . . . turned down and encouraged to take [their] price increase
among [products governed by TLP agreements]. Several oil companies were told that a
price increase for a ‘visible’ product would require public hearings and lead to
protracted delays.” Id. at 11 (quoting W.A. Johnson, The Impact of Price Controls on
the Oil Industry, How to Worsen an Energy Crisis, in ENERGY: THE POLICY ISSUES 99
(G. Eppen ed., 1975)).
379
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 223 (“The government was moving
toward a system a mandatory allocations of petroleum products even before the oil
embargo.”).
380
Id. at 218.
381
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 668.
382
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 218.
383
Id. at 219.
376
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When war broke out between Israel and her Arab
neighbors in October 1973, approximately 17% of U.S. oil
supplies derived from Arab sources.384 The Organization of
Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) halted exports
to the United States and several other countries in retaliation
for their support of Israel, causing severe supply disruptions.385
Although a bill creating an import allocation system was
already moving toward passage in Congress before the
embargo,386 the supply disruptions caused by the embargo “gave
impetus to the movement for an allocation system and added a
new rationale for such a system: the distribution of crude oil
and refined products during a period of supply disruption.”387
Responding to the pressures for a new allocation
program, Congress adopted the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act (EPAA) in 1973388 and the initial set of rules
implementing it went into effect in January 1974.389 “The
legislation was originally drafted to deal with the problems
smaller refiners, independent marketers and others had been
experiencing in obtaining supplies prior to the embargo
[and] . . . many of its provisions still reflected its more limited
initial purpose.”390 It was available, however, and so Congress
quickly adopted this square peg to fill the round hole that
world events presented. Nixon seized on allocation as a
384
RICHARD B. MANCKE, PERFORMANCE OF THE FEDERAL ENERGY OFFICE 1
(1975) [hereinafter MANCKE, PERFORMANCE]. The embargo “reduced Arab oil supplies
from 20.8 million barrels per day in October to 15.8 million barrels per day by
December.” LANE, supra note 299, at 30. Additional production from other countries
eased the shortage in the early months of 1974. Id. at 31.
385
MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 1. The embargo consisted of
rolling production restraints that cut supply more each month and a total ban on
export of oil to the United States, the Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, and
Rhodesia. YERGIN, supra note 27, at 613. Actual reductions in supply were smaller
than they would have been without substitution of non-Arab supplies to the nations cut
off. There were 20.8 million barrels per day sold in early October. Id. at 614. At the
lowest point during the embargo, non-OAPEC sales were 15.8 million barrels per day,
for a gross loss of 5 million barrels per day. Id. But because other producers increased
production, the net loss was only 4.4 million barrels per day, or about 9% of total world
production in the “free world” before the embargo. Id. The impact was worse than this
suggests, however, because demand was growing at 7.5% per year. Moreover, during
the cutbacks, information on substitution was not yet completely available and so the
loss seemed larger. Id. The embargo was almost a complete surprise to U.S.
policymakers, who, as a result, were unprepared for it. Id. at 608-09.
386
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 487.
387
LANE, supra note 299, at xix; 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 487 (embargo
“hastened” allocation controls).
388
Pub. L. No. 93-159 (Nov. 27, 1973).
389
39 Fed. Reg. 1924 (Jan. 15, 1974).
390
LANE, supra note 299, at 38-39.
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response to the politics of the situation, perhaps in part to
undercut his potential Democratic rival in the 1972
presidential elections, Washington Senator Henry Jackson,
who had promoted allocation during 1973.391
To coordinate the response to the embargo, the
government established the Federal Energy Office (FEO),
which after a “glamorous, hyperactive six-month existence”
became the Federal Energy Administration (FEA).392 “[T]he
newly created Federal Energy Office began introducing an
almost unimaginably complicated and wide-ranging set of
regulations for allocating both crude oil and refined products.
All assessments of the period agree that, viewed in toto, these
allocation regulations aggravated consumer suffering
stemming from the embargo.”393 Unfortunately, the FEO/FEA
actions generally distorted the markets for oil products even
more, rather than mitigating the problems. For example, the
FEO pressured refiners to produce more home heating oil at
the expense of gasoline production because it feared a shortage
of the former.394 But the FEO had overestimated demand for
heating oil395 and underestimated demand for gasoline and so
its pressure exacerbated gasoline shortages and produced a
surplus of heating oil (supplies of heating oil in February 1973
were 38% higher than they had been in February 1972).396
The FEO adopted an allocation system for crude, which
was “meant to distribute supplies evenly around the country.”397
Instead, “it assured, perversely, that gasoline could not be
shifted from an area already well-supplied to one where it was
needed.”398 Federal allocations of gasoline to regions were not
matched to demand because they were based on regional usage
from before the shortages and did not take into account
changes in regional population and driving patterns due to
higher prices and jawboning efforts by the government.

391

1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 671-73.
MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 2.
393
Richard B. Mancke, The American Response: “On The Job Training”?, in
OIL DIPLOMACY: THE ATLANTIC NATIONS IN THE OIL CRISIS OF 1978-79, at 27, 33 (1980)
[hereinafter Mancke, American Response].
394
LANE, supra note 299, at 43; MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 8.
395
LANE, supra note 299, at 46 (noting that price increases in heating oil,
however, reduced demand more than regulators anticipated and the result was a glut
of heating oil and a shortage of gasoline).
396
MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 9.
397
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 617.
398
Id.; see also MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 11.
392
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Erroneous allocations ranged from 63% of projected needs in
New Hampshire and Virginia to 122% in Wyoming.399 In short,
the federal response to the embargo eliminated the market’s
ability to adjust, substituting an administrative allocation
system that worsened the crude supply disruptions.
Nevertheless, the federal government failed to learn
from the embargo experience that markets were a superior
means of adjusting to supply shocks. Instead, each new
problem provoked additional, quixotic regulations designed to
“fix” the problems caused by the prior set. As a result of the
difficult political dynamic that produced them,400 the quotas
and controls introduced in response to the Arab oil embargo
grew ever more complicated.401
399

LANE, supra note 299, at 48-49; MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384,

at 11.
400
Yergin gives a clear explanation of the problem, which is worth quoting at
some length:

The massive reallocation posed a very considerable logistical problem. Even
under calm and relatively predictable circumstances, managing an integrated
oil system was a highly complex matter. Supplies of varying qualities from
various sources had to be linked into the transportation system and then
moved to refineries that had been designed to handle those specific oils. Free
will was not an option when it came to assigning crude oils. The “wrong”
crudes could do considerable damage to the innards of a refinery, as well as
reducing efficiency and profitability. And once the crude supplies were run
through the refinery and turned into a number of products, they then had to
be moved into a distribution system and linked with a “market demand” that
wanted that particular balance of products—this amount of gasoline, that
amount of jet fuel and heating oil.
And to make matters even more difficult, the companies still had to figure out
what their oil supplies actually cost, so that they did not sell at a loss or
invite attack for excessive profit margins. The costs for oil royalties, extent of
government participation, buyback prices, volumes—all these were changing
week by week, and were further complicated by leapfrogs and retroactive
increases by the various exporting governments. “It was impossible to know
whether a calculation made on the basis of all the known facts on one day
would not be overturned by a rewriting of those facts a month later,” said an
executive from Shell.
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 622. In addition to the confusion created by the ever-shifting
regulations on energy pricing and imports, the Nixon White House repeatedly
reorganized its energy policy team during 1972-1973. KATZ, supra note 271, at 17-19
(describing various reorganizations and terming them “in chaos” by May 1973). The
piecemeal approach to energy issues in general meant that energy matters were
scattered among sixty government agencies, “each operating with little or no
communication with the others.” Id. at 31. Congressional efforts to produce a unified
national policy failed to produce legislation. One analyst concluded that Congress “was
whipsawed by regional concerns, conflicting special interests, and contradictory advice
from various experts.” Id. at 34.
401
See U.S. FED. ENERGY ADMIN., A COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR DOMESTIC
CRUDE OIL PRICING FOR PRODUCERS AND FIRST PURCHASERS (1977) [hereinafter FEA,
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Phase III of the Nixon price controls began in January
1973 and allowed companies to self-administer price controls.402
However, after gasoline prices rose 7.4% by March (increases
that were within the Phase III guidelines), greater controls
were re-imposed on oil products.403
Price controls also increased the demands for a nonmarket allocation system. For example, after April 1973,
Phase III of the price controls included “Special Rule No. 1”404
that barred the twenty-three largest oil companies from raising
prices above their January 11, 1973 level.405 Among other
things, Special Rule No. 1 created a disincentive for the large
companies under it to import crude oil.406 This, in turn,
disadvantaged the smaller, inland refiners who had grown
dependent on trading import permits under MOIP for access to
the oil fields controlled by the major oil companies closer to
their refineries.407 They were “forced into direct competition
with the majors for domestic sources of crude.”408 Some of these
inland refiners then “joined the rising chorus of those
demanding a government allocation system.”409
Even the bureaucracy became overwhelmed by the
complexity of the price controls, and Phase III failed to tame
inflation adequately.410 Phase III was followed by “Phase III½,”
a sixty-day price freeze intended “to provide an opportunity for
Federal price regulators to rethink and redesign the Phase III
price controls” that lasted from June 12, 1973 to September 7,
1973.411 The freeze meant that oil companies were charging

COMPLIANCE GUIDE], for an excellent introduction to the complexity of petroleumpricing rules.
402
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 217; see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74,
at 471-74 (describing Phase III).
403
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 217.
404
38 Fed. Reg. 6283-84 (Mar. 8, 1973).
405
LANE, supra note 299, at 14-15; see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 47274 (describing Special Rule No. 1).
406
LANE, supra note 299, at 14-16 (giving full account of Special Rule No. 1’s
impact). In short, since Special Rule No. 1 did not apply to smaller firms, which were
“for all intents and purposes, free of controls” because the Phase III rules were not
adequately enforced, these firms were able to buy at controlled prices and sell at
uncontrolled prices. Id. at 15. Because smaller firms were able to sell product at
whatever price the market would bear, they could outbid large firms for supplies.
407
Id. at 17; BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 219.
408
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 219.
409
LANE, supra note 299, at 17.
410
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 220.
411
LANE, supra note 299, at 18; see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 474
(describing Phase III½).
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different customers different prices for the same goods.
“Inequities and inefficiencies were created, harming some
sectors and helping others, but confusing all.”412 It also meant
that imported oil costs could not be passed on to consumers.413
In September 1973, dissatisfaction with the Phase III½ freeze
drew 1,000 heating oil distributors and 2,000 gasoline dealers
to Washington for protest demonstrations.414
Phase IV followed, introducing a regulatory distinction
between new and existing sources of domestic crude and
allowing higher prices for the former in an effort to boost
supply.415 By the spring of 1974, multiple groups clamored for
federal allocation of oil and refined product supplies:
“independent refiners wanted access to domestic crude;
nonbranded independent gasoline marketers wanted allocation
of gasoline; New England fuel oil marketers and consumers
sought an allocation program for heating oil; and farmers
wanted a propane allocation program.”416 While the oil price
controls were supposed to end in 1974 along with the other
“temporary” price controls, the Arab oil embargo’s price
pressure led to an extension into the Mandatory Petroleum
Price Regulations which continued the “temporary” controls
after the end of price controls generally.417
With the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) of
418
1975, Congress revised the EPAA scheme in an incoherent
The freeze increased demands for an allocation program. As the freeze period
came to an end, gasoline dealers recognized that they would soon be able to
sell the gasoline in their tanks at substantially higher prices. Many simply
shut their stations or severely restricted sales. Gas station closings and the
resulting shortages at the end of October seemed to underline the need for a
system of mandatory allocation for petroleum products.
LANE, supra note 299, at 33-34.
412
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 221.
413
Id. at 220.
414
Id. at 223.
415
Id. at 221; see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 474-78 (describing Phase
IV).
416
LANE, supra note 299, at 25; VIETOR, supra note 98, at 248 (Independent
Refiners Association of America and its customers, forty-seven associations of 70,000
gas station operators, all favored extension of controls in the 1970s.).
417
LANE, supra note 299, at 19; VIETOR, supra note 98, at 238 (“The price
freeze eventually gave way to a series of price controls that finally expired in 1974—
except for the oil industry.”); see also Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627 (1973).
418
Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871
(1975). EPCA was set to expire on October 1, 1981, ending all oil price controls at that
time, U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE DECONTROL OF DOMESTIC OIL PRICES: AN
OVERVIEW 5 (1979) [hereinafter CBO, OVERVIEW], because the Ford administration
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omnibus energy bill that “included provisions both to reduce
and to raise the price of oil.”419 EPCA essentially incorporated
the Phase IV program, including classifications for pricing
purposes,420 which were intended to prevent “windfall” profits to
domestic oil producers.421 But EPCA modified the Phase IV
two-tier system, turning it into a three-tier system: old oil
(from domestic wells that began producing before 1973); new oil
(from wells that began producing during or after 1973); and
uncontrolled oil (oil from the Alaskan North Slope, the Naval
Petroleum Reserve, and “stripper”422 oil).423 Old oil’s price was
set relatively low; new oil’s price was higher; and uncontrolled
oil sold at the market price.424 Not surprisingly, the profits
available from reclassifying oil into the market-price categories
from the controlled price categories produced a number of

traded an immediate price rollback on crude oil prices for authority to end the program
after forty months and to end the controls on refined products sooner if Congress did
not object and for larger price increases during the forty months. KATZ, supra note
271, at 58-59 (describing compromise); LANE, supra note 299, at 54; see also LANE,
supra note 299, at 105-06 (explaining compromise).
419
KATZ, supra note 271, at 57.
420
LANE, supra note 299, at 104; see also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 494-97
(describing law’s implementation); BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 228 (“principle
feature” of EPCA in December of 1975 “was the retention of at least standby price and
allocation controls on the industry for five years and the broadening of the crude oil
controls to include new oil, released oil, and stripper-well oil”). “Lower tier” (or “old”)
oil was the amount of oil produced from a property during the corresponding month of
1972. LANE, supra note 299, at 104. It could be sold at “the highest posted price for
that grade of crude at that property on May 15, 1973, plus $1.35,” giving a range from
$3.50 to $7.00 per barrel. Id. at 104-05. “Upper tier” oil was “new, released and
stripper—all produced domestically—plus imported crude.” Id. at 105. “New” oil was
the excess over the 1972 base production level or oil from a new property. Id. Released
oil was the result of an incentive that allowed a barrel of old oil to become new for each
barrel of new oil produced from a property. Id. Stripper crude came from wells
producing ten barrels or less per day. Id. Upper-tier crude could be sold at market
price. Id.
421
LANE, supra note 299, at 113.
422
“Stripper” oil came from wells producing ten or fewer barrels per day of
petroleum and petroleum condensates, including natural gas liquids, during the
preceding calendar year. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM.
ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COM., U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 96TH CONG.,
THE CASE OF THE BILLION DOLLAR STRIPPER: THE EVASION OF PRICE CONTROLS ON
DOMESTIC CRUDE OIL BY RESELLERS 2 (1980) [hereinafter BILLION DOLLAR STRIPPER].
423
CBO, OVERVIEW, supra note 418, at 5-6. The various definitions had many
subtleties and complexities, described in some detail in id. at 5-8. See also MANCKE,
PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 18 (concise, clear explanation of pricing structure);
FEA, COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 401, at 7-34 (describing how to classify oil).
424
For example, in 1979 the old, new, and uncontrolled prices were $5.86,
$13.06, and $18.50 per barrel, respectively. CBO, OVERVIEW, supra note 418, at 6-7.
The first two prices are wellhead prices; the latter is at the refinery gate and so
includes transportation costs.
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In addition, the price
successful schemes to do so.425
differentials created an incentive to maximize production of
upper-tier oil from a reservoir rather than to maximize total
production.426 Refiners’ cost structure depended on the mix of
crude types that they refined. High-cost crude dependent
refiners were able to pass along their costs only if the market
allowed, while lower-cost refiners could sell all they produced.427
Accordingly, capacity utilization rates among refiners varied
widely.428 Analysts concluded that EPCA created problems
“infinitely worse” than the quota system it replaced.429
EPCA also “implemented far-reaching controls affecting
energy supply and consumption patterns which reinforced and
prolonged the distortions of the system.”430 The program proved
so complex to administer that there were hundreds of formal
amendments and “interpretative modifications” made to the
regulations between 1974 and 1978. “[N]early all of these
changes were in response to pleas for relief from particular
industry groups, or political pressures from the Congress.”431
425

BILLION DOLLAR STRIPPER, supra note 422, at 2 (noting that when the
price of stripper oil grew rapidly in January 1979, “a significant and growing
discrepancy began to appear in data reported to the DOE. Refinery receipts of stripper
oil, which had closely tracked production for several years, suddenly began to exceed
production. On a sustained basis this is, of course, a physical impossibility.”) One
method of doing so was to resell the oil through a number of entities, obscuring its
origins. Id. at 5. Eventually, enforcement actions were brought against a number of
firms for millions of dollars of false certifications. See Cost to Consumers, supra note
26, at 42-43.
426
LANE, supra note 299, at 111 (“In some instances, techniques to maximize
production from a unitized reservoir might be foregone in favor of techniques that
maximized production which could be sold at upper-tier crude prices.”).
427
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 222-23.
428
Id. at 225.
429
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 252.
430
KATZ, supra note 271, at 31. The extent to which the pricing system
required far-reaching controls can be seen from considering just one set of
consequences. Refiners differed in the proportion of old and less-controlled crude they
processed. To prevent those processing a higher proportion of old and cheaper crude
from earning higher profits,
the FEO had to enforce differential ceilings on the prices refiners could
charge for their products. The method was to allow each refiner a specified
markup over its full unit production costs. Even within well-defined
geographical markets, the price controls on old crude led to intercompany
differences of as much as 12¢ per gallon in retail gasoline prices.
MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 19. Once the embargo-related shortages
passed, to prevent those with lower costs from underselling their competitors, the
government required these refineries to sell some of their cheaper oil to their
competitors at controlled prices. Id. at 20.
431
LANE, supra note 299, at 57. See also DOE’s Enforcement of Alleged
Pricing Violations by the Nation’s Major Oil Companies: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of
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These frequent changes produced considerable uncertainty
about the rules.
By late 1975 it was still no exaggeration to state that in large
segments of the industry there was uncertainty as to actual current
costs and legal prices, about possible retrospective gains or liabilities
when regulations were sorted out and finally applied, and about
whether or not operations were or were not in compliance with
regulations as they eventually would be interpreted.432

The allocation program attempted to equalize the cost of
crude and equalize oil supplies so that all refineries operated at
the same percentage of their operating capacity.433 Refineries
with supplies over the national average were required to sell,
at their weighted average cost, the excess to those with
supplies under the national average.434 This created a number
of perverse incentives. For example, any refiner who found
additional supplies on the world market at prices above its
average cost would be forced to sell the extra oil to its
competitors at a discount.435 (This “extra” oil’s marginal cost
would have to have been above the average cost of the rest of

the Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong. 4 (1981) (“The regulations
implementing [the petroleum price and allocation] controls were quite complex,
addressing as they did a very complex industry. The sheer magnitude of this industry
is such that even a seemingly trivial type of violation of these complex regulations can
result in apparent violations in the hundreds of millions of dollars.” (statement of
James B. Edwards, Sec’y, Dep’t of Energy)); YERGIN, supra note 27, at 660 (describing
complexity and cost of regulations in 1970s).
432
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 229. This was a problem throughout
the program. Transfer pricing rules led to risk for oil importers, for if they bought at
high spot-market prices, they risked prosecution for violating rules if they could have
bought comparable oil under contract at lower prices, and so “many oil companies
continued to refrain from participating in the spot market.” Mancke, American
Response, supra note 393, at 34.
433
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 226.
434
LANE, supra note 299, at 40; VIETOR, supra note 98, at 246; see also
MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 15-16 (providing a clear, concise discussion
of the inter-refinery allocation problem). A particularly vivid example is the case of
Sohio, operating in Ohio. Sohio had a huge price advantage over its competitors from
its Alaskan crude supplies (which received preferential treatment under DOE
regulations). Forced by DOE regulations to pass this price advantage on to its
customers, Sohio undersold its competition and increased its market share in Ohio.
The independents sought a regulatory correction with an ad hoc lobby group, the “Ohio
Independents for Survival.” Their lobbying precipitated a general rules change that
favored the independents. LANE, supra note 299, at 171-72. Other lobbying groups
also formed to attempt to secure changes in DOE rules to their advantage. Id. These
efforts “diverted substantial amounts of managerial and entrepreneurial time and
attention away from marketplace problems and toward political problems . . . [and]
created constituencies for the continued existence of particular aspects of the controls,
and in many cases for the controls themselves.” Id. at 172.
435
LANE, supra note 299, at 41.
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the refinery’s oil because the average cost included the pricecontrolled domestic oil.) Price ceilings set under EPCA proved
difficult to calculate precisely, given their relationship to the
market price for foreign crude and its market share in the
United States, necessitating multiple adjustments.436 The net
effect penalized refiners who had taken steps to resolve the
shortages for the benefit of those that had done nothing.437 In
economic terms, the 1970s allocation program was a step
backward from MOIP, which had at least allowed the price of
quotas to be set in the marketplace, whereas the FEA set the
prices under the new program.438
The regulations also created incentives to operate
inefficient refineries simply to get the entitlements to crude oil
that owning a refinery produced: “the result was the bringing
out of mothballs any piece of ‘refining junk’ that could be
found—leading to the return of hopelessly inefficient ‘tea
kettle’ refineries of the kind that had not been seen since the
flood of oil in the East Texas field in the early 1930s.”439
Further modification of the program gave the small refiners
additional entitlements based on a sliding scale in an attempt
to reduce the cost advantage the larger, more efficient refiners
had.440 As a result, smaller, less efficient refiners profited at
the expense of larger, more efficient refiners, and additional
new, inefficient firms entered the refinery industry.441
The price control regulations did not allow passthroughs
of capital costs even to the same extent that they allowed
passthroughs of higher crude-acquisition costs, discouraging
refiners from investing in the technology needed to process

436

Id. at 107.
Id. at 41.
438
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 227.
439
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 660; see also FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES,
supra note 9, at 51 (During the 1970s, “government controls on crude oil prices and
allocation favored small refineries, which provided incentives for companies to open
and operate small, inefficient refineries, including many that produced little or no
gasoline.”).
440
LANE, supra note 299, at 134. Under the “sliding scale,” refiners got 11.1%
of the first 10,000 barrels per day of capacity and then smaller percentages of capacity
above that. For example, if a refinery had capacity above 300,000 barrels per day, it
received only 3.7% of the capacity above that amount. VIETOR, supra note 98, at 125.
Over time, the sliding scale became even steeper, rising to 22% for the first 10,000
barrels per day by the end of the program. Id. at 126.
441
Between 1974 and 1980, sixty-five of the sixty-seven new refineries built
had a total capacity below 45,000 barrels per day and sixty of these had a total capacity
below 30,000 barrels per day. LANE, supra note 299, at 134-35.
437
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high-sulfur crudes.442 Moreover, smaller refineries were less
likely to have the ability to process high-sulfur fuel or to
maximize production of lead-free gasoline. This reinforced the
negative impact of the quota system and discouraged
investment in processing high-sulfur crude.443 “Accordingly,
most new refinery capacity brought on stream after the
adoption of the small refiner subsidies was in the form of small
refineries designed to operate on low-sulfur crude oil and to
produce a relatively undesirable slate of products.”444 These
refiners earned their owners economic rents from the
allotments, but contributed little to broadening and deepening
the gasoline market. To some extent, such refiners actually
hindered the development of the market, for their existence
denied the more efficient producers crude they could have used
to expand into new regional markets and subsidized the
creation of protected pockets within the national market.
Because the new refinery could receive its own
allocation of the cheaper oil, building a new refinery became
preferable to expanding an existing one.445 The gains were
substantial. Economic analysts calculated that the annual
value of the cheaper oil allocations reached $17 billion in

442
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 295; LANE, supra note 299, at 138. In
Senate testimony, a DOE official elaborated on how regulations had discouraged
investment in refining:

First, the most serious aspect of the problem is that seven years of price
controls and general regulatory uncertainty have inhibited investment in the
refinery expansions and improvements needed to make unleaded gasoline, or
to make gasoline-range material out of heavy and high sulfur domestic crude
oils. . . . Second, price controls have discouraged refinery improvements that
increase efficiency, since they require that the full amount of such cost
savings be passed on in the form of lower product prices. Third, the
regulations do not reflect the fact that during the period of controls cost
increases relative to the production of gasoline have been much greater than
for other products. . . . Finally, the regulations take a snapshot of each
refiner’s prices as of May 15, 1973, and allow it to add certain costs to that
price, no matter how that company’s relative pricing or competitive
circumstances have changed in the meantime.
Id. at 139-40 (quoting John F. O’Leary, Deputy Sec’y, Dep’t of Energy, Statement
Before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (Dec. 11, 1978)).
443
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 295.
444
LANE, supra note 299, at 135-36.
445
PETERSON & MAHNOVSKI, supra note 76, at 36 (“Despite falling demand,
between 1975 and 1981 the construction of small, simple refineries was further
stimulated by federal crude oil supply controls, which gave unusual supply advantages
to small refineries.”).

1014

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:3

1979.446 As economists Kenneth Arrow and Joseph Kalt dryly
noted in a 1979 analysis,
The prospect of a transfer of $17 billion per year induces political
competition for its acquisition among producers, refiners, and
consumers. The entitlements program is an outcome of this process
of competition and is the mechanism by which eventual ownership of
the windfall gains that arise under crude oil price controls is
resolved.447

Predictably, “the Federal Register became more
important than the geologist’s report.”448 It also meant that
there were now vested interests in controls where there had
not been before, and so weakened opposition to the EPAA
within the oil industry.449
Once crude shortages no longer existed, the allocation
program was used to address the disparities in access to crude.
When crude was limited, “disparities in crude costs . . . had not
been a problem because supplies had been tight and product
could be sold at whatever price a firm could charge under the
regulations.” Once supplies were more abundant, however,
“those with higher than average crude costs feared that they
would be forced out of the marketplace.”450 The “entitlements”
program granted refiners “the right to refine one barrel of price
controlled crude oil during a given month,” allocated in such a
way as to give each refinery a proportionate share of the pricecontrolled gasoline but with a bias toward small refiners, who
received more entitlements than their proportionate share
would justify.451 This provided a tremendous cost advantage for
small refiners, as much as ten cents per gallon of gasoline.452
The Arab oil embargo spurred a 65% rise in real
gasoline prices from 1972 to 1976 (21% when adjusted for the
general rate of inflation).453 These prices pulled non-Arab oil
446

KENNETH J. ARROW & JOSEPH P. KALT, PETROLEUM PRICE REGULATION:
SHOULD WE DECONTROL? 11 (1979).
447
Id.; see also LANE, supra note 299, at 28 (“It was government forces in
effect during the previous two years that had not permitted market forces to operate in
the petroleum industry. Thus, the allocation program was a direct consequence of the
price control program.”).
448
VIETOR, supra note 98, at 238.
449
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 227.
450
LANE, supra note 299, at 128.
451
Id. at 129-31. The allocation formulas were complex and are described in
detail in id. at 128-30.
452
Id. at 133.
453
BERNARD A. GELB, THE CONF. BOARD, INFO. BULL. NO. 38, U.S. ENERGY
PRICE AND CONSUMPTION CHANGES IN THE MID-1970’S, at 4 (1978).
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and refined products into the United States from outside
sources.454 Price controls on domestically produced crude oil—
designed to prevent “windfall profits” to oil producers—instead
resulted in windfalls for refiners because the demand for the
cheaper, domestic oil greatly exceeded the price-controlled
price. For example, refiners could include the price of gasoline
they purchased for resale in the calculations of their average
price, which determined the price at which they could sell all
their gasoline. Thus, refiners selling gasoline at a controlled
price below the market price had an incentive to purchase
gasoline at any price, including prices above market price, to
bring their average up to the market price.455 In general, the
regulations lowered the price of crude to domestic refiners,
increasing their market share at the expense of foreign
refiners, but also increasing the average operating costs of
They boosted the market share of
domestic refiners.456
nonbranded gasoline from 10.4% in 1973 to 18.4% in 1979.457
When President Carter took office, his administration’s
initial policy goal was aimed at finding a way to decontrol
domestic oil prices “so that consumers could react to correct
price signals.”458 However, Carter’s attempts to reform energy
policy quickly mired in special interest politics.459
The Carter administration attempted “‘voluntary’ wage
and price guidelines, . . . backed by moral suasion, publicity,
and the denial of Federal contracts to firms that violated them.
At least initially, this was taken to include denial of the right
to bid on Federal oil leases,”460 which induced compliance by the
major oil companies. These “voluntary” guidelines were in
effect between October 1978 and December 1980.461 Like the
mandatory regulations, these guidelines proved “quite complex

454

MANCKE, PERFORMANCE, supra note 384, at 7.
LANE, supra note 299, at 143.
456
Id. at 147.
457
Id. at 158.
458
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 663. See also 1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 50310 (describing Carter’s “phased decontrol” strategy).
459
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 663 (When the Carter administration tried to
reform energy policy, it got “a firsthand education in how special interests operate in
the American system, including liberals, conservatives, oil producers, consumer groups,
automobile companies, pro- and anti-nuclear activists, coal producers, utility
companies and environmentalists—all with conflicting agendas.”).
460
LANE, supra note 299, at 57.
461
FRANK CAMM, CHARLES E. PHELPS & P.J.E. STAN, RESOURCE ALLOCATION
UNDER THE COWPS PRICE GUIDELINE: THE CASE OF FIXED PROPORTIONS, at v (1981).
455
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in practice.”462 There is at least some evidence that these
Because price
controls caused refinery-level shortages.463
controls did not account for the interrelationships of products
produced by refineries, they caused shortages in non-controlled
products.464
The Carter administration was also hampered by the
Iranian hostage crisis, which doubled spot-market prices by
February 1979.465 The loss of lighter Iranian crudes forced
refineries to use heavier crudes, reducing gasoline yields.466
The allocation program had “fallen into disuse” because a
market surplus had rendered it moot, but these new shortages
brought it back into play. By 1979, small refiners were again
making extensive use of the program.467

462

Id. at 3.
Id. at viii (“Some casual empirical evidence supports the belief that the
COWPS controls were in fact the determinate cause of refinery-level shortages in 19781980.”).
464
Id. at vi. The economic analysis is relatively complex, and described in
detail in the above cited report. Briefly, the analysis can be summarized as follows:
463

If and only if the productive technology of the firm embodies certain types of
fixed proportions (as appears to be the case for refiners), then complying with
[Council on Wage and Price Stability (COWPS)] guidelines can lead to a
shortage of refined product from any given refiner. If the COWPS constraint
becomes so binding that the profit-maximizing refiner cannot charge marketclearing prices for its products at any level of output, then it will select the
output that leads to the highest COWPS-allowed profits and will charge less
than market prices. This, of necessity, leads to rationing of the product by
the refiner among its customers and is a prima facie condition of shortage.
Importantly, this theory shows how rationing of products can occur for
products that were totally uncontrolled by the DOE, such as diesel fuel,
heating oil, jet fuel, and other products. And indeed, there was nonprice
rationing for each of these products by some refiners during the shortages,
rationing that cannot logically be attributed to the DOE price controls on
refiners.
Id.; see also id. at 42 (noting shortages in jet fuel that occurred during a labor strike at
a major airline and while the DC-10 fleet was grounded by the FAA, “a time when
aggregate demand for fuel was unusually low”).
465
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 688. Oil was cut off for sixty-nine days starting
at Christmas 1979; it returned at a permanently lower production rate. Paul Kemezis,
The Permanent Crisis: Changes in the World Oil System, in OIL DIPLOMACY: THE
ATLANTIC NATIONS IN THE OIL CRISIS OF 1978-79, at 3, 4 (1980). Iran, at the time of the
crisis, was the source of approximately 15% of internationally traded oil. Mancke,
American Response, supra note 393, at 29. Iran was also the source of 9% of U.S. oil
imports and 3% of U.S. consumption before revolution. Id. at 31; see also YERGIN,
supra note 27, at 702 (When Carter ordered a freeze on Iranian assets and ban on
Iranian oil imports in the wake of the seizure of the hostages in the American embassy
and Iran retaliated with a ban on exports to the United States, it disrupted supply
channels and forced reallocation of oil.).
466
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 692.
467
LANE, supra note 299, at 69.
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When President Ronald Reagan decontrolled oil prices
in January 1981,468 the rationale for operating small, inefficient
refineries dissipated and the number of refineries declined
The Reagan administration,
quickly and dramatically.469
unlike other post-World War II administrations, did not
intervene to protect small refiners.470 Although the number of
refineries fell from 324 in 1981 to 202 in 1991, the average
capacity rose substantially from 65,300 barrels per day in 1983
to 80,900 barrels per day in 1993 and 112,500 barrels per day
in 2003.471
With deregulation, the oil industry went through “a
wholesale corporate reorganization from which no major
company was immune.”472 Twenty-three small refiners shut
down in 1981 alone.473 Add to this falling real prices and the
rise of institutional investors interested in rapid returns, and
the oil companies were forced to become leaner and more
profitable quickly, sparking inter-company battles and a wave
of consolidations.474 The shift from a regulatory program that
encouraged the proliferation of refineries focused on domestic
crude sources and kept small, less efficient refineries open, to a
market-place that punished inefficiency led many refineries to
close in the 1980s.
5. Impacts on the Market for Gasoline
The post-World War II economic regulation of the oil
industry flowed from the belief that such a vital commodity
required government involvement. From there, “the drift of
policy was inexorable . . . because at each step the decision was
marginal—only a little more control was involved—and the
benefits from the entire enterprise appeared substantial.”475
But the regulatory scheme in place from the Korean War
468

Exec. Order No. 12,287, 46 Fed. Reg. 9909 (Jan. 30, 1981).
FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 51 (“After the
government controls were eliminated in 1981, a large number of small, inefficient
refiners exited over the course of a number of years.”).
470
KATZ, supra note 271, at 159 (“Citing free market arguments,
administration spokesmen stated after deregulation that no special treatment for the
refining industry was needed and that if the industry shrank as it adapted to
decontrol, the government should not meddle.”).
471
FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 51-52.
472
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 726.
473
2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1237.
474
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 726-28.
475
BOHI & RUSSELL, supra note 63, at 15.
469
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through 1981 failed to achieve its goals. Instead, it took crude
away from efficient refiners and allowed “refiners
manufacturing lower proportions of the products in short
supply to use higher than normal proportions of the available
crude,” shifted crude from the coasts, “where supplies were
short, . . . [to] the midwest, where supplies were [already]
plentiful,” and established “the precedent of bailing out refiners
that had come to depend on the spot market for a large
proportion of their crude supplies, reducing whatever incentive
they might otherwise have had to stockpile oil for such
Moreover, the regulatory
contingencies in the future.”476
system repeated its mistakes from one crisis to the next.477
At virtually all times, but particularly during the 1960s
and 1970s, economic regulations induced significant distortions
in the market for gasoline. The decline of the U.S. refining
industry’s world share is closely tied to American energy
policies, policies which included such disincentives for efficient
investment as the 1970s price controls’ requirement that larger
domestic refineries sell imported oil to competitors at below
cost. Combined with other nations’ interest in developing their
own refining industries, economic regulation contributed to
American refiners’ inability to meet the growing demand for
gasoline, both in the United States and the world.
Although these regulatory efforts ultimately had no
more chance of success than King Canute’s legendary command
to the sea had of stopping the tides, they had two long-term
impacts for our purposes. First, gasoline imports, as opposed to
crude oil imports, became more important in the American
gasoline market.478 Before World War II, most crude oil refined
and consumed in the United States was produced

476
LANE, supra note 299, at 89; see also KATZ, supra note 271, at 150
(“[S]pecial programs passed by Congress to protect independent refiners required
domestic producers to subsidize the refiners’ importation of foreign crude.”).
477
LANE, supra note 299, at 100-01 (“The most striking conclusion to emerge
from this analysis is the fact that most of the ‘mistakes’ made by the government in
handling the Arab embargo were repeated during the Iranian disruption six years
later. This result cannot be attributed merely to the change of administrations or the
turnover of administrative personnel. The same ‘mistakes’ were made because the
same groups were affected by the regulations and responded politically in the same
ways.”).
478
Gasoline imports became important in the 1970s.
NPC, FACTORS
AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 4. Imports grew from “a net negative in the early 1950s
to a peak of about 7% of domestic demand in the late 1980s” and have since fluctuated
between 2% and 6%. NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 21-22.
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domestically.479 Indeed, throughout World War II, the United
States had the vast majority of advanced refineries, with
“[a]pproximately 60 percent of the total world crude-distillation
and 65 percent of thermal cracking capacity” at the end of the
war.480
Second, the pervasive economic regulation had a more
subtle, but in our judgment, more debilitating effect. By
making the pages of the Federal Register and United States
Code more important to the oil industry than developing new
technologies for recovering and refining petroleum, regulations
convinced oil men, politicians, and bureaucrats that “kings”
could command the tides of the oil business. Regulators never
recognized that the burdens of their regulatory structures were
bearable only because the industry was simultaneously
expanding production outside the United States, developing
new technologies to improve refinery productivity, and growing
crude supplies so rapidly that the real price of crude continued
to fall. The parasitic regulatory burden thus went largely
unnoticed as it merely siphoned off portions of the gains from
technical and economic improvements.481 The widespread use
of “regulatory trading,” in which oil was traded to allow its
reclassification and resale at a higher price (at least quasilegitimately), during periods of allocation controls is indicative
of the destruction allocation programs caused.482
Whether these regulations served the real economic
interests of their supporters at the expense of the general
welfare483 or, more benignly, whether they reflected a

479
USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 2 (“At the present time the
country’s more than 450 refineries are supplied with crude oil by almost 425 thousand
domestic producing wells and a relatively small volume of crude oil from foreign
sources.” (citation omitted)).
480
Id. at 6. The next largest shares were in the Netherlands, West Indies,
and the Soviet Union, “each having approximately 10 to 15 percent as much crudedistillation capacity as the United States.” Id.
481
The same is true of some current environmental regulations of fuel
composition. See, e.g, NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 37-38 (“The fact that product
prices actually declined in spite of increased [regulatory] costs suggests that the direct
cost increase was more than offset by other efficiency gains within the industry.
Without increased environmental costs, prices would be lower.”). Imports have been
growing “significantly” in recent years, primarily from Europe. NPC, OBSERVATIONS,
supra note 13, at I-2. Although imports are small overall, they account for 25% of
gasoline supplies in PADD I. Id. at I-9.
482
1 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 681-82, 685-710 (describing history of
regulatory trading in detail).
483
YERGIN, supra note 27, at 660 (noting that the direct costs alone of the
federal energy regulatory system “measured simply in terms of expenditures by
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combination of incompetence and ignorance among policy
makers, we cannot say. The key point is that energy policy in
this period involved major interventions running counter to the
long-term market trends in gasoline, propping up inefficient,
smaller refineries, and diluting the competitive pressures for
securing supplies and technological innovation. Despite the
massive scale of these interventions, they reversed the longterm trends only briefly, during the immediate aftermath of
the Arab oil embargo in the mid-1970s. Their distortions so
pervaded the refining industry, however, that the industry in
1981 bore little resemblance to what it would have been in
their absence. Most importantly, these distortions’ cumulative
impact restricted the growth of a national market in gasoline
by protecting isolated markets from competition, punishing
firms that engaged in market-expanding behavior such as
securing cheap, foreign crude supplies, and deterring
investment in U.S. refineries.
By 1980, oil and refined gasoline were internationally
traded commodities, abundantly and cheaply available from
primarily non-U.S. sources. The failure to adapt to that fact
itself distorted the U.S. refining industry. The legacy of oil
regulation was a narrower, shallower national gasoline market
than would have evolved in the absence of forty years of import
and price controls.
Refineries were smaller, less
technologically sophisticated, and more concentrated on the
Gulf Coast than they would have been in the absence of
regulation.484 The gravity of these distortions was not fully felt
in the 1980s, however, because economic conditions kept
gasoline demand below 1978 levels well into that decade.485
Indeed, the problem’s impact is still mitigated today by the
East Coast importing gasoline from Europe, a solution possible
only because Europe relies heavily on diesel passenger
vehicles, which produces a gasoline surplus.486 If the diesel

government agencies and by industry on regulatory matters—added up to several
billion dollars in the mid-1970s”).
484
2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1163, 1226-28.
485
FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 19 (“U.S. gasoline
consumption fell significantly between 1978 and 1982, and remained lower during the
1980s than it had been in 1978, despite lower crude oil and gasoline prices during the
late 1980s. Those reduced prices resulted in part from substantially reduced U.S.
gasoline consumption and decreased worldwide petroleum consumption due to
increased price sensitivity and an economic recession.”).
486
NPC, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 13, at I-9 to -11.
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market grows in the United States, as some forecast it will,487
supplies of diesel are not likely to be available from European
refineries.
These regulatory factors, in turn, exacerbated the
burden of the environmental regulations that followed.
Competition in the gasoline market pushed refiners to adopt
increasingly sophisticated and expensive techniques to convert
larger percentages of crude oil feedstocks into the most
valuable end products (transportation fuels like gasoline)488 and
to control the consistency of the products they produced. With
diverse inputs and a wide range of possible refinery outputs,
refineries became increasingly sophisticated and costly to
build. The increased capital costs created a trend toward
larger refineries.
Even before the EPA directly regulated gasoline
composition, pre-existing regulatory and market forces had
virtually ensured that all but the most carefully designed
environmental regulation would fragment the market.
American refining capacity was insufficient to meet the U.S.
demand for gasoline, requiring substantial imports of gasoline
and leaving little excess capacity within the United States.
Furthermore, the potential for expanding existing refineries
was constrained by cost and the need for locations near oil
pipelines and ports. Although these same forces had produced
a national market for commodified gasoline, that market
remained vulnerable in ways that policy makers appear to
have ignored.
B.

Environmental Regulations and Gasoline Markets
1. Fuel Formulation

Although the federal government has long had authority
to regulate various aspects of motor fuels,489 and it has
487
See John Peter, Plotting Diesel’s Stake in North America, DIESEL FORECAST
(2005) (“The Big 3 domestic manufacturers are already well established in Europe’s
diesel market where nearly 50 percent of all light-duty vehicles are diesel powered.
And they would like nothing more than to add light-duty diesels to their respective
powertrain portfolios in North America.”).
488
GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 1 (The highest-value products from
refining crude oil today are transportation fuels (gasoline, jet fuel, diesel) and light
heating oils and the primary goal is to convert “as much of the barrel of crude oil into
transportation fuels as is economically practicable.”).
489
See Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, 504 (1967)
(giving Department of Health, Education and Welfare the authority to regulate fuels
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exercised that authority by requiring registration of fuels and
additives,490 state and federal regulators imposed only one
important fuel formulation requirement before the late 1980s:
requiring the removal of lead additives. Beginning in the late
1980s, however, the EPA and state and local governments
began to intervene more, increasing their efforts after the
passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (1990
CAAA).491 These fuel requirements added a set of constraints to
refinery operation and transportation of fuels.492 This section
analyzes the major fuel formulation requirements.
As noted earlier, lead had been added to gasoline to
boost octane since the 1920s.493 Price controls on tetraethyl
lead produced shortages in 1946, which in turn spurred a
federal octane ceiling to reduce demand. When price controls
were abolished in late 1946, the shortage ended.
Lead
shortages reappeared in the early 1950s when Korean War-era
price controls were imposed.
The federal government
considered a plan, supported by small refiners, to regulate
octane levels to reduce demand. The plan was abandoned,
however, because the need for different octane levels in
different regions due to climatic conditions made it too
complex. Instead, the government rationed tetraethyl lead
until 1952.494
Beginning in the 1950s, technological improvements
gradually reduced the amount of lead added to gasoline,

and fuel additives); Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1694
(1970) (allowing fuel additive testing) and id. at 1698-1700 (allowing regulation of
additives that could impair emissions-control equipment).
490
Reitze, supra note 152, at 486-87, 491-97.
491
FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 69 (“As a result of the
proliferation of unique fuel requirements, differing fuel specifications apply in different
parts of the country at various times of the year.”). The EPA uses the term “boutique
fuels” in a very limited way, including only “clean fuel program[s] designed and
enforced under state authority to reduce motor vehicle emissions and improve air
quality; and [a]pproved by the [EPA] under the authority of Section 211(c)(4)(c) of CAA
Amendments of 1990; and, [i]ncluded in an EPA-approved state [clean air]
Implementation Plan (SIP).” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TASK FORCE ON BOUTIQUE
FUELS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 5 (2006) [hereinafter EPA, TASK FORCE]. This
excludes a wide range of state mandates for “bio-fuels,” among other things, and so
understates the extent of fuel formulation regulation.
492
Jones, supra note 116, at xxi (noting importance of issue of “providing
products to the high specification now required by our customers, by the public and
pressure groups and by regulators (both domestic and, increasingly, supra-national)”).
Research into ways to provide products that meet required specifications “at an
acceptable cost” has been important in recent years. Id. at xxii.
493
See supra notes 149-52.
494
This paragraph is based on 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1150-56.
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primarily through improved catalyst use.495 When Congress set
automotive emissions standards with the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970, it “assumed that the automobile
manufacturing industry would meet those standards by
installing catalytic converters in the exhaust stream.”496 Lead
would have harmed the catalysts in these converters, and so
the 1970 Amendments authorized the EPA to order gasoline
refiners to alter gasoline formulations to protect the catalytic
converters.497 The EPA acted almost immediately to begin the
process of removing lead from gasoline.498
In 1972, in addition to protecting catalytic converters,
the EPA also initiated rulemaking based on lead’s health
effects.499 Not surprisingly, small refiners were again the
beneficiaries of special treatment, winning an exemption from
the rule until January 1, 1977 “in recognition of [their] special
lead-time problems,”500 and then receiving an additional partial
extension from Congress through October 1, 1982.501 As a
495

Bing Zhou, Ray Balee & Rebecca Groenendaal, Nanoparticle and
Nanostructure Catalysts: Technologies and Markets, 2 NANOTECH. L. & BUS. 222, 223
(2005).
496
Thomas O. McGarity, MTBE: A Precautionary Tale, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 281, 294 (2004) [hereinafter McGarity, MTBE].
497
The authority was phrased broadly, however, allowing the EPA to control
the use of additives on environmental grounds generally. See 42 U.S.C. 7574(c)(1)(A)
(2000).
498
In 1971, the newly formed EPA announced that it was considering
restrictions on lead as an additive. Regulation of Fuel Additives, 36 Fed. Reg. 1486
(proposed Jan. 30, 1971). In 1972, the agency proposed regulations, Fuels and Fuel
Additives, 37 Fed. Reg. 11,786 (proposed June 14, 1972), and in 1973, the EPA
exercised its Clean Air Act § 211(c)(1)(A) authority to require a series of lead additive
reductions beginning January 1, 1975 to a final level of no more than 0.5 grams per
gallon by January 1979. Control of Lead Additives in Gasoline, 38 Fed. Reg. 33,734
(1973). Refiners challenged the EPA’s actions and lost, Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d
722 (D.C. Cir. 1974), although the challenge resulted in a less-restrictive phaseout
schedule. 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1252-53. This relaxation resulted from the
delay in investment needed to convert refineries to unleaded production caused by the
regulatory uncertainty resulting from the litigation. In addition, unleaded production
reduced the volume of gasoline produced from each barrel of crude, and the government
feared shortages. Id. at 1254-55; Mancke, American Response, supra note 393, at 34
(“Higher operating costs, stemming from larger crude oil requirements and the
multimillion-dollar capital investments needed to modify a large refinery to produce
unleaded gasoline, entail that unleaded gasoline is substantially more expensive to
manufacture than leaded gasoline.”).
499
Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 37 Fed. Reg. 3882 (Feb. 23, 1972).
The final rule was issued in January 1973. 38 Fed. Reg. 1254 (Jan. 10, 1973).
Although the lead additive makers challenged the EPA’s actions, the en banc D.C.
Circuit upheld the rule. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
500
38 Fed. Reg. 33,734, 33,740 (1973).
501
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 223, 91 Stat. 685,
764 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(g) (2005)).
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result, between 1979 and 1982, there appeared “a small
subindustry of ‘blenders,’” firms created “to take advantage of
the small refiner exemptions,” which “would purchase
inexpensive, low-octane gas from foreign markets and blend in
just enough high-octane leaded gas to stay within the smallrefiner exemption.”502
Removing lead produced “a desperate search for ways to
maintain the octane level of [refiners’] gasoline pool.”503 The
prevailing solution was to “crank up the severity of the cat
reformer, making higher octane reformate,” but this reduced
the volume of gasoline produced and pushed refiners to look for
lead substitutes that would boost octane.504 Some refiners
resorted to an alternative additive to boost octane,
methylcyclopentadienyl
manganese
tricarbonyl
(MMT),
505
However, under the 1977
previously approved by the EPA.
Clean Air Act Amendments, “which may well have been
enacted with MMT in mind,” refiners were not allowed to
market gasolines for catalytic converter-equipped vehicles that
were not substantially similar to the gasolines used to certify
the vehicle, hampering MMT use.506 In late 1978, the EPA
restricted refiners’ use of MMT507 but a few months later, it
approved the use of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE) as an
octane-boosting additive, a decision with important
consequences, discussed below.508
The interaction of the environmental regulation with
the 1970s economic regulations also caused problems for
refiners. Pricing rules did not allow refiners to fully pass
through to consumers the additional costs of producing
unleaded gasoline, and so “[b]ecause th[e] premium was less
than the added costs associated with producing unleaded
gasoline, most oil companies chose to go slow in expanding

502
Thomas O. McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing in Environmental
Regulation, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 943, 950 (1994) [hereinafter McGarity, Radical
Technology-Forcing].
503
LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 141.
504
Id.
505
McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496, at 296; see also Reitze, supra note 152,
at 506-07.
506
McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496, at 296.
507
Id. The agency is currently reviewing the safety of MMT. See U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, Comments on the Gasoline Additive MMT (methylcyclopentadienyl
manganese tricarbonyl), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/fuels/additive/mmt_cmts.htm
(last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
508
McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496, at 297.
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their unleaded gasoline capacity.”509 As a result, there were
periodic shortages of unleaded gasoline in the 1970s,510
prompting the EPA to slow down the lead phaseout.511
The lead ban revealed the fragility of refining
infrastructure. Regulations raising costs combined with price
controls to reduce the economic returns to refining, lowering
the incentive to invest in capacity. In virtually every instance,
small refiners lobbied for and received special treatment (for a
time), further harming the development of an efficient refining
sector. As had happened with earlier regulatory constraints, a
combination of external events and policy responses mitigated
the problem. Lower-than-expected demand and delays in the
lead phaseout both ameliorated the capacity crunch,512 and the
EPA used an innovative quasi-market mechanism to reduce
the compliance costs of the lead phaseout, allowing refineries to
trade lead credits,513 and so bought off the small refiners.
A second formulation requirement began in the late
1980s. Through 1987, regulators had not seen volatility in
gasoline as an air quality problem. But when the summer of
1988 delivered “some of the worst ozone excursions on record,”
research fingered high-volatility gasoline as a contributing
culprit.514 States began the trend toward fuel controls to
address the ozone issue.515 Before the 1990 Amendments,
California refiners led a push toward “cleaner” fuels out of
concern that the state would mandate a mixture of 85%
methanol and 15% gasoline,516 and ultimately introduced a wide
range of fuels built around the addition of MTBE.517
In 1989, following state actions, the EPA set upper RVP
limits for summer gasoline nationwide,518 and then
509

Mancke, American Response, supra note 393, at 35.
Id.
511
McGarity, Radical Technology-Forcing, supra note 502, at 949.
512
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, VOLUME THREE: PROJECTIONS 57, DOE/EIA-0173 (1979).
513
2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1258-59 (describes trading).
514
NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 108. One problem
was that the EPA allowed vehicles to be certified with lower volatility gasoline than
was used in practice, leading to higher emissions than anticipated. See Reitze, supra
note 152, at 515-16.
515
Reitze, supra note 152, at 516 (describing efforts of Northeast States for
Coordinated Air Use Management, an eight-state coalition, and a subgroup of the
coalition to impose volatility requirements in 1989).
516
McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496, at 305-06.
517
Id.
518
NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 109.
510
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“substantially expanded” its involvement after the passage of
the 1990 Amendments, which mandated the federal
reformulated gasoline (RFG) program.519 Unfortunately, in
1990, gasoline formulation was known to affect “performance
criteria, notably volatility, octane quality, good startability, and
driveability, but little was known about the effects of fuel
composition on vehicle emissions.”520
As “a relatively minor and late-arriving aspect of a
multi-year effort to amend” the Clean Air Act that reached
fruition in 1990,521 Congress also required adding oxygenates to
gasoline in order to reduce emissions in carbon monoxide
nonattainment areas.522 The requirement, apparently resulting
from a coalition of farm-state senators, was passed without
consideration of the environmental impacts of any of the
additives, including MTBE.523
As the new bill was being debated on the floor of the Senate,
Senators Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) and Bob Dole
(R-Kan.) introduced an amendment under which refiners would have
to reduce the ozone forming potential of the gasoline sold in the nine
most seriously polluted ozone nonattainment areas by 15% while
adhering to a 2.7% oxygen requirement and keeping aromatics below
25%.524

This measure, seemingly designed to boost demand for ethanol,
raised the level of government involvement in fuel design to new
heights. The later discovery of MTBE’s serious environmental
problems led Congress to substitute ethanol as the oxygenate of
choice.525
The 1990 Amendments allowed the EPA to impose a
baseline set of requirements for gasoline, including mandating
reformulated gasoline in nine geographical areas to help meet
federal standards for ground level ozone.526 The first set of RFG
requirements was applied in 1995, with a second, tighter phase
following in 2000. The EPA initially required the RFG
519

Id.
PEARSON, supra note 132, at 83.
521
McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496, at 306.
522
42 U.S.C. §§ 7512(a)-(b), 7545(m) (2000).
523
McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496, at 309; see also Reitze, supra note 152,
at 526-28 (describing interest group maneuvering over oxygenates).
524
McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496, at 309.
525
Reitze, supra note 152, at 528 (noting that rulemaking ultimately had “a
tilt away from a fuel neutral approach to one that carved a place for ethanol”).
526
The 1990 amendments specified a wide range of characteristics of “base”
gasoline. 42 U.S.C. § 7581(4) (2000).
520
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formulations in nine metropolitan areas, although others were
added later.527 States were allowed to add more areas to the
RFG program, although the EPA could delay “opt-ins” if RFG
supplies were insufficient.528 In 1992 and again in 1996,
California promulgated its own regulations, which were even
more stringent than the EPA’s requirements.529
The initial specification for RFG gasoline required an
oxygen content of at least 2% by weight, a benzene content of
no more than 1% by volume, no lead or manganese, a yearround average NOX emission level of a 1990 summer baseline
gasoline, and reduced toxic air pollutant and volatile organic
compound emissions.530 The federal RFG program set different
targets for northern and southern states, reflecting “the
historical industrial practice where southern gasoline had
lower RVP than northern gasoline to compensate for higher
ambient temperatures.”531 Thus, the federal RFG requirements
produced three fuels: a “northern” RFG; a “southern” RFG; and
uncontrolled gasoline used outside the areas where states or
the EPA mandated one of the RFG gasolines.
These regulatory requirements produced several
changes in gasoline refining. The 1989 standard was primarily
met by reducing the butane content of gasoline, which required
compensating for the resulting loss of octane by increasing
catalytic cracking and alkylation of gasoline.532 The 1992 RVP
standards were met by increasing downstream processing of
gasoline and blending lower RVP components with higher
Both of these steps required “large capital
octane.533
investments.”534
Even implementing a comparatively simple regulatory
program like this required some sophisticated regulations. For
527
42 U.S.C. § 7545. The initial nine were Baltimore, Chicago, Hartford,
Houston, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New York City (including suburbs in other states),
Philadelphia, and San Diego. Reitze, Fuels, supra note 152, at 524 n.307.
528
42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(6)(A)-(B).
529
See California Air Resources Board, The California Reformulated Gasoline
Regulations, available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/gasoline/gasoline.htm#Programs
(last visited Apr. 12, 2007) (summarizing state program).
530
See Reitze, supra note 152, at 532-36 (describing initial regulations).
531
NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 116-17.
532
EPA, PROFILE, supra note 68, at 91. Because n-butane also raises the
average octane, however, a substitute was needed to maintain the blend’s octane level.
Needless to say, refineries also found themselves with seasonal surpluses of n-butane.
GARY & HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 8-9.
533
EPA, PROFILE, supra note 68, at 91.
534
Id.
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example, one concern was that the blendstocks removed from
the RFG fuels would be used in gasolines for non-RFG areas,
increasing the volatility of gasolines there and causing new
problems. As a result, the EPA adopted “antidumping” rules to
prevent the gasoline components not used in RFG from being
blended into gasolines outside the RFG mandated areas.535
These rules used baselines individualized for each refiner.536
Moreover, the 1990 CAAA oxygenate requirements
necessitated waivers in part because of limited time to build
the “new oxygenate production, storage, and transportation
facilities,” as well as the constraints on the ability to buy
oxygenates for storage.537
A second set of constraints on refiners came from the
EPA’s order under the 1990 Amendments to dramatically
reduce the sulfur content in transportation fuels, including
gasoline.538 These restrictions reduced the permissible sulfur
content in highway diesel.539 Combined with the shift in crude
supplies to heavier sour (e.g., higher in sulfur) crudes, this
required refiners producing fuel for the U.S. market to make
substantial capital investments.540
Beginning in 1998, the EPA imposed additional
requirements on fuels. In that year, the EPA began requiring
refiners to use a more complex model of fuels’ emissions
properties known, appropriately, as the “Complex Model.”541
Furthermore, after 1990, the EPA regulated deposit control
additives in fuel.
“The details of the regulations and
procedures did not emerge for several years, and led to an
interim stage of certification of four types of detergent additive:
polyalkylamines, polyetheramines, polyalkylsuccinimides and
polyalkylaminophenols.”542 The key is that as the regulations
535

NPC, 1990S, supra note 63, at 13 (“It is illegal to dump undesirable
gasoline components from RFG into conventional gasoline for other areas of the
country. Starting January 1, 1995, refiners, blenders, and importers will be required
to comply with regulations that will prohibit any increase in VOC, NOx, CO, or TAP
emissions over 1990 levels in gasoline sold outside the RFG program cities.”); see also
Reitze, supra note 152, at 536-37.
536
Reitze, supra note 152, at 536; 40 C.F.R. § 80.91 (2006).
537
NPC, 1990S, supra note 63, at 6.
538
Calvert, Heywood, Sawyer & Seinfeld, supra note 133, at 42 (Reducing
sulfur content both lowers sulfur-oxide emissions and makes catalytic reduction of
HCs, CO, and NOx more efficient.).
539
Reitze, supra note 152, at 507-12. 40 C.F.R. § 80.195 contains the gasoline
sulfur requirements.
540
See supra note 172.
541
Blackmore, supra note 92, at 248 (describing model).
542
Id.

2007]

WHY GASOLINE COSTS SO MUCH

1029

became more complex, the EPA’s involvement in fuel design
steadily increased. Moreover, boutique fuel requirements are
not simply a matter of the government specifying a particular
set of gasoline characteristics. The technique used to add one
required ingredient may affect the completed fuel’s
characteristics in other dimensions.543
In the oxygenate regulations, the EPA initially allowed
the use of both ethanol and MTBE. After refiners had invested
considerable capital in MTBE facilities, however, the
chemical’s negative environmental impacts became widely
recognized and its use was phased out.544 This left refiners with
both significant stranded investments in MTBE545 facilities and
shortages of ethanol.546
The formulation restrictions did not stop with those
imposed by the EPA. State and local governments also
imposed restrictions on gasolines sold in their jurisdictions
through various State Implementation Plans (SIPs).547
Although there is no comprehensive list of formulations
mandated by all levels of government, there appear to be at
least seventeen different formulations—a major increase from
543

For example, the EPA was concerned with

potential abuse of the process of adding oxygenate to gasoline downstream of
a refinery. This practice, called “splash blending,” involves mechanical
mixing of finished gasoline or gasoline blending stock having front-end
volatility set at a typical warm-season value (RVP of 7 to 8 psi) with a liquid
oxygenate (such as ethanol). Splash blending, unlike refinery-performed
match blending that renormalizes product output to the required properties
of an RFG, can change the proportional constituents of a gasoline by diluting
(replacing) their mass and volumetric share in each gallon. It also has the
potential to increase the quantity of the total fuel that evaporates from
vehicles if the fuel’s resulting RVP is significantly higher. EPA sought to
obviate this possibility by requiring the type of oxygenate that can be added
be stipulated at the refinery and thus maintain RVP integrity.
NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 126-27. The problem was
ultimately solved by the EPA’s “in situ” sample audits, which led most refiners to blend
at the refinery. Id. at 127.
544
But see McGarity, MTBE, supra note 496 (arguing that refiners bear a
portion of the responsibility for stranded investment because of lack of investigation
into environmental impact).
545
See STILLWATER ASSOC., INC., MTBE PHASE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 57 (2002),
available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/2002-03-14_600-02-008CR.pdf (discussing
problem of phaseout and recognizing stranded investment issue).
546
James R. Healey, Ethanol Shortage Could Up Gas Prices, USA TODAY,
Mar. 30, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/energy/2006-0330-ethanol-gas-prices_x.htm?csp=1.
547
See EPA, Reformulated Gasoline Frequent Questions, http://www.epa.gov/
oms/rfg/faq.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2007) (discussing SIP revisions for statemandated gasoline formulations).
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the single standard (the lead standard) in place in the mid1980s.548 In addition, some state and local governments have
imposed “biofuel” requirements.549
These requirements have three primary effects on
gasoline markets. First, the fuel requirements may isolate
particular geographic markets from the overall gasoline
market, making it harder to bring new supplies to a region or
uneconomical to shift supplies out of a region.550 Second, as
noted earlier, additional capital investment may be needed to
produce the boutique fuels. This limits the number of current
plants able to produce a particular fuel, which creates both an
incentive to exit the market and a barrier to enter the market.
Econometric investigations into these requirements, comparing
prices and price volatility between matched pairs of boutique
and non-boutique cities, found that not only is there evidence
that boutique fuel requirements raise the cost of gasoline, but
that the price impact varies with the geographic isolation and
degree of competition in the relevant market.551 Third, these
requirements alter the path of technological change, diverting
investment away from improving production processes to meet
regulatory requirements.552
Additional strong evidence indicates that the boutique
fuel requirements, occurring together with limited refinery
capacity and pipeline connections to other regions, affect prices.
548
MAJORITY STAFF OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, GAS
PRICES: HOW ARE THEY REALLY SET? 94 (2002), available at http://www.senate.gov/
~gov_affairs/042902gasreport.htm.
549
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 486J-10 (2005) (requiring 10% ethanol content
for all unleaded gasoline sold after April 2, 2006).
550
For example, if a boutique fuel is more costly to create than conventional
gasoline, refiners may be unwilling to divert supplies of it to meet a shortage in an area
that does not require the boutique fuel. There is evidence that boutique fuels are more
costly to produce than standard gasolines. See Jennifer Brown, Justine Hastings, Erin
T. Mansur & Sofia B. Villas-Boas, Reformulating Competition? Gasoline Content
Regulation and Wholesale Gasoline Prices 4-5 (Dep’t of Agric. & Res. Econ., U. Cal.
Berkeley, Working Paper, No. 1010, 2007), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/
are_ucb/1010.
551
Id. at 4-5. A forthcoming EPA analysis reportedly finds that boutique
requirements are not a factor in increasing gasoline prices, claiming that the refining
and distribution network is “able to provide adequate quantities of boutique fuels, as
long as there are no disruptions in the supply chain.” H. Josef Hebert, EPA: Special
Fuel Not to Blame for Costs, ABC NEWS, June 22, 2006, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=2108257 (quoting the EPA report). We
have not yet seen the EPA report, but the quote suggests the agency focused on the
wrong question. It is precisely when there are disruptions in the supply chain that a
broad, deep market makes a difference.
552
One summary of industry trends concluded that air pollution “has driven
the direction of our technological development.” Jones, supra note 116, at xxiii.
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After examining regional prices, the FTC found that differences
in price variability across regions began appearing in 1992 and
have increased since 1995.553 The agency concluded that “[t]he
timing of price changes . . . suggests that they may bear some
relationship to the introduction of Phases I (1992) and II (1996)
of the stringent and specialized CARB [California Air
Resources Board] requirements for gasoline sold in
California.”554 While the FTC study found evidence of a
boutique fuel price effect in California, it did not find such
evidence in the Gulf Coast, where the agency concluded that
the larger amount of refinery capacity and greater
interconnection of that region with other areas reduced the
impact of disruptions at any particular facility.555 The FTC
found similar results in the East Coast, Rocky Mountain, and
midwestern states.556
The increasing difference between U.S. market and nonU.S. market gasolines represents another effect of boutique
fuel requirements.557 Low sulfur requirements for both gasoline
and diesel in the United States limit the types of oil that many
refineries can process to make products for the U.S. market.558
This limits the possibility of importing gasoline from some
foreign refineries, reducing those refineries’ ability to supply
gasoline when there are spot shortages.559
As discussed earlier, running a modern refinery is
essentially an issue of complex optimization in which refiners
must solve the problem of creating the highest-value mix of end
products by managing the streams of intermediate products

553

FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 88-89.
Id. at 90.
555
Id. at 94.
556
Id.
557
NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 37 (“European conventional gasoline
does not meet U.S. specifications for either conventional or reformulated gasoline.
Adjusting European gasoline to U.S. quality would require some upgrading with an
associated cost increase.”).
558
Mortished, supra note 63 (“Few refineries are able to convert more of the
heavy sulphurous ‘sour’ crudes into petrol and most of those are in the United States.”).
Although Canadian and European sulfur requirements are moving in similar
directions, making gasoline from those sources potentially available for the U.S.
market, Caribbean and South American refiners are less likely to be able to meet the
U.S. sulfur requirements without large capital investments. NPC, ADEQUACY, supra
note 59, at 41.
559
BEHRENS & GLOVER, supra note 10, at 3 (“Foreign refiners typically
manufacture products designed to sell in the international market, not the special
product ‘boutique fuels’ demanded by a significant share of the U.S. market.”).
554

1032

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:3

The boutique fuel
manufactured at different stages.560
requirements thus increase the number of constraints in the
optimization problem. If the constraints are binding (and they
are meaningless if they are not), then the constraints have
costs.561
The market-fragmenting nature of the various boutique
fuel requirements is easy to grasp: by making gasoline sold in
Phoenix different from gasoline sold in Tucson, boutique fuel
requirements prevent owners of Phoenix-formulated gasoline
from selling their gasoline in Tucson and vice versa, limiting
the depth of the markets. Indeed, boutique fuel requirements
are government-mandated versions of what sellers of branded
gasoline
spend
considerable
resources
unsuccessfully
attempting to persuade gasoline consumers to believe: that a
gallon of one gasoline differs significantly from a gallon of
another gasoline.562 What is less obvious is the impact of the
broader fuel formulation requirements. The ultra-low sulfur
and other wider restrictions all reduced refinery capacity by
helping push marginal refiners out of the marketplace and
raising the barriers to entry by increasing the capital
requirements for entry.563
There are two main consequences of fragmenting the
gasoline market. First, markets function best when they are
deep rather than shallow.564 That is, when a market has many
participants and the materials traded in the market are
relatively standardized, there are many potential providers of
the goods to each potential buyer. Antitrust law recognizes the
560
See A. Ogden-Swift, Control and Optimization, in 2 MODERN PETROLEUM
TECHNOLOGY, supra note 37, at 181, 181 (“Refinery planning and scheduling,
optimization, process control and monitoring are essential to achieving [maximum
profits]. Typically savings from improvements in these areas exceed $20 million per
year for a world-scale refinery by choosing the best feedstocks, the best way to operate
the refinery, effective control at the best point, and efficient detection and management
of abnormalities.”).
561
See Jones, supra note 116, at xxi (“The development of products that meet
the required quality standards has not generally been unduly difficult; where problems
have arisen they have frequently arisen from the need to ‘trade off’ one characteristic
against another.”).
562
This seemed to have worked well early on: a 1947 government study noted
a “strong consumer tendency to deal regularly at particular stations where the desired
brand is sold” and that “the general preference of consumers [is] for branded gasoline.”
USDOC, WAR AND POSTWAR, supra note 39, at 28.
563
NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 99.
564
Some analyses have found this to be key in gasoline markets. See, e.g.,
Marshall C. Howard, Interfirm Relations in Oil Products Markets, 20 J. MKTG. 356, 361
(1956) (“The greatest source of interfirm friction and competition is price policy of both
suppliers and their market outlets when product is in ample supply.”).
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inherent advantages of markets with many buyers and sellers.
This basic premise undergirds virtually all economic
discussions of the efficiency of competitive markets. The
classic example of deep market efficiency is the market for
widely traded public company stocks (e.g., Microsoft) or
commodities like gold, silver, and pork bellies. Attempts to
exercise market power in such deep markets fail because
opponents can easily profit by applying price pressure against
the would-be monopolist.565 Extending a market makes it
deeper by bringing in additional participants.
There is
evidence of such an impact in the case of boutique fuel
regulations. A study from the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) concluded that
[f]or the boutique fuels—which are sold only in certain cities in the
East Coast and Gulf Coast regions, or in California—increased
market concentration led to higher wholesale prices than for
conventional gasoline. This difference likely stems from the limited
availability of the boutique fuels, which can only be produced by a
few refiners.566

Second, boutique fuel requirements defeat the market
forces promoting standardization in gasoline. Standardization
is an important means of deepening a market. Standardizing a
good allows buyers to make low-cost comparisons between
goods offered by different sellers, facilitating price competition.
In gasoline markets, for example, government regulations
require that fuel sellers post octane numbers for fuel and the
method used to calculate the octane number567 in order to
facilitate consumer comparison of different sellers’ products.568
The EPA has (commendably) taken a number of steps to reduce
the impact of boutique fuel requirements, but these merely
mitigate the extent of the problem caused by multiplying fuel
formulation requirements,569 they do not address the
565
See EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, A HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL SPECULATION 252 (1999) (discussing Hunt brothers’ attempt to corner the
silver market).
566
GAO, MERGERS, supra note 69, at 79.
567
Octane numbers can be determined by various methods. See GARY &
HANDWERK, supra note 61, at 15.
568
See Posting of Minimum Octane Numbers on Gasoline Dispensing Pumps,
36 Fed. Reg. 23,871 (Dec. 16, 1971) (FTC rule requiring posting).
569
See EPA, TASK FORCE, supra note 491, at 11-12 (listing efforts to mitigate
problems). Congress has also expanded the EPA’s authority to grant waivers when
necessary to reduce disruptions. See Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1541 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 7545). While waivers are useful in an emergency, they do not address the
underlying structural problems and do not relieve price impacts from non-emergencies.
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underlying issue. Most importantly, the EPA’s mitigation
efforts actually undercut the regulatory certainty necessary to
induce investment in expanding refinery capacity significantly
because they signal that investors cannot rely on a stable
regulatory environment.
Firms that are able to convince consumers that their
products differ significantly from competitors’ products are able
to charge a price premium because consumers’ differentiation
between the products reduces competition. For example, CocaCola is able to sell its soda for a higher price than store brands
because consumers distinguish Coke from store-brand colas.
To protect this product differentiation, Coca-Cola spends a
considerable amount on advertising aimed at maintaining a
brand image.570 Similarly, “green” energy providers are able to
charge above market rates for energy produced by
“sustainable” methods to consumers who prefer to consume
power that is not produced with non-renewable energy, even
though the electricity itself is indistinguishable from power
produced by plants using non-renewable energy.571
Boutique fuels are a special case of interference with
standards. Consumers are not allowed to choose the fuel they
will use, except in border regions between areas with different
fuel requirements.
These fuels prevent arbitrage across
geographic markets, preventing market forces from reducing
price differentials.572 Arbitrage produces price convergence
with startling effectiveness.573
When an imbalance between supply and demand across
different geographic markets causes price differentials, for
example, opportunities for arbitrage exist and attract the
570
See Coca-Cola Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 70 (2005), available at
http://www2.coca-cola.com/investors/pdfs/form_10K_2005.pdf (reporting advertising
expenditures of $2.5 billion for 2005).
571
Michael Evan Stern & Margaret M. Mlynczak Stern, A Critical Overview of
the Economic and Environmental Consequences of the Deregulation of the U.S. Electric
Power Industry, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 79, 148 (1997) (noting that green and “dirty” energy
cannot be distinguished).
572
Arbitrage is an attempt to profit by exploiting price differences in different
markets.
573
Indeed, one rationale for the adoption of the euro was that it would
facilitate price comparisons and produce arbitrage opportunities across the countries
adopting it. The Euro Will Be One of the Worlds Most Stable Currencies: José Maria
Gil-Robles, President of the European Parliament Answers Questions, CONTEXT
EUROPEAN EDUC. MAG., Mar. 2, 1997, available at http://www.context-europe.org/
ca181.html (“[F]or the first time, it will be possible to easily compare the prices of goods
and services in different countries. The Euro will therefore stimulate competition,
which will be beneficial for both consumers and enterprises.”).
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attention of entrepreneurs. If a good costs more in Phoenix
than in Tucson, entrepreneurs will buy the good in Tucson and
bring it to Phoenix. This will increase demand in Tucson,
creating market pressure for higher prices there. It will
increase supply in Phoenix, creating market pressures for
lower prices there. Ordinarily, the price between Tucson and
Phoenix will converge. In general, price differentials will likely
persist only where transactions costs limit opportunities for
Even where such transactions costs exist,
arbitrage.574
however, there are market pressures to reduce the cost of
delivering gasoline from Tucson to Phoenix and allow the
Tucson gasoline source to undercut the Phoenix price.575 Where
boutique fuel requirements fragment markets sufficiently to
cause price differentials, such individual efforts at arbitrage
are also likely to occur—and this reduces the effectiveness of
the boutique fuel requirement.
2. Obstacles to Refinery Capacity Growth
In the 1950s, “entry into gasoline retailing [was]
‘relatively easy.’”576 As we have seen, there have been periods
of rapid (sometimes too rapid, from the industry’s point of view)
expansion of refinery numbers and capacity in response to
demand and regulatory stimuli. The post-war refinery crunch
quickly yielded to considerable expansion in the 1950s and the
perverse incentives of the 1970s brought numerous plants
online (including some of dubious efficiency) with little lead
time. But remarkably, no new refinery has been built in the
United States since 1976.577 Rather than build new refineries,
574
A gasoline price differential between Phoenix and Tucson will not be
competed away by Tucson gasoline owners trucking their gasoline to Phoenix unless
the price in Phoenix is more than the cost of transporting the gasoline from Tucson to
Phoenix, plus the cost of gasoline in Tucson. Because an arbitrageur seeking to exploit
the price differential will have to bring the gasoline to Phoenix to sell, transportation
costs will matter.
575
Indeed, we observe individuals engaged in arbitrage on small scales where
there are artificial barriers to price competition. Thus, for example, on the ArizonaCalifornia border, Arizona gas stations advertise the lower price of gasoline in Arizona
because Arizona has a lower gasoline tax than California, so individuals fill up their
tanks in Arizona to avoid paying the higher tax in California (this information comes
from the personal observation of one of the authors). Tax boundaries create such
behavior in many instances.
576
Dirlam & Kahn, supra note 33, at 838.
577
Jad Mouawad, No New Refineries in 29 Years, But Project Tries to Find a
Way, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.corpwatch.org/
article.php?id=12227; FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 50 (“Since
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refiners have expanded existing facilities, meeting the increase
in U.S. demand for transportation fuels without domestic
greenfield projects.578
What accounts for the difference between “easy” entry
in the 1970s and a completely stalled new construction
program since 1976? For starters, the refining business has
not drawn investment because its economics are unattractive.
For example, after the oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979,
demand for refined petroleum products fell and “[r]efinery
expansion plans were consequently curtailed and plans for
‘green field’ refineries abandoned, particularly in Europe and
Similarly, in the 1990s, “some firms
North America.”579
divested refineries because of high operating costs and low
returns. For companies acquiring these refineries, it was more
cost effective to acquire an existing refinery than to build one,
especially given the high cost and stringent environmental
requirements for refinery construction in the United States.”580
Low interest from investors offers a partial explanation, but
the industry’s massive investments in compliance with new
environmental regulations and expansion of existing refineries
demonstrate that considerable capital has flowed into the
industry despite the unfavorable economics. Thus, low investor
interest cannot entirely explain the absence of new refineries.
Put simply, firms had a choice between expanding existing
facilities and building new ones and, since 1976, they have
chosen the former.
Refiners also contend that they have not been able to
build new refineries because of the combination of high capital
costs, regulatory costs, and low returns.581 Emissions controls
1976, no new refinery has been built in the U.S. with the primary purpose of producing
gasoline.”).
578
FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 49 (“Between 1985 and
2005, U.S. refineries increased their total capacity to refine crude oil into various
refined petroleum products by 10.3 percent, moving from 15.7 million barrels per day
in 1985 to 17.3 million barrels per day in 2005. Most of this new capacity came into
operation after 1998. This increase—approximately one million barrels per day—is
roughly equivalent to adding approximately 10 average-sized refineries to industry
supply.” (citation omitted)).
579
Jones, supra note 116, at xviii.
580
GAO, MERGERS, supra note 69, at 42.
581
One reason is the protectionist impact of air pollution regulations that
require new plants to secure off-setting emissions reductions, but grandfather existing
facilities. 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1266; GAO, MERGERS, supra note 69, at 66. A
1974 report by the National Petroleum Council reached similar conclusions. It found,
based on a survey of refiners, that refiners expected to spend on environmental
regulatory compliance an amount ($3.3 billion in 1970 dollars) that could have paid for
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on refineries have led to massive capital and operating cost
expenditures.582 Of course, many of these same problems would
also afflict expansions of existing facilities, but they do not
seem to have stopped that process, and critics of the industry
remain skeptical.583
Land use restrictions provide a more likely explanation
for the thirty-year lull in refinery construction. Throughout
the industry’s history, neighbors of potential refinery sites have
objected to their construction. For example, Standard Oil’s
attempts to build a refinery in Chicago to process the sulfurladen Lima oil field’s production caused opposition from
neighbors of the proposed plant “on account of the odor from
Lima crude and the fire hazard.” The refinery was ultimately
built in Whiting, Indiana, “a desolate spot on the sand dunes
along the southern shore of Lake Michigan.”584 Today, of
course, “desolate spots” close to oil supplies are harder to find
than they were in the early twentieth century and even the
most desolate spot may have environmental restrictions that
impede construction of a refinery. An attempt to build a
refinery in a relatively isolated rural area in Yuma County,
Arizona, for instance, has drawn some local opposition.585

1.3 to 2.2 MMB/CD refinery capacity. NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 3536.
582
2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1250-51.
583
Environmental pressure groups, for example, argue that refiners are
deliberately restricting the expansion of capacity through mergers and closure of
refineries. See Public Citizen, Myths and Facts About Oil Refineries in the United
States,
http://www.citizen.org/cmep/energy_enviro_nuclear/electricity/Oil_and_Gas/
articles.cfm ?ID=11829 (last visited Apr. 12, 2007) (arguing that “[o]il companies have
exploited their strong market position to intentionally restrict refining capacity by
driving smaller, independent refiners out of business”). After reviewing data on
mergers, the GAO concluded that “anecdotal data” exists to support the idea that
mergers “have had some impact on barriers to entry in the U.S. petroleum industry.”
GAO, MERGERS, supra note 69, at 64. There is little question that many refinery
owners have reduced capacity by closing plants. The dispute is over their motivation in
doing so—refiners contend that the closed plants had been uneconomical to operate, in
part because of the costs of capital requirements. An alternative explanation for some
of the closures is the impact of antitrust regulators’ insistence on divesture of
particular refineries as a condition of approval of mergers. For example, vertically
integrated oil companies reduced refining capacity by closing or selling unprofitable
refineries (sometimes as a result of FTC pressure in mergers), which reduces their
capacity and reduces their ability to supply unbranded gasoline.
584
GIDDENS, supra note 37, at 10.
585
See, e.g., Jonathan Athens, Opposition to Refinery Grows, YUMA SUN, Nov.
21, 2004, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive10913.html. But see
Tammy Krikorian, Petitions in Wellton Back Refinery, YUMA SUN, Dec. 10, 2004,
available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive111913.html (detailing support in
neighboring community). See also infra notes 593-99.
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The rise of land use regulation, other environmental
restrictions, and popular resistance to the “local refinery”
limited expanding capacity as early as the 1970s.586 For
example, by 1974, state-level restrictions in California and
Delaware posed significant barriers to refinery construction.587
At the federal level, environmental legislation protecting
coastal areas restricted the availability of considerable land
with access to tankers for crude supply.588
The FTC analysis of the industry concluded that “[i]n
general, the FTC has not found entry to be likely in petroleum
refining; the sheer complexity of entry (both inherent and due
to environmental restrictions) is a significant barrier to timely
entry.”589 Furthermore, the agency found that both high-sunk
costs and environmental regulations present significant
deterrents to entering the refining business. “These entrydeterring factors have become more formidable since the 1980s,
as refineries have become more capital-intensive and
environmental regulations have become more restrictive.”590
Indeed, the 2005 FTC review of gasoline pricing concluded that
“costly and extensive permitting and licensing requirements
mandated by various federal, state, and local environmental
and other laws, as well as community opposition” “likely”
induced U.S. refiners to expand by increasing capacity at
existing refineries rather than by constructing new ones.591 The
GAO also recognized these barriers to entry. It concluded that
the refining sector “is characterized by pervasive barriers to
entry, including large capital investment requirements at the
refining level, and regulatory and permitting impediments at
the refining and wholesale/retail levels.”592
The ongoing effort to build a refinery near Yuma,
Arizona illustrates the obstacles and difficulties facing refinery

586
NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 5 (“Despite the rigorous
standards for both water and air quality that refineries must meet now and in the
future, resistance still exists in many areas of the country to constructing plants, even
with appropriate environmental equipment.”).
587
Id. at 42.
588
See Breck C. Tostevin, Note, ‘Not On My Beach’: Local California
Initiatives to Prevent Onshore Support Facilities for Offshore Oil Development, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1987) (discussing obstacles to development of oil facilities in coastal
areas).
589
FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 33.
590
Id. at 197.
591
FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 50.
592
GAO, MERGERS, supra note 69, at 66.
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construction. In 1999, Arizona Clean Fuels initially sought593 to
build a $2-3 billion refinery594 in Maricopa County, but
Maricopa’s emissions restrictions and ozone noncompliance led
Arizona Clean Fuels to shift its focus to Yuma County.595 In
addition to the company obtaining state and federal approval
for its emissions permit, the refinery would need local zoning
changes. All of these requirements involved multiple public
hearings and lengthy review by various bodies.596 Arizona
Clean Fuels estimated that it needed “two dozen” permits to
Opponents also
build and operate the refinery.597
unsuccessfully sought a referendum on the zoning changes.598
Arizona Clean Fuels’ efforts to secure the required permits
persisted for six years, costing the company $30 million
without producing a single physical act toward construction.599
The capital investment needed to produce boutique fuels
provides yet another entry barrier. Meeting these new fuel
593
Oil Refinery Permit Takes Next Step for Approval, YUMA SUN, Feb. 5, 2005,
available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive12080.html.
594
Initial estimates put the refinery cost at $2 billion. See T.M. Schultz,
Surprise! Refinery Eyeing Yuma County, YUMA SUN, Oct. 31, 2003, available at
http://refinery.org/news/2003/news_10310305.htm. By 2005, however, news stories
estimated the cost at over $3 billion. Jonathan Athens, Refinery Awaits Green Light
from Mexico, YUMA SUN, Oct. 14, 2005, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/
ysarchive16704.html (noting estimate of $3.2 billion); Blake Schmidt, Refinery Price
Tag at $3 Billion, YUMA SUN, Sept. 15, 2005, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/
google/ysarchive16151.html. A new refinery on the Gulf Coast is also estimated to cost
a similar amount. See NPC, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 13, at I-20. Purchases of
refineries value them at approximately 25%-33% of new construction cost, according to
an industry study. Id. at I-21.
595
James Gilbert, Gas Plant Proposal Still Needs Refining, YUMA SUN, Jan.
29, 2004, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive13659.html; Schultz,
supra note 594. The refinery would get its crude from a pipeline from Mexico. Id.
596
See, e.g., Jonathan Athens, Oil Refinery a Slippery Issue, YUMA SUN, Aug.
20, 2004; Jonathan Athens, Refinery Permit Subject of Public Hearings, YUMA SUN,
Nov. 8, 2004, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive10707.html. The
proposed site included “cultural resource sites” of two Native American tribes, about
which the refinery owner had held two years of meetings. Jonathan Athens, Wellton
District Closer to Land Transfer, YUMA SUN, Mar. 10, 2005, available at
http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive12622.html.
597
Tammy Krikorian, EPA: No Objection to Refinery Permit, YUMA SUN, Mar.
22, 2005, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive12823.html.
598
Jonathan Athens, Refinery Foes Form Battle Plan, YUMA SUN, Dec. 3,
2004, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive11094.html; Jonathan
Athens, Board of Supervisors Unanimously Approves Land Use Change for Proposed
Oil Refinery in East Yuma County, YUMA SUN, Dec. 14, 2004, available at
http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive11268.html (noting that, “[i]n a surprise
move,” opponents abandoned their plan to seek a referendum).
599
David Sharp, Farm Leader: U.S. Needs More Refining Capacity, YUMA
SUN, Sept. 11, 2005, available at http://sun.yumasun.com/google/ysarchive16041.html.
This lengthy process is not unique in refinery permitting. See 2 BRADLEY, supra note
74, at 1263-64 (discussing delays for projects in the 1970s).
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formula specifications “required substantial investments.”
Environmental regulation-related investments in domestic
refineries reached at least 25% of total refinery investment
during the 1990s, with industry groups estimating it accounted
for $102 billion in 2004 dollars, up to half of the oil industry’s
total environmental expenditures.600 Many smaller refineries
closed in the 1990s, in part because they lacked the capacity to
meet the new fuel requirements and their owners declined
investing in the upgrades needed to provide that capacity.601
Significant investments were required in the 1990s,
particularly to enable production of the 1992 RFG gasoline.602
The FTC Mergers report noted that “[s]ome recent [refinery]
closures have been related to the large investments required to
meet new fuel specifications.”603 For example, in 2001, an
Illinois refinery closed rather than make a $70 million
investment to meet new product specifications.604 “Refinery
environmental investments, which peaked near $3.3 billion in
1992 ($3.9 billion in 2002 dollars) . . . accounted for about 25%
of total domestic refinery capital investment during the
1990s.”605 Environmental expenditures hit a new peak in the
1990s, around the introduction of the 1992 gasoline
formulation requirements.606
Thus, it seems likely that the combination of refinery
economics’ unattractiveness, capital-intensity, economies of
scale, and fuel specification and locational regulatory
requirements provides significant barriers to entry for the
refining industry. Together, these factors may well form a
greater barrier to entry than the sum of their parts. For
example, the relatively low refinery profitability not only deters
investment in this capital-intensive business, but magnifies the
hurdle posed by the required regulatory investments.
Moreover, some of these barriers apply to expanding refineries
into new boutique fuel product lines. Although the FTC noted
600

FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 57.
Id. at 52; see also FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 184 (stating that “the
large capital investments required under recent environmental regulations may
disadvantage small refineries, which lack economies of scale relative to larger ones”).
602
FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 69 (“Total environmental capital
investments peaked at $4.8 billion in current dollars ($5.7 billion in 2002 dollars) in
1993 with the implementation of new product standards for gasoline, improvements to
retail station tankage, and other pollution control measures.”).
603
Id. at 186.
604
Id.
605
Id. at 69.
606
Id. at 82 fig.3-9.
601
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that even if entry into refining by building entirely new
refineries is not likely, entry by existing refiners into new
product lines remains possible.607 Such entry can often require
significant capital investment even at an existing refinery,
however. Unfortunately, the low margins are insufficient to
justify the investment necessary to overcome these hurdles.608
The undeniable reality remains that the number of
domestic refineries has steadily fallen, even as capacity has
grown, leaving relatively little slack in the system if a refinery
shuts down for unplanned maintenance or to weather a
hurricane.609 Planned maintenance can also be a problem, since
major maintenance is typically planned up to a year in
advance610 and so may coincide with unplanned events
(weather, etc.) that cause supply disruptions.
Even the
impressive capacity growth of the past thirty years, partially
caused by the rise in utilization rates, has reduced system
flexibility by leaving little unused capacity available to make
up for unplanned closures.611
3. Crowding Out Investment
Refineries pollute the air, emitting a variety of
impurities through their operations, including “fugitive
emissions of the volatile constituents in crude oil and its
fractions, emissions from the burning of fuels in process
heaters, and emissions from the various refinery processes
themselves.”612 “Evaporative losses from refinery tankage also
represent a significant proportion of the total loss,” particularly
607

Id. at 197.
FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 50.
609
This is what happened with the Katrina-related reduction in capacity in
the Gulf Coast region refineries.
610
NPC, OBSERVATIONS, supra note 13, at II-4.
611
FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 76 (“High utilization
rates also can contribute to price volatility and periodic supply problems. When
unexpected gasoline supply disruptions occur or gasoline demand increases
unexpectedly, then high refining utilization rates can mean that no or little extra
refining capacity is available to remedy a supply shortage or satisfy an increase in
demand.”).
612
EPA, PROFILE, supra note 68, at 39 (“Fugitive emissions occur throughout
refineries and arise from the thousands of potential fugitive emission sources such as
valves, pumps, tanks, pressure relief valves, flanges, etc. While individual leaks are
typically small, the sum of all fugitive leaks at a refinery can be one of its largest
emission sources. Fugitive emissions can be reduced through a number of techniques,
including improved leak resistant equipment, reducing the number of tanks and other
potential sources, and, perhaps the most effective method, an ongoing Leak Detection
and Repair (LDAR) program.”).
608
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from floating roof storage tanks.613 As one would expect,
refineries are heavily regulated under the Clean Air Act.
Controlling some of these emissions is relatively
straightforward, yet sometimes costly.
Simply replacing
floating roof tanks with less leaky alternative storage
containers and fixing leaky pipes and valves reduces pollution
and can improve a refinery’s bottom line. “Studies have shown
that 70% of all emissions from a process unit originated from
Although “[s]imply
about 1% of the leaks’ sources.”614
tightening of valve seals can often eliminate leakage once
detected” and only a few valves are the source of most leaks,615
identifying which of the thousands of valves in a refinery are
the 1% causing the problem is time-consuming and costly.
In addition to investments in pollution control,
refineries face market and regulatory pressures to invest in
expanding capacity, adding the capability of processing cheaper
heavy-sour crudes,616 and upgrading equipment to meet the
new fuel specifications.617 In particular, meeting fuel standards
requires expensive investments in refining equipment
upgrades,618 and refineries undoubtedly will continue to have to
613

Martin, supra note 37, at 201.
Id.
615
Id.
616
Stock analysts favor companies with the ability to refine cheaper heavysour crudes. See, e.g., Stock Report, ConocoPhillips, STANDARD & POOR’S (Apr. 8,
2006), at 2 (citing “considerable ability to refine heavy-sour crude feedstocks” as a
positive attribute); Stock Report, ConocoPhillips, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 29, 2006), at 2
(ConocoPhillips “is well positioned to benefit from a trend toward wider spreads
between the cost of lighter, high-quality oil and heavier, low-quality feedstock.”).
Compare Stock Report, Sunoco, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 2, 2006), at 1 (noting Sunoco is
relatively less attractive because it “is unable to add a significant amount of heavy sour
crude conversion capacity like many of its peers”). But see Stock Report, Valero
Energy, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 15, 2006), at 1 (“We think Valero’s heavy sour crude
refining capacity provides a nice short-term competitive advantage, but not a
sustainable one.”).
617
Standard & Poor’s stock analyses of refining companies see increasing
restrictions on fuel composition as improving returns in refining. See, e.g., Stock
Report, Frontier Oil, STANDARD & POOR’S (Apr. 8, 2006), at 3 (“[W]e expect increased
fuel demand amid tightened sulfur regulations for gasoline and diesel fuel, the phasein of ethanol and the elimination of MTBE as a gasoline blending component to support
above mid-cycle refining margins in 2006 and 2007.”). But see Stock Report, Marathon
Oil, MORNINGSTAR (Feb. 28, 2006), at 1 (noting refining and marketing “are brutally
competitive areas where companies have to resort to being price-takers”).
618
FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 182 (“Downstream processing units also
have been important in allowing refineries to meet new environmental regulations for
fuel products.”). In one case, the FTC even found that synergies from a merger “were
likely to contribute significantly to the continued viability of the acquired refinery in
light of the upcoming investments needed to satisfy regulatory requirements for
cleaner-burning fuels.” Id. at 35; see also id. at 184-85 (describing synergies).
614
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make those investments to meet the new fuel specifications and
Moreover, there are
reduce pollution from operations.619
important scale economies to operating groups of refineries as a
unit,620 creating an incentive to combine refineries through
acquisitions, and Wall Street, if not the FTC, views regional
capacity concentration positively.
There are thus pressures on refiners to invest
significant capital in multiple areas: mergers and acquisitions,
reducing refinery emissions, new processing equipment for
heavy crudes, new processing equipment for the new fuel
formulations, and expanding capacity. These pressures mount
in the context of a highly cyclical business,621 with low returns
in some years, albeit at least partially offset by high returns in
others.622 For example, returns were below zero in 1992 and
near zero in 1995,623 but reached record levels in 2005.624 The
cyclical nature of the business raises the cost of capital by
making investors more reluctant to purchase equity. For
example, Morningstar’s spring 2006 reports on the major U.S.
refiners argue that their stocks are heavily overpriced, a
whopping 36% for Marathon Oil, the second largest
independent refiner, and 69% for Valero Energy, the largest
independent refiner.625

619
See, e.g., Stock Report, Valero Energy, MORNINGSTAR, supra note 616, at 1
(“We expect capital spending to remain high over the next couple of years as the firm
finishes making capital improvements to comply with the new Environmental
Protection Agency clean-air regulations and adds capacity.”).
620
FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 185 (“[I]t may be possible to increase the
total amount of gasoline produced, or to produce it at lower cost, by blending higher
octane, higher sulphur gasoline from one refinery with lower octane, lower sulphur
gasoline from another refinery. The advantages of multi-refinery operation in allowing
a firm to exchange intermediates probably have become more important since the mid1980s because of the larger number of environmental mandates for gasoline
specifications.”).
621
See Stock Report, Sunoco, MORNINGSTAR, supra note 616, at 1 (refining is
“an economically unattractive and cyclical industry”).
622
See, e.g., Stock Report, BP PLC ADR, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 29, 2006), at 1
(“Refining and marketing activities . . . have less attractive economics [than
exploration]. The industry has historically been plagued by periods of excess capacity
that lead to weak—or even negative—gross profits.”).
623
FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 72.
624
See, e.g., Stock Report, Tesoro, MORNINGSTAR (Mar. 2, 2006), at 1 (noting
“refiners have been riding a cyclical high and raking in the profits” and that Tesoro’s
“gross refining margins increased more than 75% from 2003 to 2005”); Stock Report,
ConocoPhillips, MORNINGSTAR, supra note 616, at 2 (“ConocoPhillips is reaping the
benefits of refining margins that are well above historical averages.”).
625
This was calculated by comparing the “fair price” with the “current price”
(price as of the report date).

1044

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:3

Investing in emissions control and boutique fuel
processing restricts refiners’ ability to invest in increasing
capacity. That is, the opportunity cost of the environmental
spending likely reduces capacity expansion. Investment in
upgrading refineries to meet environmental requirements and
add the capacity to produce boutique fuels, which the American
Petroleum Institute (API) estimates at $47 billion in the last
decade, may be crowding out investment in upgrading capacity.
As API’s Edward Murphy noted, such investment “is going to
cost you money and the only thing you will get is cleaner air
and less emissions—which are good—but no new capacity.”626
For the past thirty years, U.S. refining capacity has grown
exclusively through increasing capacity in domestic refineries
(rather than from new refineries), a trend likely to continue,627
which suggests that the industry’s ability to keep pace with
demand will be reduced by the capital needed to meet
regulatory requirements.
Furthermore, these regulatoryrelated investments impede the industry’s ability to make
domestic refineries more flexible in their inputs, such as adding
more heavy-crude processing capacity.
The ability and
incentive to invest in innovation are also crowded out: “Almost
all that is changing today is driven by environmental
regulation, causing refiners to tweak the existing processes.
The technology introduced in the last 15 years has been
centered on catalyst improvement, not new processes.”628
If refineries in the United States cannot meet domestic
demand, of course, the United States might be able to import
gasoline from foreign refineries.629 European refineries often
produce a surplus of gasoline, primarily because of Europe’s
greater demand for diesel fuel for passenger vehicles and, to be
sure, the United States has imported significant amounts of
gasoline from Europe in the past decades.630 Some refineries
outside the United States have significant cost advantages
626

Mouawad, supra note 577.
FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 197 (“Future supply increments are
expected to come from expansion of existing refineries and increased reliance on
imported refined products rather than the opening of new refineries.”).
628
LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 5; Jones, supra note 116, at xxi (noting that
regulatory product specifications are one of the factors which “has a significant
influence on the prioritization of technological development within the industry”).
629
Gasoline imports rose during the 1990s, from 4.7% of supply in 1992 to
9.7% in 2004. FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 59. The FTC expects
imports to grow further in the future. FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 61.
630
See Alexei Barrionuevo, Europe Drives Up Gas Exports, Keeping U.S.
Pump Prices Low, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2002, at A1.
627
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because of lower labor and regulatory costs. For example, in
the early 1970s—before much of the Clean Air Act’s impact—
refineries in the Caribbean had a forty to sixty cent per barrel
cost advantage over U.S. Gulf Coast refineries.631 In some
cases, these cost advantages can make imports of gasoline
competitive despite the increased transportation costs.
Boutique fuel specifications, however, reduce the ability of
foreign refineries to export gasoline or blendstocks to the U.S.
market. There is, thus, some question about whether imports
of gasoline and blendstocks will be able to expand significantly
if the growth of U.S. refinery capacity begins to lag behind the
growth of demand.
4. Cumulative Market Impacts
These negative regulatory market externalities have
weakened the gasoline market’s competitive forces.
Consequently, the market is slower to adjust to supply
disruptions, less likely to produce arbitrage opportunities, and
more insulated from market pressures for innovation. While
the refining industry is competitive when market concentration
is measured against a national market, with relatively low
standard measures of concentration,632 the same is not true of
specific markets.
For example, the California market,
separated from the rest of the country by both geographic
isolation and the CARB boutique fuel specifications, is quite
concentrated. Indeed, before the CARB specifications, the
standard measure of market concentration (HHI)633 fell from
1,434 in 1985 to 1,184 in 1990, but rose again to 1,475 in 2003
after the CARB specifications were introduced. It would have
been significantly higher had the FTC not forced divestitures of
For
several refineries during mergers in that period.634
example, the FTC calculated that the Exxon/Mobil and
Chevron/Texaco mergers would have produced an HHI of 2,377

631

NPC, FACTORS AFFECTING, supra note 61, at 6-7.
FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 191.
633
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a “commonly accepted measure of market
concentration. It is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in
a market, and then summing the resulting numbers. The HHI number can range from
close to zero to 10,000.”
Investopedia.com, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hhi.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
634
FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 196.
632
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for the CARB market in the absence of the divestitures.635
Moreover, the boutique fuel specifications limit competition
from foreign refineries.636
While there are reasons to be skeptical of the FTC’s
analyses of market competitiveness, the point is not whether
any particular energy company merger should proceed.
Rather, the point is that more sophisticated analyses of the
gasoline market, analyses which pay attention to fuel
specifications and pipeline connections, suggest that the
market is less competitive than the national statistics indicate.
Because much of the data necessary to evaluate the
competitiveness of submarkets is proprietary and unavailable
to the public, we cannot directly test this hypothesis. The
available evidence, however, comports with our analysis.
Why does this matter? The total impact of the various
environmental regulations described above is more than the
mere sum of its parts. These combined trends, together with
the other industry and general economic trends noted earlier,
suggest that the United States depends on a smaller number of
larger refineries clustered in fewer geographic locations and
connected by fewer pipelines than it would without these
policies. Of course, environmental regulations are hardly the
only cause of this situation. Indeed, we contend that the
current situation stems from bad policies and industry trends
spanning the entire twentieth century. However, on the
margin, environmental regulations have exacerbated these
other trends, leaving the United States dependent on a refinery
infrastructure more vulnerable to natural disasters, terrorist
attacks, and industrial accidents than it would be if different
environmental policies had been pursued.
C.

Incentives for Fragmentation: Gasoline and the
Structure of the Clean Air Act

Two structural features of the Clean Air Act frame the
context in which regulators design the programs they
implement.
First, the Act establishes national ambient
635
Id. at 197; see also KEITH LEFFLER & BARRY PULLIAM, PRELIMINARY
REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL REGARDING CALIFORNIA GASOLINE PRICES, at
chart 7 (1999) (noting that the seven largest refiners of California gasoline had a total
market share of 95% in the late 1990s).
636
See, e.g., Stock Report, Valero Energy, MORNINGSTAR, supra note 616, at 2
(stating that “the limitation of refined product imports because of new EPA
regulations” makes domestic refiners’ stocks more attractive).
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standards.637 These standards are generally to be achieved
through SIPs, largely drafted by state environmental
agencies.638 The state agencies must demonstrate through
EPA-approved emissions models that their SIPs’ combined
restrictions will yield compliance with the national ambient
standards and other requirements of the Clean Air Act.639
Thus, states must achieve the relevant ambient standard by
effectively allocating the emissions among the sources
(including new sources) within the state’s jurisdiction.640 The
ability to allocate additional emissions is valuable, because a
state that cannot provide for emissions from new or expanding
sources will be shut off from economic growth.641
Second, the Clean Air Act treats mobile and stationary
sources differently.642 Stationary sources are subjected to
national technological requirements as well as highly specific
operating restrictions included in the SIPs.643 As significant
stationary emissions sources, refineries are heavily regulated
under the Clean Air Act and emissions controls erect more
barriers to entry, blocking new refineries.644
Until the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, mobilesource pollution control primarily involved the EPA regulating
tailpipe emissions when new cars left the factory.645 States
enjoy very limited authority over vehicle emissions systems,
primarily to prevent fragmentation of the automobile market.646
637
This paragraph draws on Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew
Dorchak, Regulation by Litigation: The EPA’s Regulating of Heavy-Duty Diesel
Engines, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 403, 408-09 (2004) (describing basic framework of Clean
Air Act regulation).
638
Andrew P. Morriss, The Politics of the Clean Air Act, in POLITICAL
ENVIRONMENTALISM, GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 263 (Terry L. Anderson ed.,
2000) (overview of SIP process).
639
See Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 637, at 415-21 (overview of
EPA modeling).
640
States cannot allow deterioration of better-than-standard ambient
conditions to the ambient standard and there are qualifications necessary with respect
to toxics pollutants as well. These are beyond the scope of this article.
641
Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 637, at 408-09.
642
Id. at 412-15.
643
Id. at 412.
644
See NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 41 (“The ongoing requirement for
environmental expenditures coupled with the need to make significant investments for
product quality changes will result in capital expenditures by the industry approaching
the maximum historical levels.”).
645
Calvert, Heywood, Sawyer & Seinfeld, supra note 133, at 37-42 (noting
that most of the improvement in mobile source emissions from 1970 to 1990 came from
measures in the design of engines and exhaust systems).
646
Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 637, at 412-13.
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Consequently, the improvements in mobile-source emissions
were largely driven by EPA action, with California contributing
through its unique authority to impose additional exhaustsystem controls.647
Although states may also impose transportation
controls, these are politically unpopular and rarely used.648
Instead, states more commonly adopt inspection and
maintenance (I&M) programs, which are also unpopular and
rarely effective.649 As a result, a state’s primary politically
feasible means of reducing mobile-source emissions today is
regulation of gasoline blends sold within the state.650
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the EPA faced an
increasingly serious regulatory problem with respect to ozone.
“Of the 29 urban areas required by the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 to submit State Implementation Plans, 27
were unable to submit plans that showed attainment by the
mandated date of 1998.”651 This sparked interest in new
methods of regulation, including a focus on fuel composition.652
The ozone problem proved technologically difficult to solve,
because ozone production by its precursors depends on a
variety of conditions.653 Moreover, the scant knowledge about
actual fleet emissions “leads to substantial uncertainties in the
Nevertheless, the 1990
calculations of emissions.”654
647

See Morriss, supra note 638.
Morriss, Yandle & Dorchak, supra note 637, at 412-13.
649
See Todd A. Stewart, E-Check: A Dirty Word in Ohio’s Clean Air Debate—
Ohio’s Battle over Automobile Emissions Testing, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 265, 285-96 (2001)
(describing battles over I&M program in Ohio). Nonetheless, even ineffective I&M
programs generate credits in the EPA’s mobile source models. On the ineffectiveness of
I&M programs, see NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 96 (“I&M
can, in principle, detect a malfunctioning control system. In practice, however, the test
has been too simplified in most locations to detect more than a few possible
malfunctions.”).
650
Little attention was paid to this until the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
authorized fuel regulation.
651
NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 17.
652
Id. at 18 (“With the persistence of the ozone-pollution problem comes the
need to develop new and innovative approaches to lowering ozone-precursor emissions.
The federal RFG program is but one example of a new approach that is being
promulgated to address this need.”).
653
See id. at 23 (“[T]he rate of ozone formation is a complex and variable
function of the concentrations of VOC and NOX as well as meteorological conditions. As
a result, establishing the relative benefits of VOC and NOX emission controls can be a
difficult and challenging task.”); id. at 23-29 (explanation of NOX/VOC interaction); id.
at 69 (“[N]ot only does ozone formation respond differently to different VOC species,
but it will often respond differently to the same compound in different locations or
during different episodes at the same location.”).
654
Id. at 66.
648
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Amendments required states to revise their SIPs to bring ozone
nonattainment areas into attainment by statutory deadlines
and set interim targets.655 In addition, states could “opt in” to
the mandatory RFG program as one means of reducing ozone
precursor emissions.656 The EPA could still require delays in
such opt-ins, however, if delays would help maintain sufficient
supplies of RFG gasoline for the mandatory markets.657
Because of the political unpalatability of serious I&M programs
and driving restrictions, states had few options beyond
boutique fuel requirements.
Regrettably, some of these mandates were imposed
without supporting data. For example, “[w]hen the 1990 Clean
Air Act Amendments were passed, there was little quantitative
information on the relation between fuel composition and
emissions, especially regarding oxygenates, on which to base
prescriptions for changes in fuel properties that would reduce
the ozone-forming potential of emissions.”658 But once these
programs are entrenched, they are difficult to dislodge,659 even
when environmental benefits prove elusive.660 For example, the
requirement that ethanol be blended into gasoline nets no
655

NPC, 1990S, supra note 63, at 9 (“States are to use the existing State
Implementation Plan (SIP) process to impose the necessary measures to bring their
nonattainment areas into compliance by [the 1990 Act deadlines]. States with
moderate, serious, severe, and extreme ozone nonattainment areas must achieve
interim reductions in VOC emissions of 15 percent by 1996 and 3 percent per year
thereafter until attainment is reached.”).
656
Id. at 12 (Los Angeles, San Diego, Houston, Chicago, Milwaukee,
Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Hartford).
657
Id. (On application of a governor, another area can opt in to the RFG
program effective January 1, 1995, but the EPA can delay it for up to three years if
there is insufficient domestic capacity for RFG production.). Refiners were concerned
about opt-ins, telling the NPC’s consultant that there was “a need for cautious
management of opt-ins” and that they saw “the potential for uncontrolled actions by
state and local governments seriously crippling the industry’s ability to meet
compliance requirements.” Id. at 7.
658
Calvert, Heywood, Sawyer & Seinfeld, supra note 133, at 43. “[I]n
retrospect we see that oxygenates represent a reasonable approach to limit CO
emissions and maintain octane ratings in the face of other composition changes but
appear to offer negligible benefits in terms of decreasing atmospheric ozone formation.”
Id.
659
See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 649 (discussing difficulties in ending an I&M
program in Ohio once established).
660
PEARSON, supra note 132, at 88-89 (“Adding oxygenates to gasoline reduced
hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide in both current and older vehicles, but had no
significant effect in more modern vehicles. One reason could be that modern vehicles
have much lower hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emissions because of their efficient
exhaust catalyst systems. There was no significant effect of adding oxygenates on
emissions of nitrogen oxides except for low-aromatic fuels, where the addition of MTBE
increased NOX.”).
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environmental benefits,661 but provides important economic
Moreover,
benefits for politically powerful interests.662
mandating specific fuel ingredients has stunted technological
development. Ethanol and MTBE, for example, both boost
octane and compete with refining processes like catalytic
In
cracking that can raise octane more economically.663
addition, gasoline characteristics may increase pollution in one
vehicle while reducing it in another.664
Moreover, both federal and state environmental
regulators must balance allocating emissions among stationary
and mobile sources. Permission to emit is valuable, and
emissions allocated to one source are unavailable for use by
another. A state seeking new industry must allocate the new
polluters sufficient permits to emit. But if the state’s emissions
are fully allocated, it must reduce existing emissions in order to
permit a new source. In the absence of markets, this can occur
in only two ways: (1) the state must reduce an existing
stationary source’s emissions, taking a valuable right away
from an existing source, or (2) the state must acquire emissions
credits by altering the EPA’s calculation of mobile-source
emissions by adopting more stringent emissions controls,
imposing gasoline formulation requirements, transportation
controls, or an I&M program. Transportation controls and
I&M programs impose direct, politically unpopular costs on
automobile owners. Emissions controls, on the other hand,
raise the cost of new cars in a way that is hidden from car
buyers, and formulation requirements raise the price of
gasoline (as we discuss below), while hiding the cost of this
measure from consumers. Predictably, regulators find the
661
Calvert, Heywood, Sawyer & Seinfeld, supra note 133, at 43 (“The addition
of ethanol to gasoline is generally counterproductive with respect to ozone formation.”);
David Pimental & Tad W. Patzek, Ethanol Production Using Corn, Switchgrass, and
Wood; Biodiesel Production Using Soybeans and Sunflower, 14 NAT. RESOURCES RES.
65 (2005) (calculating ethanol’s net energy benefits as negative). The theory behind the
oxygenate requirement was that introducing oxygen into the fuel would ensure more
complete burning of the hydrocarbons, leading to less CO and more CO2 and H2O, while
reducing HC emissions. LEFFLER, supra note 40, at 145.
662
See Adler, supra note 158.
663
NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 105-06 (“In general,
those processes [e.g., cracking] can be more economical than those that produce
oxygenates; and thus, oxygenates were not initially the additive of choice for enhancing
the octane number in fuels . . . .”).
664
TAMINIAU, supra note 38, at 218 (“[C]hanges in a given property may lower
the emissions of one pollutant but may increase those of another . . . [and in] some
cases, results also depended on vehicle category,” with changes in fuel improving
emissions from some types of vehicles but not from others.).
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latter two methods more politically acceptable than the former
two.
The structure of the Clean Air Act’s regulatory
apparatus made gasoline regulation almost politically
irresistible by 1990. Prior regulatory efforts had focused
elsewhere, making additional regulation of tailpipe emissions,
for example, even more costly as regulations moved up the
marginal cost curve. The need to allow for new emissions from
stationary sources created pressure to gain emissions
reductions from mobile sources, and fuel regulation was the
most politically attractive of the available options. Fuel
regulation avoided imposing costs on the auto manufacturers,
imposed primarily hidden costs on consumers, and offered
refiners the prospect of a level playing field surrounded by a
regulatory fence that could deter would-be competitors through
higher capital costs.
The fuel requirements also give regulators something to
“sell” in the political marketplace. As the fuel mandates
become increasingly complex, and are largely buried in the
details of poorly indexed and massive SIPs,665 it seems likely
that they will evolve toward specifications designed to take
account of the capacities of incumbent refineries in particular
markets purely through technical dialogues between regulators
and refineries. Political pressures can accelerate this trend;
recall how quickly the energy regulations on price mutated in
the 1970s.666 As gasoline formulation requirements proliferate
and become more complex, they can hardly avoid the political
imperatives to evolve in a similar way.
Refiners and automobile manufacturers share some, but
not all, interests. Both have an enormous investment in the
future of internal combustion engine-powered automobiles.
Auto makers and gasoline refiners have long recognized this
interdependency and have, on a number of occasions,

665

See Morriss, supra note 638 (discussing SIP’s massive size and complexity).
LANE, supra note 299, at 55-56 (“The FEA and DOE amended the
regulations through formal rulemaking over 200 times in the seven years following
their formal promulgation in January 1974, and many of these changes were complex,
multi-part amendments. . . . In addition to the regulations themselves, the various
administrators of the regulations issued dozens of formal rulings on such complex
matters as the definition of ‘property’ and the ‘refiner price formula.’ Furthermore, the
Office of General Counsel provided over 2,800 formal interpretations of the rules to
various individual firms. Finally, some 1,600 final decisions regarding exceptions,
appeals, and other petitions for special relief or redress were issued by DOE’s Office of
Hearings and Appeals (OHA) and its predecessor offices.”).
666
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attempted cooperative efforts to address emissions.667 Yet each
prefers that the other incur the costs of environmental
regulations on auto emissions.668 For example, an analysis of a
joint oil/auto company emissions control project in Europe
noted disagreements over the proper allocation of pollution
control responsibilities, with the oil industry arguing “that if
they have to make the precise fuels the car industry wants the
fuel will be so expensive that ‘you will have to buy it in little
bottles in the pharmacy.’”669
Of course, government policies have rarely been
explicitly aimed at causing market fragmentation. Yet the
market appears fragmented, with the federal government
rejecting the conclusion that gasoline markets are national,
and the FTC looking at transportation costs and refinery
667

Ford and Mobil formed the Inter-Industry Emission Control Program
(IIEC) in 1967 in response to pressures to improve air quality. “The objective of the
IIEC was to develop a powerplant and emission-control system that not only lowered
emissions, but also improved fuel economy, vehicle driveability, and vehicle durability.”
J. ROBERT MONDT, CLEANER CARS: THE HISTORY AND TECHNOLOGY OF EMISSION
CONTROL SINCE THE 1960S, at 5 (2000). The project had an initial budget of $7 million
and a three-year plan. By 1971, it included thirteen companies, including six oil
companies and seven car companies (only Ford of the Big Three). Id. at 45. A second
stage began in 1974 and was completed in 1977, spending a total of $32 million during
the two stages. Id. at 46.
[GM] elected not to be a partner in IIEC, preferring to develop emission
control technologies using its own internal resources, including personnel and
facilities. Chrysler also did not join the IIEC program, electing to rely on
internal resources and considerable support from its supplier base. Concerns
relating to antitrust laws perhaps were an additional factor in these
decisions.
Id. at 47.
In 1989, “the auto and oil industries initiated the Auto/Oil Air Quality
Improvement Research Program (AQIRP) . . . The purpose of AQIRP was to develop
data on potential improvements in vehicular emissions and air quality that could be
realized through the use of RFG, various alternative fuels, and the development of
automotive technology.” NAS, OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL, supra note 142, at 110.
AQIRP involved 3,000+ emissions tests, twenty-six reformulated fuels, two reference
gasolines, twenty 1989 cars and light-duty trucks, and fourteen older vehicles from
1983-1985. Id. at 133.
668
A report on negotiations over the final report of the joint oil-auto program
to develop technological data to inform regulators in the EU illustrates the tradeoffs
between emissions controls based on fuel changes and those based on engine changes:
[T]ensions arose between the two industries who were fighting hard to get
the most results favorable for their industry. It often was a win-lose situation
where improvements for the auto industry meant a loss for the oil industry
and vice-versa. . . . [The discussions] was also described as “physically,
mentally and morally very hard” and the competition between the two
industries was compared to European warfare.
TAMINIAU, supra note 38, at 217.
669
Id. at 202 (footnotes omitted).
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capacity for specific blends as factors in defining regional
markets.670 A partial explanation may lie in the opportunity for
a “bootleggers and Baptists” coalition inherent in the
environmental regulatory scheme. As economist Bruce Yandle
explained in formulating the theory, a “bootleggers and
Baptists” coalition is analogous to the combination of interests
supporting laws barring alcohol sales on Sunday.671
Bootleggers support such laws because they restrict
competition from legal sellers of alcohol. Baptists support the
laws because of their general opposition to alcohol sales. While
the bootleggers and Baptists disagree over the appropriate
policy concerning many aspects of alcohol—Baptists would be
more likely to support harsh penalties for bootlegging, for
example, while bootleggers would not—their interests overlap
with respect to Sunday liquor laws. Not only is their coalition
larger than either group individually, but the Baptists provide
a crucial legitimate rationale for the laws benefiting the
bootleggers.
In the case of gasoline markets, the “bootleggers” are
the stationary sources and automobile manufacturers, while
the “Baptists” are the environmentalists, whose faith672
includes a creed that largely rejects the power of market
incentives to improve environmental quality without detailed
government regulations. Both auto makers and stationary
sources have a strong interest in seeing air quality
improvements “purchased” through regulations on someone
else.673 Thus, shifting the cost of controlling emissions to
drivers and refiners appeals to both groups. Doing so directly,
however, has the potential to provoke a political response,
while regulating fuel content in a manner that conceals the
cost to the public through “clean fuel” mandates is less likely to
draw opposition.674 Although refiners currently bear the brunt
670

FTC, MERGERS, supra note 5, at 23-24.
See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory
Economist, REGULATION, May/June 1983, at 12, 13.
672
See Robert Nelson, Environmental Religion: A Theological Critique, 55
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 51 (2004) (describing environmentalism’s similarities to more
traditional religions).
673
One example is the automobile industry’s effort to reduce fuel volatility.
See NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 93 (“There is disagreement between the
automobile and oil companies about the vehicle performance benefits of lower DI
gasoline.”).
674
See, e.g., id. at 37 (“[S]ome costs [of fuel regulations] may not be apparent
to consumers. Examples include the fuel economy loss from oxygenate addition to
gasoline and the shareholder value lost from low capital returns to the industry.”).
671
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of the costs imposed through fuel regulations, their reward is a
regulatory “fence” around the industry that prevents new
entry, allowing them to pass along the costs of the massive
investments necessary to meet the new fuel specifications.675
III.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While the specifics of the fragmented gasoline markets
described above rest on a regulatory history unique to the
United States, other countries are following the U.S. lead in
modifying fuel composition for environmental reasons.676 And
to be sure, most industrialized nations have had distorted
energy markets since World War II, with each choosing to warp
its markets in its own fashion, making the problem of negative
regulatory externalities a general one. Indeed, the tempest
currently brewing in gasoline markets threatens to worsen as
five related regulatory and market conditions loom along the
horizon:
(1) Refineries are becoming more complex and costly as refining
technology evolves to meet the combined demands of regulators and
modern engines.
(2) The number of refineries is declining, even as their individual
capacity increases, due, in part, to the increasing complexity and
cost of refining technology. As a result, gasoline supplies are
vulnerable to unplanned outages at refineries.
(3) The pipeline interconnections between refineries and markets are
insufficient to support a national market.
(4) Boutique fuel requirements prevent gasoline blended for one
location from being sold in other locations.
(5) Reduced inventories leave little slack in the system for
unplanned refining shutdowns.

The confluence of these conditions leaves the gasoline market
vulnerable to hurricanes, accidents, crude supply interruptions,
terrorists, and dictators.677 These vulnerabilities, in turn,
jeopardize market stability, threatening consumers with price
675
This seems particularly likely in light of the EPA’s unsuccessful attempt to
build a fence around the U.S. market through its foreign refiners’ rule.
676
A. Cluer, Gasoline Processes, in 2 MODERN PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 37, at 83, 85.
677
Andy Webb-Vidal, US Is ‘Not Ready’ for Chávez Oil Ban Threat, FIN. TIMES
(London), June 14, 2006 (reporting unreleased Government Accountability Office
report highlighting U.S. vulnerability to oil pressure from Venezuela).
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hikes and fuel shortages. Lest we overstate our case, this is
not a doomsday scenario, but merely recognition of the
compounded problems confronting the nation’s gasoline
markets.
As we have discussed, these problems have long,
complicated histories. Recall that much of America’s energy
policy flows from its own blend of political, industrial, and
regulatory interests. The Arab oil embargo in the early 1970s
combined with the advance of environmentalism and helped
undermine industry efforts to develop new technologies or
build new refineries. As regulators convinced the industry and
environmental advocates that market barriers best served the
country’s economic and ecological interests, the economic
regulatory schemes became politically entrenched, despite their
subsequent failure. These then exacerbated the burden of
increasingly stringent environmental regulations adopted
through the 1980s and 1990s.
Gasoline formula regulation is, we have argued, an
artifact of both the structure of the Clean Air Act and the long
history of gasoline regulation. The regulations fragmented the
market and effectively de-commodified gasoline.
Fuel
composition regulations can also reduce gasoline supply by
making it uneconomical to convert portions of a barrel of crude
into gasoline.678 Mandating fuel blends ignores the fact that
most mobile-source emissions come from a fraction of the total
vehicle pool.679 But altering fuels affects all vehicles, and it
remains an open question whether doing so is a cost-effective
way to address a problem primarily caused by a small minority
of vehicles. Consider as well that customizing petroleum
blends is also a way for refiners to distinguish their products.
Some refiners are already trying to distinguish their gasolines
on the basis of environmental quality.680 To the extent that

678
See NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 99 (“For a 50ºF DI reduction, 10 to
15% of the heavier gasoline molecules must be removed and either cracked to lighter
molecules or replaced. . . . [T]he NPC believes that, in general, refiners would tend to
remove the heavy molecules from the gasoline pool and seek other outlets for these
molecules, such as to distillate or export . . . [and cause] a gasoline volume loss of as
much as 10-15%.”).
679
Calvert, Heywood, Sawyer & Seinfeld, supra note 133, at 40.
680
Jones, supra note 116, at xxi (“Where companies have sought to
distinguish the quality of their fuels in recent years it has . . . [been] more usually on
the basis of environmental quality.”).
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market fragmentation restricts such competition, it potentially
forestalls market forces that promote environmental quality.681
Having acknowledged such problems and traced their
heritage, policy makers should begin to consider ways to
mitigate future disruption and damage. One lesson from the
tortured history of gasoline regulation is that sending
regulators home might be the simplest way to avoid further
problems. But there are lessons as well for those unwilling to
rely on markets alone. In the most general terms, of course,
the gasoline market must slowly be defragmented as
consumers, producers, and policy makers treat gasoline as a
true commodity in need of a deep and broad market. To
accomplish this, we do not advocate installing another layer of
top-down federal agency micromanagement. Although we
recognize the entrenched political interests involved, the
problem need not have only a governmental solution; the
government’s abysmal record in anticipating fuel trends
counsels against relying on central planning solutions.682
Furthermore, the dangers of federally mandated technical
specifications are apparent from the record. By creating
incentives to shift pollution reductions to fuel specifications at
the time when the refining industry became most susceptible to
market fragmentation, Congress and the EPA have vastly
complicated the gasoline market. If Congress had instead
focused on creating incentives for emissions reductions, rather
than specifying technologies, gasoline refiners and auto
manufacturers would have been drawn to work together to
develop methods of capturing those incentives.
Rather than focus on new federal solutions, the gasoline
market’s regulatory schemes should be streamlined to
minimize their arcane complexity, and harmonized with
consistent, long-term policy agendas to limit regulators and
market forces working at cross-purposes. In light of the five
regulatory and market conditions listed above, we recommend
removing barriers to expanding and diversifying refinery
capacity and making clean fuels more desirable to producers

681
See 2 BRADLEY, supra note 74, at 1264-68 (discussing anti-environmental
impacts of environmental regulation).
682
Petroleum demand forecasting in particular is remarkably imperfect. Both
OPEC and the International Energy Agency failed to foresee the rate at which world
demand for oil grew in 2004, for example, estimating a 1.5% increase in demand when
actual demand grew by 3.3%, more than twice forecasts. FTC, GASOLINE PRICE
CHANGES, supra note 9, at 26.
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and consumers alike.683 For example, there are moves to
standardize elements of refinery design by reducing costs
through the use of off-the-shelf components rather than custom
ones.684 Fragmenting the market for gasoline reduces the
opportunities for such standardization. Regulators could “fast
track” approval of designs based on such components,
encouraging the trend.685
Encouraging investment that deepens the market can
also help. Valero, a major U.S. refiner, made significant
investments in the ability to process lower-quality “sour”
crudes in recent years, investments that paid off by allowing
Valero to buy cheaper crude.686 More refiners might be
following Valero’s path but for the expense of regulatory
compliance.
Unfortunately, fuel regulation and political
interests have diverted investment away from technology that
could improve environmental quality and funneled it into
technology like ethanol and MTBE, whose environmental
virtues are dubious at best.687 Not only is such investment a
waste, but continuing such regulatory diversions threatens the
overall market. An important step would be to eliminate the
ethanol mandate and replace it with a performance standard.
Similarly, adopting a strategy similar to that used in the lead
phaseout for sulfur reductions, rather than imposing a uniform
sulfur standard in a short period as the EPA has done, could
spur both technological developments to reduce sulfur and
increase refining capacity by allowing refineries to adapt more
economically to the requirements.688
683

The best incentive is to remove the disincentives and to allow market
processes to work. Politically, of course, a laissez faire approach to energy issues seems
unlikely. The most we can realistically hope for is a set of policies that do relatively
little harm.
684
Jones, supra note 116, at xx.
685
The permitting process takes significant time. See, e.g., NPC, ADEQUACY,
supra note 59, at 134 (noting six to eighteen months necessary for permit applications
and state agency review); id. at 136-40 (describing overall process times).
686
Valero Energy Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6-15 (Mar. 14, 2005),
available at http://eol.edgar-online.com/edgar_conv_html/2005/03/14/0000950134-05004779.html.
687
Agencies tend not to recognize the opportunity cost of compliance. For
example, one FTC report concluded that the additional costs of producing boutique
fuels “made the countervailing cost savings that refineries found through technological
and other advances even more important in keeping the price of gasoline relatively low
during the 1990s.” FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 58. This ignores
the fact that these savings are not the result of the regulation and thus would have
been implemented regardless of the increased costs. Such savings thus are not
“countervailing,” but merely fortuitous.
688
See NPC, ADEQUACY, supra note 59, at 27.
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Finally, deregulatory and market-based steps should be
taken to allow investors to build and expand refineries and
pipelines. Recent damage from Gulf Coast hurricanes should
prompt the industry and regulators to consider the strengths
and weaknesses of the fuel-transportation infrastructure, with
an emphasis on new and secure methods of transport designed
to withstand multiple emergency refinery closings. The EPA’s
shift away from allowing refineries to trade off pollution
increases from expansions against offsetting reductions from
the same plant and the New Source Review litigation689 against
refiners slow increases in capacity through expansion of
existing refineries’ capacity.690 Refiners have identified interest
groups’ court challenges to permits as a significant barrier to
expansion of refinery capacity691 and such challenges could
certainly be resolved more quickly. Likewise, more attention
needs to be paid to the rigidity of boutique fuel requirements
that prevent blends in one city from being moved to another
during a crisis. Doubt remains as to whether all of the touted
gains from boutique fuels are even realized.
Removing
pollutants like lead and sulfur from the fuel supply provides
net environmental benefits, assuming the octane enhancers
that replaced lead are not later found to cause even worse
problems. But with respect to the volatility and other more
recent specifications met by altering the blendstocks used to
formulate particular gasoline blends, the gains are offset by
emissions from the substitute uses of the displaced
blendstocks.
Although the EPA attempted to prevent
“dumping” of high-volatility blendstocks and refiners can alter
the mix of hydrocarbons produced in refineries to some degree,
there remains an empirical question about whether these
changes improved environmental quality.
Empirical questions can often be answered, if anyone
cares to spend the time and money on research to do so. There
have been some efforts at such research. Concerns over
regulation prompted many firms in the auto and refining
industries to join together to examine the technical details of
the fuel-engine interaction and its impact on emissions.
Fourteen oil companies, together with the “Big Three” U.S.
auto makers, formed the Auto/Oil Air Quality Improvement

689
690
691

See, e.g., id. at 140-41 (discussing NSR issues).
Id. at 27.
Id. at 118 (discussing impact of environmental justice litigation).
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Research Program (AQIRP) in 1989 “to develop data on
fuel/vehicle systems” to study emissions, with modeling focused
on ozone and economic analysis of alternatives.692
The
participants ultimately spent $40 million on the program.693
The AQIRP research produced data suggesting that the impact
of gasolines’ composition varied considerably across vehicle
types and ages.694 It also showed that at least some changes
traded decreases in one pollutant for increases in another,695
while others had unambiguously positive impacts on
Encouraging such research through clear
emissions.696
restrictions on antitrust actions could vastly expand our
knowledge of how fuel composition affects the environment.
More speculatively, one wonders what might happen if
U.S. gasoline markets were not fragmented. There are clear
relationships between fuel properties and engine emissions (as
well as between fuel properties and other aspects of engine
performance).
In the absence of gasoline composition
regulation, how might these be addressed? A hint of this
alternative future lies in the ASTM fuel specification (D4814)
created in 1988 and modified in 1994 by the private standards
organization. This specification includes multiple classes of
fuels.697 The trend in the United States is away from using it

692
MONDT, supra note 667, at 199; Blackmore, supra note 92, at 247 (“The
project aimed to develop data to help regulators meet the US goals for cleaner air, and
was the largest and most comprehensive of the type ever undertaken. . . . [T]he
project . . . embraced not only vehicle fuel-emission measurements but also air-quality
modeling and economic analysis.”). The program involved Chrysler, Ford, and GM plus
Amoco, Arco, Ashland, BP, Chevron, Conoco, Exxon, Marathon, Mobil, Phillips, Shell,
Sun, Texaco, and Unocal. PEARSON, supra note 132, at 83. This cooperation was
motivated in part by fear that alternative fuels (e.g., methanol) would be mandated
based on their perception as “clean” fuels. “Automobile and oil companies, traditionally
uncomfortable partners, joined forces in order to quantify the possible improvements in
emissions due to changes in conventional fuel composition.” Id. at 82.
693
PEARSON, supra note 132, at 85.
694
Id. at 87 (“Reduction of gasoline aromatics content from 45% to 20%
produced the interesting result of hydrocarbon emissions being reduced by some 6% for
current vehicles and increased by 14% for older vehicles. . . . Nitrogen oxides were
reduced by 11% in older vehicles, yet there was no significant effect in current
vehicles.”).
695
Id. at 88 (“Reducing gasoline olefin content from 20% to 6% increased
hydrocarbons by 6% and decreased nitrogen oxides by 6% for both current and older
fleets.”).
696
Id. (“Reducing sulfur . . . from 450 ppm to 50 ppm reduced all pollutants in
current fleets substantially by improving the efficiency of the catalytic converters.
Hydrocarbon emissions were reduced by 18%, carbon monoxide by 19%, and nitrogen
oxides by 8%. Air toxics were reduced by 10%.”).
697
Blackmore, supra note 92, at 246 (six vapor-pressure classes and five
vapor-lock classes).
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due to Clean Air Act fuel requirements, but the reliance on a
private standards organization is an alternative path for
resolving the conflict between the gasoline refiners and auto
manufacturers over responsibility for emissions reductions.698
Market-based measures also have the potential to produce
innovative contractual measures that improve air quality.
Creative contracting is important, both for consumers of fuels
such as trucking companies and airlines, and for refiners
seeking stable, long-term supplies of crude.699 Thus, given the
dangers of a highly fragmented boutique gasoline market with
depleted refinery capacity and low inventories, market-driven
incentives should be developed to ameliorate future risks and
economic disasters. In the meantime, burdensome economic
and environmental regulatory entanglements should be
loosened to spark innovation. To borrow a line from country
singer Terri Clark, “Let ’em go ’cause I don’t need no strings;
just give me a road and a little gasoline.”700

698
See Morriss & Dudley, supra note 314, at 355-56 (discussing potential roles
of private standards-setting organizations).
699
See, e.g., FTC, GASOLINE PRICE CHANGES, supra note 9, at 30 (describing
importance of futures contracts as hedges against price increases and for refiners’
planning).
700
TERRI CLARK, A Little Gasoline, on FEARLESS (Mercury Nashville 2000).

